Bush plan to increase local political and economic efforts, some skeptical
"SECRETARY RICE: . . . We will further decentralize and diversify our civilian presence in Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. Iraq has a federal government. We must therefore get our civilians out of the embassy, out of the Green Zone, and into the field across Iraq, to support promising local leaders and promising local structures. This will enhance and diversify our chances of success in Iraq.
The mechanism to accomplish this is the provincial reconstruction team, or PRT. The logic behind PRTs is simple: Success in Iraq relies on more than military efforts, it requires robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts across the entire U.S. government to help Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout all Iraq.
We in the State Department fully understand our role in this mission and we are prepared to play it. We are already trying -- we are ready to strengthen, indeed, to surge our civilian efforts. We plan to expand our PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams] in Iraq from 10 to at least 18. In Baghdad we will go from one PRT to six, and in Anbar province, from one to three, because local leaders are taking encouraging steps there to confront violent extremists and to build hope for their people.
To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure that it is closely integrated with our political assistance and our security strategy, I am pleased to announce today that I am appointing Ambassador Tim Carney to the new position of Coordinator for Iraq Transitional Assistance. Ambassador Carney is formerly our Ambassador to Haiti. He has enormous experience in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and development. He will be based in Baghdad where he will coordinate and work closely with his Iraqi counterparts.
. . . In the provinces, it's also important to recognize that not everything -- as important as Baghdad is, not everything rests on Baghdad. One reason that we're diversifying and decentralizing into the provinces and the localities is that you want to strengthen the governance from the bottom up, as well. And we've learned that it is somewhat more effective to be able to deliver governance and economic development and reconstruction at a more local level.
And I think it's starting to have an effect. We've seen it work in Mosul, we've seen it work in Talafar, and as the Secretary said -- as Bob said, in Anbar, we're beginning to get some signs that the tribal sheiks there want to fight the violent extremists. And we've been in Anbar for awhile now working politically. So I think you should think of what the government needs to show in Baghdad, but also the building of governance structures outside of the country [Baghdad?]." [1]
"The front-line operatives in the campaign to stabilize Iraq are the American and Coalition members who comprise the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs. These are relatively small operational units comprised not just of diplomats, but military officers, development policy experts (from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice), and other specialists (in fields such as rule of law, engineering, and oil industry operations) who work closely with Iraqi provincial leaders and the Iraqi communities that they serve. While PRTs dispense money for reconstruction projects, the strategic purpose of these civil-military field teams is both political and economic. By building provincial governments' ability to deliver essential services and other key development projects to local Iraqis, PRTs help to extend the reach of the Iraqi government to all corners of the country and help build the stability necessary to complete the transition to full-Iraqi control." [2]
"The teams consist of U.S. and Coalition Partner members and, depending on the needs of the province, range in size from 35 to 100." [3]
"Many outside experts said the new program will have little impact in the current climate of violence and political stalemate in Iraq.
. . . Administration officials insisted yesterday that long-standing difficulties between the U.S. military and civilian officials, particularly regarding the Provisional Reconstruction Teams, have been resolved. Even as the State Department had difficulty staffing the teams, the Pentagon was reluctant to provide security for them.
The teams, a Rice initiative begun in 2005, are designed to move into areas where violence has been quelled to provide immediate economic and civil affairs assistance so that residents can see tangible improvements in their lives after military action. In many cases, protection for the teams had to be purchased from private security contractors. In a highly critical October audit, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction said the teams had fallen far short of their goals and that as much as 30 percent of their funding had been spent on security costs.
According to a list of 'key tactical shifts' previewed by the White House yesterday, the State Department teams and the military's battalion combat teams will now be integrated "in most areas." [4]
"Whether it is wise to increase the staffing of the teams by a factor of five is likely to be questioned by existing team members, the American official said.
That is because extremely restrictive security regulations have made it difficult for the specialists already on the provincial reconstruction teams, often called P.R.T.’s, to leave their bases and work with Iraqis, the official said.
. . . Oversight agencies have previously reported that the existing teams have had trouble equipping themselves with items as essential as pencils and other office supplies.
The teams also have been criticized for relying heavily on uniformed personnel whose skills are poorly matched with specialized needs in the field. That concern has repeatedly come up because the State Department has had great difficulty persuading civilian officials to accept jobs at the dangerous, isolated and uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.
. . . Beyond their purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to support the counterinsurgency efforts by the United States military." [5]
"Rep. Chet Edwards, a middle-of-the-road Texas Democrat who numbers President Bush among his constituents, did not judge the commander in chief's words about Iraq on Wednesday night through the lens of his party affiliation or personal predispositions.
His standard was set by an Army officer who sent the congressman a powerfully honest, thoughtful and sophisticated 3,800-word memo based on the soldier's experiences in Iraq.
. . . 'Our real goal,' he wrote, 'was to persuade our Iraqi friends and allies to actively and publicly support us . . . to help us tip the balance of public opinion in our favor.' That meant helping them with security and 'civil works projects' and giving them 'prestige by showing publicly that our commander listened to their advice.'
Then these shrewd words: 'We discovered that we were not fighting a military campaign, but a political campaign -- not too different from what a small town mayor might do to win reelection back in the U.S. . . . Fighting terrorists was only something we did when needed, because it interfered with our political objectives. If we could ignore the terrorists, we were winning. If we had to stop our economic and political activities in order to fight terrorists, they were winning.' " [6]
sources
[1] U.S. Department of State. Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January 11, 2007 (quote from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
[2] U.S. Department of State. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Building Iraqi Capacity and Accelerating the Transition to Iraq Self-Reliance. January 11, 2007.
[3] U.S. Department of State. Helping Iraqis Rebuild Iraq: Two Provincial Reconstruction Teams. January 11, 2007.
[4] The Washington Post. Reconstruction Effort to Emphasize Iraqi Jobs. January 11, 2007.
[5] The New York Times. Rebuilding Teams Would Swell Under Bush’s New Iraq Plan. January 15, 2007.
[6] The Washington Post. Wisdom From Down the Chain of Command. January 12, 2007.
posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 10:47 AM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:50 PM ET
tags: iraq bush provincial reconstruction team
The mechanism to accomplish this is the provincial reconstruction team, or PRT. The logic behind PRTs is simple: Success in Iraq relies on more than military efforts, it requires robust political and economic progress. Our military operations must be fully supported and integrated with our civilian and diplomatic efforts across the entire U.S. government to help Iraqis clear, hold and build throughout all Iraq.
We in the State Department fully understand our role in this mission and we are prepared to play it. We are already trying -- we are ready to strengthen, indeed, to surge our civilian efforts. We plan to expand our PRTs [Provincial Reconstruction Teams] in Iraq from 10 to at least 18. In Baghdad we will go from one PRT to six, and in Anbar province, from one to three, because local leaders are taking encouraging steps there to confront violent extremists and to build hope for their people.
To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure that it is closely integrated with our political assistance and our security strategy, I am pleased to announce today that I am appointing Ambassador Tim Carney to the new position of Coordinator for Iraq Transitional Assistance. Ambassador Carney is formerly our Ambassador to Haiti. He has enormous experience in post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction and development. He will be based in Baghdad where he will coordinate and work closely with his Iraqi counterparts.
. . . In the provinces, it's also important to recognize that not everything -- as important as Baghdad is, not everything rests on Baghdad. One reason that we're diversifying and decentralizing into the provinces and the localities is that you want to strengthen the governance from the bottom up, as well. And we've learned that it is somewhat more effective to be able to deliver governance and economic development and reconstruction at a more local level.
And I think it's starting to have an effect. We've seen it work in Mosul, we've seen it work in Talafar, and as the Secretary said -- as Bob said, in Anbar, we're beginning to get some signs that the tribal sheiks there want to fight the violent extremists. And we've been in Anbar for awhile now working politically. So I think you should think of what the government needs to show in Baghdad, but also the building of governance structures outside of the country [Baghdad?]." [1]
"The front-line operatives in the campaign to stabilize Iraq are the American and Coalition members who comprise the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, or PRTs. These are relatively small operational units comprised not just of diplomats, but military officers, development policy experts (from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Justice), and other specialists (in fields such as rule of law, engineering, and oil industry operations) who work closely with Iraqi provincial leaders and the Iraqi communities that they serve. While PRTs dispense money for reconstruction projects, the strategic purpose of these civil-military field teams is both political and economic. By building provincial governments' ability to deliver essential services and other key development projects to local Iraqis, PRTs help to extend the reach of the Iraqi government to all corners of the country and help build the stability necessary to complete the transition to full-Iraqi control." [2]
"The teams consist of U.S. and Coalition Partner members and, depending on the needs of the province, range in size from 35 to 100." [3]
"Many outside experts said the new program will have little impact in the current climate of violence and political stalemate in Iraq.
. . . Administration officials insisted yesterday that long-standing difficulties between the U.S. military and civilian officials, particularly regarding the Provisional Reconstruction Teams, have been resolved. Even as the State Department had difficulty staffing the teams, the Pentagon was reluctant to provide security for them.
The teams, a Rice initiative begun in 2005, are designed to move into areas where violence has been quelled to provide immediate economic and civil affairs assistance so that residents can see tangible improvements in their lives after military action. In many cases, protection for the teams had to be purchased from private security contractors. In a highly critical October audit, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction said the teams had fallen far short of their goals and that as much as 30 percent of their funding had been spent on security costs.
According to a list of 'key tactical shifts' previewed by the White House yesterday, the State Department teams and the military's battalion combat teams will now be integrated "in most areas." [4]
"Whether it is wise to increase the staffing of the teams by a factor of five is likely to be questioned by existing team members, the American official said.
That is because extremely restrictive security regulations have made it difficult for the specialists already on the provincial reconstruction teams, often called P.R.T.’s, to leave their bases and work with Iraqis, the official said.
. . . Oversight agencies have previously reported that the existing teams have had trouble equipping themselves with items as essential as pencils and other office supplies.
The teams also have been criticized for relying heavily on uniformed personnel whose skills are poorly matched with specialized needs in the field. That concern has repeatedly come up because the State Department has had great difficulty persuading civilian officials to accept jobs at the dangerous, isolated and uncomfortable bases in the Iraqi provinces.
. . . Beyond their purely civil duties, the teams will also be expected to support the counterinsurgency efforts by the United States military." [5]
"Rep. Chet Edwards, a middle-of-the-road Texas Democrat who numbers President Bush among his constituents, did not judge the commander in chief's words about Iraq on Wednesday night through the lens of his party affiliation or personal predispositions.
His standard was set by an Army officer who sent the congressman a powerfully honest, thoughtful and sophisticated 3,800-word memo based on the soldier's experiences in Iraq.
. . . 'Our real goal,' he wrote, 'was to persuade our Iraqi friends and allies to actively and publicly support us . . . to help us tip the balance of public opinion in our favor.' That meant helping them with security and 'civil works projects' and giving them 'prestige by showing publicly that our commander listened to their advice.'
Then these shrewd words: 'We discovered that we were not fighting a military campaign, but a political campaign -- not too different from what a small town mayor might do to win reelection back in the U.S. . . . Fighting terrorists was only something we did when needed, because it interfered with our political objectives. If we could ignore the terrorists, we were winning. If we had to stop our economic and political activities in order to fight terrorists, they were winning.' " [6]
sources
[1] U.S. Department of State. Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January 11, 2007 (quote from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
[2] U.S. Department of State. Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Building Iraqi Capacity and Accelerating the Transition to Iraq Self-Reliance. January 11, 2007.
[3] U.S. Department of State. Helping Iraqis Rebuild Iraq: Two Provincial Reconstruction Teams. January 11, 2007.
[4] The Washington Post. Reconstruction Effort to Emphasize Iraqi Jobs. January 11, 2007.
[5] The New York Times. Rebuilding Teams Would Swell Under Bush’s New Iraq Plan. January 15, 2007.
[6] The Washington Post. Wisdom From Down the Chain of Command. January 12, 2007.
posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 10:47 AM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:50 PM ET
tags: iraq bush provincial reconstruction team
Labels: bush plan, condoleezza rice, federalism, iraq
posted by eric at 9:10 AM
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