Time is the solution says Iraq's Vice-President
Iraq's Vice-President Adel Abdul Mahdi, Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani "and other Shiite leaders in the government don't share Washington's perception of a downward spiral. They also don't buy the American sense of urgency -- the oft-expressed idea that the new government has only a few months to succeed. Consequently, the many ideas for silver bullets tossed around in the U.S. debate mostly don't interest them.
You could see this in the conversation I joined at Mahdi's suite at the Ritz Carlton hotel. We journalists peppered him with questions about why the formation of a unity government had failed to reduce the violence. We asked about all the options usually talked about in Washington -- from a rewrite of the constitution to a partition of the country; from an international conference to the dispatch of more U.S. troops.
For the most part, our queries were politely and somewhat laconically dismissed. Iraq is not in a civil war, Mahdi said, and doesn't need more U.S. troops. It has a constitution and elected government, and thus there is no need for an international conference. As for constitutional reform, the Shiite and Kurd parties that wrote the charter last year are waiting for proposals from Sunni dissidents. Mahdi added: 'So far we have heard nothing.'
So what is the solution? 'Time -- that is it,' Mahdi replied. 'A nation like Iraq needs time. The elections for a permanent government happened eight months ago. We have been in office a few weeks. The people who we have in office have never governed. These people come from oppression and a bad political system. We can't import ministers to Iraq. There will be many mistakes. The Americans made many mistakes, and Iraqis had to support that.' " [1]
The Pentagon's recently released report to Congress said something similar when it spoke of the new Iraqi government's "inexperience."
"Some Iraqi ministers tend to focus on near-term performance, rather than on long-term capacity building. A lack of effective procedures within the ministries, such as policy development, procurement, and budgeting, was endemic to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, and three years is not enough time to reverse decades of organizational incapacity. This situation should improve with time.
Lack of proper 'tools,' such as information technology, finance systems, and planning capabilities, inhibit the governing of complex issues. The result is that Iraqi planning, budgeting, and execution processes are less than fully effective. IRMO [Iraq Reconstruction Management Office] is currently procuring and developing these tools, but it will take time—years rather than months—before Government of Iraq staff is able to use these tools fully and to manage the ministries to full effectiveness." [2]
sources
[1] The Washington Post. Not Wanted: An Exit Strategy. September 4, 2006.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. p. 13. August 29, 2006.
posted: monday, september 4, 2006, 6:40 PM ET
update: monday, september 4, 2006, 6:46 PM ET
You could see this in the conversation I joined at Mahdi's suite at the Ritz Carlton hotel. We journalists peppered him with questions about why the formation of a unity government had failed to reduce the violence. We asked about all the options usually talked about in Washington -- from a rewrite of the constitution to a partition of the country; from an international conference to the dispatch of more U.S. troops.
For the most part, our queries were politely and somewhat laconically dismissed. Iraq is not in a civil war, Mahdi said, and doesn't need more U.S. troops. It has a constitution and elected government, and thus there is no need for an international conference. As for constitutional reform, the Shiite and Kurd parties that wrote the charter last year are waiting for proposals from Sunni dissidents. Mahdi added: 'So far we have heard nothing.'
So what is the solution? 'Time -- that is it,' Mahdi replied. 'A nation like Iraq needs time. The elections for a permanent government happened eight months ago. We have been in office a few weeks. The people who we have in office have never governed. These people come from oppression and a bad political system. We can't import ministers to Iraq. There will be many mistakes. The Americans made many mistakes, and Iraqis had to support that.' " [1]
The Pentagon's recently released report to Congress said something similar when it spoke of the new Iraqi government's "inexperience."
"Some Iraqi ministers tend to focus on near-term performance, rather than on long-term capacity building. A lack of effective procedures within the ministries, such as policy development, procurement, and budgeting, was endemic to the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein, and three years is not enough time to reverse decades of organizational incapacity. This situation should improve with time.
Lack of proper 'tools,' such as information technology, finance systems, and planning capabilities, inhibit the governing of complex issues. The result is that Iraqi planning, budgeting, and execution processes are less than fully effective. IRMO [Iraq Reconstruction Management Office] is currently procuring and developing these tools, but it will take time—years rather than months—before Government of Iraq staff is able to use these tools fully and to manage the ministries to full effectiveness." [2]
sources
[1] The Washington Post. Not Wanted: An Exit Strategy. September 4, 2006.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. p. 13. August 29, 2006.
posted: monday, september 4, 2006, 6:40 PM ET
update: monday, september 4, 2006, 6:46 PM ET
posted by eric at 5:07 PM
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