The disengagement solution

Edward N. Luttwak of Center for Strategic and International Studies says that "[disengagement] would start with a tactical change: American soldiers would no longer patrol towns and villages, conduct cordon-and-search operations, or man outposts and checkpoints. An end to these tasks would allow the greatest part of the troops in Iraq to head home.
. . . The remaining American forces, including ground units, would hole up within safe and mostly remote bases in Iraq — to support the elected government, deter foreign invasion, dissuade visible foreign intrusions, and strike at any large concentration of jihadis should it emerge. . . . The Americans would operate training programs within safe bases.
. . . The total number of American troops in Iraq — even including any surge — is so small, and their linguistic skills so limited, that they have little effect on day-to-day security. Nor have they really protected Iraqis from one another. At most, the presence of American soldiers in any one place merely diverts attacks elsewhere.
. . . Intelligence is to counterinsurgency what firepower is to conventional warfare, and we just do not have it or the capacity to gather information on our own."

Luttwak also says that America disengaging would cause the Shiites and Sunnis "to find ways to stabilize relations with each other."

Op-ed by Edward N. Luttwak, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

source
Luttwak, Edward N. (The New York Times). February 6, 2007. To Help Iraq, Let It Fend for Itself.

related posting
Sadr's redeployment plan not covered enough / Is war for U.S. almost over? January 23, 2007.

posted: wednesday, february 7, 2007, 5:32 PM ET

tags: iraq withdrawal