The Shiite Saboteurs Conspiracy Theory

The Shiite militias and death squads (most notably Moktada al-Sadr or anyone connected to him) are engaging in sectarian violence, not to protect Shiites from terrorists and insurgents, but to sabotage the Iraqi government.

The large-scale sectarian violence began on February 22, 2006 with the bombing of a revered Shiite mosque in Samarra. (Though it was hardly peaceful before.) And yet, 11 days earlier, Iraq had begun a transition period in which they would govern themselves. In three months, on May 20, 2006, they would establish their new government. The Shiites, who comprised 60 to 65% of the population had won the majority of the elections and held most of the power. After centuries of Sunni rule and decades of rule under a Sunni dictatorship, it appeared that the Shiites' time had come. And yet instead, they choose to lash out at the Sunnis, greatly undermining their new government's ability to function. But why would the Shiites choose to engage in this self-defeating, low-class, street justice when legitimate, internationally recognized power was so close at hand, especially since they had shown such self-restraint and maturity against Sunni acts of violence throughout the previous year?

Many seem to say that the mosque was so revered that the Shiites couldn't help but respond or that they were so fed up with the Sunni attacks that they decided to do something about it. But surely they saw the self-defeating nature of this violent response and that they were being provoked into acts that would destroy their chance at leading their nation.

It could be that some Shiites didn't like something about the new government. Sadr associates have previously spoken of meddling from the Americans. Or it could be for some other reason that those more knowledgeable about Iraq might possibly know. But it doesn't make sense to me, so I'll put it in the form of a conspiracy theory for future pondering.

News Quotes

"In early 2004, U.S. forces had intercepted a worried letter from the Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, to Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi fretted that his fight against American forces was going poorly. But he had a plan: "If we succeed in dragging [the Shiites] into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger," he wrote.
Throughout 2005, Sunni insurgents launched increasingly vicious attacks on Shiite civilians and holy places. Sistani regularly called on his followers to exercise restraint, which they did with remarkable forbearance. But Sadr, who had long positioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist—and who had cooperated with Sunni fighters in the early stages of the insurgency—now publicly called for Sunnis to disavow Zarqawi. New battle lines were being drawn.
The turning point came on Feb. 22, 2006, when assailants bombed the golden-domed Askariya Shrine in Samarra. This was the burial place of the 10th and 11th imams, and one of the holiest sites of the Shia faith. After the Samarra bombing, many Shiites felt compelled to lash back." [1]

After various elections and votes, Iraq had begun a transition to Iraqi rule on February 11, 2006, 11 days before the Samarra bomb. The new government took power on May 20, 2006, three months after the bombing. [2]

The Newsweek article also said that America "hammered" Sadr's forces twice in 2004, that Sadr has consistently called for America's withdrawal from Iraq, and that "Washington's favorite Iraqi," Ahmed Chalabi, had helped bring Sadr into the Iraqi political process after America's 2004 battles with Sadr's Mahdi Army. [1]

sources
[1] Newsweek. How Al-Sadr May Control U.S. Fate in Iraq: Sword of the Shia. December 4, 2006.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. p. 22. November 2006.

share
del.icio.us
digg

posted: monday, december 25, 2006, 6:28 PM ET
update: monday, december 25, 2006, 6:46 PM ET

tags: iraq moktada al-sadr conspiracy theory