Sadr returns as Hakim & Talabani medical problems / Sunni tribal leader visits Sadr City

"Moqtada al-Sadr, the influential Shiite cleric and militia leader who went into hiding before the launch of a U.S.-Iraqi security offensive in February, is in the southern city of Kufa, senior U.S. military commanders said Thursday.
Sadr, who has long opposed the U.S. occupation and is ratcheting up pressure for a withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, has returned from neighboring Iran, perhaps as recently as this week, they said.
. . . Sadr's movement is wooing Sunni leaders and purging extremists in his Mahdi Army militia in an attempt to strengthen his image as a nationalist who can lead all Iraqis at a time when antiwar sentiments are growing in the United States and Iraq's political landscape is increasingly fractured.
Sadr's apparent reemergence comes days after his main Shiite rival, cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, went to Iran for treatment of lung cancer. Hakim is also trying to strike a nationalist stance, recently changing the name of his party from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq to the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq." [1]

"The Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, flew to the United States on Sunday for a multiweek visit that his office said was for rest and for help in reducing his weight. His office denied local news media reports that Mr. Talabani was ill and said he was in general good health apart from his weight, The Associated Press reported. His extended departure comes at a time when the United States is pressing Iraqi politicians to make progress on a variety of measures." [2]

"Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr resurfaced Friday after nearly four months in hiding and demanded U.S. troops leave Iraq, a development likely to complicate U.S. efforts to crack down on violence and broker political compromise in the country.
. . . 'No, no for Satan. No, no for America. No, no for the occupation. No, no for Israel,' the glowering, black-turbaned cleric chanted in a call and response with the crowd.
. . . 'To our Iraqi Sunni brothers, I say that the occupation sows dissension among us and that strength is unity and division is weakness,' he said. 'I'm ready to cooperate with them in all fields.'
. . . Al-Sadr's associates say his strategy rests in part on his belief that Washington will soon start reducing troop strength, leaving behind a hole in Iraq's security and political power structure that he can fill. He also believes al-Maliki's government may soon collapse under its failure to improve security, services and the economy, they say." [3]

"In a hopeful sign on Tuesday, a Sunni tribal leader made a conciliatory public visit to Sadr City, the Shiite enclave in western Baghdad. Sheikh Hamid al-Hayis, leader of an alliance of Sunni tribes that recently began providing men to fight Al Qaeda beside the marines in Anbar Province, met with backers of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr.
Salih al-Ugaily, a Sadr supporter in Parliament, said in an interview that the two sides had agreed on the need for reconciliation and to expedite holding provincial elections, a major demand of Sunni Iraqis, many of whom have said they feel disenfranchised after boycotting previous elections." [4]

sources
[1] Ricks, Thomas E. & Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Sadr Back in Iraq, U.S. Generals Say. May 25, 2007.
[2] Cloud, David S. (The New York Times). 7 U.S. Soldiers Die in Iraq, 6 in Sweep of Baghdad. May 21, 2007.
[3] The Associated Press. Radical Anti-American Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr Returns to Iraq. May 25, 2007.
[4] Cloud, David S. (The New York Times). Baghdad Truck Bomb Kills 25 and Wounds 100 Others. May 23, 2007.

posted: saturday, may 26, 2007, 10:55 AM ET
update: saturday, june 16, 2007, 3:55 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr

Sadr fight qaeda so US exit; outreach to Sunnis

"Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr . . . is reaching out to a broad array of Sunni leaders, from politicians to insurgents, and purging extremist members of his Mahdi Army militia who target Sunnis. Sadr's political followers are distancing themselves from the fragile Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, which is widely criticized as corrupt, inefficient and biased in favor of Iraq's majority Shiites. And moderates are taking up key roles in Sadr's movement, professing to be less anti-American and more nationalist as they seek to improve Sadr's image and position him in the middle of Iraq's ideological spectrum.
'We want to aim the guns against the occupation and al-Qaeda, not between Iraqis,' Ahmed Shaibani, 37, a cleric who leads Sadr's newly formed reconciliation committee, said.
. . . 'We are not anti-American. We think the Americans have an important role in rebuilding Iraq, but as companies, not as an army,' [Salah al-Obaidi, a senior aide to Sadr said]. . . 'We can open a new channel with the Democrats, even some of the Republicans.'
. . . If the sectarian war can be stopped, if the Mahdi Army and Sunni insurgent groups can join hands and break al-Qaeda in Iraq, there will be less reason for U.S. forces to stay, said Shaibani, wearing a black dishdasha, a traditional loose-fitting tunic, and clutching a Nokia cellphone during an interview in late April. 'The American argument is we can't have a timetable because of al-Qaeda,' he said. 'So we're going to weaken al-Qaeda for you.'

source
Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Iraq's Sadr Overhauls His Tactics. May 19, 2007.

posted: tuesday, may 22, 2007, 2:40 PM ET

tags: iraq moktada al-sadr al qaeda

Sadr withdraws six cabinet members

"In the first major shake-up of Iraq's fragile coalition government, six ministers loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr pulled out of the cabinet on Monday over Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's refusal to set a timetable for an American troop withdrawal from Iraq.
The action frees Maliki to pick qualified people to fill ministries that are widely seen as ineffective, corrupt and sectarian. Yet it could also deepen tensions with Sadr within the government and on the streets, which could thwart U.S. and Iraqi efforts to bring about political reconciliation and stability, Iraqi officials and analysts said.
. . . Sadr legislators . . . declared that they wanted Maliki to replace Sadr loyalists in the cabinet with 'independent technocrats' who would not place sect, tribe or religion over the best interests of Iraqis.
. . . 'Maliki doesn't have much time,' said Mithal al-Alusi, an independent Sunni legislator, referring to filling the cabinet. 'Either you make the changes now and deal with the problem. Or else he'll lose everything.' " [1]

"Mr. Sadr . . . went underground at the start of the new Baghdad security plan in February.
. . . Mr. Sadr’s latest call for a timetable for American withdrawal comes as many Democrats and a few Republicans in Congress are pressing President Bush for exactly the same thing.
. . . Mr. Maliki said in a written statement that he 'welcomes the announcement of his eminence Moktada al-Sadr authorizing him the allocation of the six ministries that are held by Sadr’s bloc.' But the prime minister resisted Mr. Sadr’s demand to press the Americans for a timetable, saying that the issue of American withdrawal was dependent on 'the readiness of our armed forces to handle the entire security portfolio in all provinces.'
. . . A senior Sadr legislator, Bahaa al-Aaraji, when asked about the timetable, said American troops should stay in Iraq for two more years at the most, and must ensure that the country has a strong army and police force before leaving.
. . . When the government was formed last year, the 38 ministries were divided up like spoils among the country’s leading political parties." [2]

sources
[1] Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Six Sadr Loyalists Quit Cabinet in Challenge to Iraqi Premier. April 17, 2007.
[2] Wong, Edward. (The New York Post). Shiite Cleric Has Six Quit Cabinet in Iraq Shake-Up. April 17, 2007.

posted: saturday, april 21, 2007, 5:06 AM ET

tags: iraq sadr maliki

Maliki on withdrawal / Sadr says US provocateur

"Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said Tuesday that he saw no need to set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from his country.
His comments came a day after tens of thousands of Iraqis took to the streets of two Shiite holy cities, demanding that U.S. forces leave the country. The rally, called by rebel cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, marked the fourth anniversary of the fall of Baghdad.
We see no need for a withdrawal timetable. We are working as fast as we can," al-Maliki told reporters while on a four-day trip to Japan. 'To demand the departure of the troops is a democratic right and a right we respect. What governs the departure at the end of the day is how confident we are in the handover process.'
. . . Al-Maliki's visit to Japan came two weeks after Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi was in Tokyo and said U.S.-led coalition forces should not be withdrawn until Iraq's army is fully trained and ready to take over security." [1]

"Calling the United States the 'great evil,' radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr on Sunday accused U.S. forces of dividing Iraq by stoking violence. He also urged his Mahdi Army militiamen and Iraqi security forces to stop fighting each other in Diwaniyah, a southern city where clashes erupted late last week.
. . . Sadr, a fierce nationalist who has long called for a U.S. withdrawal, stopped short of telling his fighters to rise up against the American troops, a move that would severely complicate an ongoing security offensive underway in Iraq.
. . . 'My brothers in the Mahdi Army, and my brothers in the security services: enough fighting and rivalry, because that is only a success for our, and your, enemy,' Sadr said in a statement brimming with emotion and passages from the Koran. 'Infighting between brothers is not right, nor is it right to follow the dirty American sedition, or to defend . . . the occupier.'
Sadr said the 'enemy' wants 'to draw you into a war to end Shiism, or rather Islam,' and he urged Iraq's army and police to remain independent of U.S. forces and to avoid being 'drawn after the occupier, because he is your stark enemy.' [2]


source
[1] Talmadge, Eric. (The Associated Press). Iraqi PM: No Timetable on U.S. Pullout. April 10, 2007.
[2] Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Sadr Blames 'Evil' U.S. for Violence. April 9, 2007.

posted: sunday, april 15, 2007, 1:58 PM ET

tags: iraq withdrawal

Sunni and Shia Baghdad compared

"[I]n Adhamiya, a [Baghdad] community with a Sunni majority, any semblance of normal life vanished more than a year ago.
. . . Anyone who works with the government, whether Shiite or Sunni, is an enemy in the eyes of the Sunni insurgents, who carry out attack after attack against people they view as collaborators. While that chiefly makes targets of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi Army and the police, the militants also kill fellow Sunnis from government ministries who come to repair water and electrical lines in Sunni neighborhoods.
. . . It adds up to a bleak prognosis for Sunnis in Baghdad. Until the violence is under control, there is unlikely to be any progress. But it is hard to persuade Sunnis to take a stand against the violence when they seem to receive so little in return.
. . . The head of the district council was gunned down 10 days ago; three months earlier his predecessor was killed the same way.
The council had been a beacon for beleaguered Adhamiya residents, its offices busy from early morning. But its members are under attack, and it is unclear how long they will be willing to continue to take the risks that come with helping their neighbors." [1]

In Baghdad's Sadr City, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's "influence is everywhere. His representatives run the hospitals, the Islamic courts, the police, the municipal offices and the mosques. He pays for funerals and school books. He builds houses and controls inflation. He punishes the corrupt and those whose activities taint Islam or his privileged name.
. . . Yet Sadr's stronghold remains one of Baghdad's poorest areas. Banners proclaiming the Sadr name overlook open sewage canals, unpaved roads and crumbling buildings.
Revitalizing his city, Sadr representatives say, is a key motive behind the cleric's uneasy cooperation with his arch adversary, the U.S. military, in recent weeks. Several reconstruction projects, some U.S.-funded, are already underway.
. . . The area is home to fighters linked to death squads who have driven thousands of Sunnis from their houses. Yet children and young men play soccer here in parks with manicured grass. Crowds mingle in open-air bazaars without fear of a suicide bomber. Women walk alone to shop, while men have long conversations in outdoor cafes, a sign of normalcy that has vanished from most of Baghdad.
. . . Now, as sectarian strife transforms the nation, cleansing mixed areas, Sadr City is perhaps the best indicator of the Baghdad that is emerging from chaos. Here, Shiites walk, pray and converse, largely with other Shiites, basking in the trust afforded by mingling with their own sect." [2]

source
[1] Rubin, Alissa J. (The New York Times). Sunni Baghdad Becomes Land of Silent Ruins. March 26, 2007.
[2] Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). An Enclave of Normalcy in Fearful Baghdad. March 27, 2007.

posted: thursday, march 28, 2007, 12:43 AM ET

tags: iraq shiite sunni

Sectarianism began with US-picked Council, Makiya says

" 'There were failures at the level of leadership, and they’re overwhelmingly Iraqi failures,' he [Iraqi intellectual Kanan Makiya] said. Chief among the culprits, he added, were the Iraqis picked by the Americans in 2003 to sit on the Iraqi Governing Council, many of them exiles who tried to create popular bases for themselves by emphasizing sectarian and ethnic differences.
'Sectarianism began there,' he said.
Mr. Makiya said he preferred not to name names. But it is well known that he had a falling out with Mr. [Ahmad] Chalabi after Mr. Chalabi began courting Moktada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite cleric, in order to win support in Iraq’s first national elections. For years before the war, Mr. Makiya had toiled with Mr. Chalabi to organize the Iraqi exiles who, despite disparate ideologies, stood united in their hatred of Mr. Hussein.
Then there is the small issue of American policy. 'Everything they could do wrong, they did wrong,' Mr. Makiya said. 'The first and the biggest American error was the idea of going for an occupation.' "

source
Wong, Edward. (The New York Times). Critic of Hussein Grapples With Horrors of Post-Invasion Iraq. March 24, 2007.

posted: monday, march 26, 2007, 9:34 PM ET

tags: iraq kanan makiya moktada al-sadr ahmed chalabi

Police allowed Hilla bombings, survivors say

"In the chaotic aftermath of the Hilla blasts [which killed at least 77], survivors not only accused Sunni terrorists of carrying out the attacks but also blamed the Iraqi police and American forces for allowing them too happen.
Enraged, they said Iraqi policemen had stopped the Shiite marchers from searching unfamiliar people nearby.
'We hold the police responsible,' said Khudair Abbas, 67, a survivor. 'We were searching the pilgrims to look for terrorists, and a police force came and prevented us from searching, saying that it is their job to do. A few minutes after the police left, the explosion happened!'
Ahmad Hassan, 22 . . . said it appeared the police were intent on breaking up any effort by the Mahdi Army, the large militia controlled by anti-American Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, to impose its own security on the march, as in past years.
'But there was no Mahdi Army among us,' Mr. Hussain said. 'We were all locals from the same area.' " [1]

"Abdul Razak al-Nadawi, a spokesman for Sadr, denounced the attacks as 'a criminal act' and blamed the government for not protecting the pilgrims. Sadr representatives, he added, had asked the government to allow the Mahdi Army to help provide security along the route from Baghdad to Karbala, but the government did not take them up on the offer.
'Last year, when the Mahdi army was involved in securing the road, no attacks occurred, but this year we have seen the breaches that happened,' Nadawi said in a telephone interview from the southern city of Najaf. 'The government should have been more alert and better prepared to deal with the situation.'
Nadawi said that the Sadrists would not be pressured to retaliate against the Sunni insurgents. 'We are still committed and comply with the words of our leader, Moqtada Sadr, which call for calm and self-restraint,' he said." [2]

Would it be a bad idea to let the Mahdi Army do purely defensive security? And if the public wants to participate in their own security, it seems like they should be encouraged, especially if the ultimate goal is to build a democratic society. Supporting the public in their efforts also seems like an opportunity for the U.S. to build good relations with the Iraqi people. It might also be an opportunity to find good recruits for future local police officers as opposed to the current police force which seems to have a history of controversy. Not that the public should be allowed to become vigilantes, but their showing of initiative should be seen as a positive, hopeful sign and not something to be suppressed.

source
[1] Oppel, Richard A. Jr. (The New York Times). Attacks Across Iraq Kill at Least 109 Shiite Pilgrims. March 7, 2007.
[2] Londono, Ernesto & Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). 118 Shiite Pilgrims Killed in Iraq Attacks. March 7, 2007.

posted: wednesday, march 7, 2007, 10:56 PM ET
update: saturday, march 10, 2007, 9:02 AM ET

tags: iraq mahdi army police

Maliki to replace Sadr allies, officials say

"Iraq's prime minister [Nuri al-Maliki] said Saturday he will reshuffle his Cabinet within two weeks and pursue criminal charges against political figures linked to extremists.
. . . The prime minister did not say how many Cabinet members would be replaced. But some officials said about nine would lose their jobs, including all six Cabinet members loyal to radical anti-American Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, an al-Maliki ally.
. . . Last month, U.S. and Iraqi troops arrested Deputy Health Minister Hakim al-Zamili, an al-Sadr ally, for allegedly diverting millions of dollars in government funds to the Mahdi Army and allowing death squads to use ambulances and government hospitals to carry out kidnappings and killings.
During the interview, al-Maliki said other top officials would face prosecution for ties to insurgents, sectarian militias and death squads _ including members of parliament."

source
Reid, Robert H. & Abdul-Zahra, Qassim. (The Associated Press). Iraq PM Vows Cabinet Shakeup in 2 Weeks. March 3, 2007.

posted: sunday, march 4, 2007, 9:02 PM ET
update: sunday, march 4, 2007, 9:32 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr maliki

Sadr supports surge

"Iraqi President Jalal Talabani said anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has ordered his top deputies to leave Iraq in order to ease the implementation of the Baghdad security plan, which U.S. and Iraqi forces began to roll out this week.
. . . During a news conference Thursday night, Talabani said Sadr told government officials that he was 'eager for the stability of the state and the success of the security plan. He gave the government the green light to detain any outlaws.'
In Washington on Thursday, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said he believed that Sadr's followers were concerned about the new operation to secure Baghdad and suggested that Sadr and his militia would 'go to ground' over the coming months. 'And the question is, during that space . . . can we and the Iraqis provide enough security so that economic development, improvements in governance, political reconciliation can all begin to make real progress in Iraq?' Gates said."

source
Londono, Ernesto. (The Washington Post). Leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq Injured in Clash, Official Says. February 16, 2007.

posted: sunday, february 18, 2007, 11:53 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr war

Sadr in Iran, some say

"Two Shiite leaders stepped forward on Thursday to confirm American reports this week that Mr. Sadr had gone to Iran.
But the two, a senior official in Mr. Sadr’s organization who spoke on condition of anonymity, and Sami al-Askari, a Parliament member from a different Shiite party, took exception with suggestions that he had fled because of a crackdown on militias and had permanently moved to Iran. They said that the cleric often visited the country and that it was unclear why he had left or when he would come back; the Sadr official said he could return to Iraq on Friday.
In a sign of how volatile the topic has become, several of the cleric’s aides continued their vehement denials that he had left at all, and accused the Americans of a propaganda campaign to paint him as a coward.
. . . If he actually did leave, it is now unclear whether he could come back: the Iraqi government said Thursday that it had closed its borders with Syria and Iran as part of the new security plan."

source
Cave, Damien. (The New York Times). Dispute Over Iraqi Cleric, Said to Have Gone to Iran. February 16, 2007.

posted: saturday, february 17, 2007, 1:31 AM ET

tags: iraq sadr

Mahdi Army improving, Sadr City residents say

"Bombings here [in Sadr City] have become less common than in other parts of Baghdad, though a coordinated series of explosions last fall killed 144 people. Residents and Sadr party officials said they felt more secure because the Mahdi Army kept watch.
. . . Sadr officials said the militia’s members would disarm temporarily during the Baghdad security plan, even if Sunnis or Americans attacked.
. . . Sunni officials said Sadr officials had calculated that if they stayed quiet for the security plan, American troops would eventually withdraw, giving Shiites even more freedom to exercise power.
. . . The Sadr organization, whose members once whipped people on the streets for selling alcohol, now works out of a centrally located office.
. . . Residents said the building reflected the move from insurgent group to established player. After winning control of six ministries and 30 seats in Parliament, residents said, the Sadrists have become a more traditionally political, less religious force, with leaders primarily interested in safety and power."

source
Cave, Damien. (The New York Times). Shiite District, Flash Point in Baghdad, Rebuilds. February 9, 2007.

posted: saturday, february 10, 2007, 11:11 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr shiite mahdi army

Sadr militia offers deal

"An Iraqi official [Rahim al-Daraji, the elected mayor of the Sadr City district] authorized to speak on behalf of field commanders for the country’s most powerful militia has approached Western military officials and laid out a plan to avoid armed confrontation, senior Iraqi and American officials said this week.
. . . Mr. Daraji said he represented 14 political and military groups in Sadr City. He said local residents, including [Moktada al-Sadr's] Mahdi Army commanders, wanted to find ways to work with the Americans to avoid any large-scale confrontation. Commanders would tell militiamen to keep their weapons off the streets, he said, if Americans agreed to certain demands.
Some of the actions Mr. Daraji said he had requested in exchange for the promises from the militias seemed likely to draw stony stares from American military officials, namely to stop conducting raids in Sadr City and to release a number of those who had been arrested.
But other demands — to provide jobs for Sadr City residents, to bring in new construction projects and to triple the number of police stations there — seemed more realistic."

source
The New York Times. Iraqi Official Offers Terms From Militia to Avoid Fight. January 25, 2007.

posted: sunday, january 28, 2007, 6:54 PM ET
update: sunday, january 28, 2007, 10:30 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr

Sadr's redeployment plan not covered enough / Is war for U.S. almost over?

"The parliamentary bloc of radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr announced an end to a boycott that has kept Iraq's young National Assembly semi-paralyzed for two months. *
The Sadr bloc returned to the assembly after a parliamentary committee and the speaker, Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, agreed to a series of demands, said Falah Hasan Shenshel, a member of the Sadr bloc.
The demands included establishing a timetable for the buildup of Iraqi troops and the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and a condition that the presence of foreign troops would not be extended without a vote by the assembly, Shenshel said. U.S. troops should retreat from Iraqi cities and return to their bases by the end of August, he said.
'By doing so, America would confirm that it came to Iraq as a liberator and not as an occupier,' Shenshel said.
Sadr's movement has 30 seats in the 275-member parliament, and his political loyalists have called for a prompt withdrawal of U.S. troops. He is widely regarded as a focal instigator of the sectarian violence that has ravaged the country in recent months." [1]

Why isn't this a bigger story? If the U.S. troops will be exiting the cities and staying at their bases, they'll probably be out of most of the danger.

(This sounds more like a proposal for a law that still needs to be voted on by the Parliament, but with Sadr, a committee and the Speaker agreeing to it, it sounds like it has a legitimate chance at passing. A recent New York Times article said that "deals on important legislation, most recently the oil law, now take place largely out of public view, with Parliament - when it meets - rubber-stamping the final decisions." [2] So its eventual passage seems even more likely, though they're still working on the oil law.)

The NYT article also said that "security is almost exclusively the policy realm of the American military and the office of the prime minister." [2] But the Iraqi Constitution says that one of the powers of Parliament (aka The Council of Representatives) is "monitoring the performance of the executive authority" (Article 60, second). The Prime Minister, who is described as being "responsible for the general policy of the State and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces," is included in the executive authority (Article 77). The Constitution also says that "a law shall regulate the work of the security institutions . . . and be subject to the oversight of the Council of Representatives" (Article 83, first). So it seems that the Parliament has definite oversight powers over the Prime Minister and his policies and over the security institutions, but the Constitution, unfortunately, does not say what these powers are. [3]

Also, I'm not certain whether the United States military operating within Iraq is the exclusive domain of the Prime Minister (though it could be.) While the Prime Minister is the commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces, the U.S. military is not part of the Iraqi armed forces, so the Parliament, whose powers also includes "enacting federal laws" (Article 60, first), might also have the legal authority to create the policy of what role the U.S. military can maintain in Iraq. [3]

At the very least, Sadr's proposed redeployment law seems no less than the U.S. Congress's proposed non-binding resolutions opposing an increase in the number of U.S. troops in Iraq which are receiving much attention in the press and by other influential parties.

And also, does the part of Sadr's proposed law about the presence of foreign troops not being extended mean just their presence in Iraqi cities or in Iraq entirely? More details are needed.

The Iraqis also seem to be taking matters into their own hands. Aren't redeployment and the Iraqis taking control what many of the anti-war people want? Is much or most of America's military involvement in the war about to end and nobody wants to say anything? (Iraq could conceivably ask America to stay beyond the deadline, but that possibility seems to be part of many of the anti-war people's plan also.)

Gen. Casey also said recently that the surge troops could begin withdrawing by "late summer" if the people of Baghdad were feeling safer. [4]

Casey's "late summer" and Shenshel's "end of August" sound like about the same time. Shenshel's plan sounds broader and more specific than Casey's, but with 80% of the violence apparently occurring within 30 miles of Baghdad [5], they seem similar. The insurgent-terrorist violence might still be an issue, however, at least from the American point-of-view.

footnotes
* It's been implied or I've been interpreting that Sadr's bloc of 30 representatives boycotting Parliament had been preventing a quorum from being gathered and thus laws from being passed. (see boycott posting, 1/21/06.) But a quorum requires only "50 percent plus one" of Iraq's 275 member Parliament. [2] So Sadr's 30 boycotting representatives, by themselves, fell far short of the 138 representatives it would have taken to mathematically prevent a quorum. Other representatives may have joined the boycott, but this was not made clear or I may have missed that part.

* Since this was originally posted, Gen. Casey's successor, Gen. David Petraeus, has said that the troop increase will 'need to be sustained, certainly for some time well beyond the summer.' [6]

source
[1] The Washington Post. Disguises Used in Attack on Troops. January 22, 2007.
[2] Cave, Damien. (nytimes.com). January 24, 2007. Iraq Parliament Finds a Quorum Hard to Come By.
[3] Iraqi Constitution. (iraqigovernment.org). Accessed January 26, 2007.
[4] The New York Times. General Sees Summer Deadline for Troops. January 20, 2007.
[5] The White House. President's Address to the Nation. January 10, 2007.
[6] Baker, Peter. (The Washington Post). Additional Troop Increase Approved. March 11, 2007.

related posting
Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? December 23, 2006.

posted: tuesday, january 23, 2007, 5:38 PM ET
update: tuesday, march 13, 2007, 8:45 PM ET

tags: iraq bush sadr withdrawal redeployment

Islamists are the Iraqi reality, Sadr pol says

"Baha al-Aaraji, a senior representative for Mr. Sadr in Parliament, said Mr. Sadr’s supporters knew that recent American efforts were aimed at weakening them, and eventually Mr. Maliki, whom they support.
'The main goals are to exclude the Sadrists from decision-making and, after the formation of a new bloc, to replace the prime minister,' he said.
But in the current political situation, in which Islamists are overwhelmingly popular among voters, the efforts are likely to fail, he said.
'In the election, Islamists from both sides won,' he said. 'It is a reality.' "

source
The New York Times. Shiite Fighters Are Arrested, Iraq Says. January 18, 2007.

posted: saturday, january 20, 2007, 7:04 PT ET
update: saturday, january 20, 2007, 7:07 PT ET

tags: iraq islamist

Chalabi touts de-baath success / Sadr boycott to end

"Ahmad Chalabi, the former exile who helped the United States build the case for invading Iraq and who heads a committee on de-Baathification, appeared at a rare outdoor news conference in the Green Zone to announce that more than 700 Baathists had returned to their old government jobs.
Smiling behind a bank of television microphones as bombs and gunfire interrupted his speech, Mr. Chalabi, who had advocated a strong de-Baathification effort, said the government’s roster of rehired workers would continue to grow."

"Falah Shanshel, one of about 30 lawmakers affiliated with the renegade Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, said the Sadr bloc would end its boycott of Parliament in the next few days."

source
The New York Times. Iraqis Answer Global Critics by Tackling Troubling Issues. January 18, 2007.

posted: saturday, january 20, 2007, 6:02 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr de-baathification

Chalabi heads Bremer's failed de-Baathification policy

" 'This is a big mistake,' [Timothy M.] Carney thought in May 2003, when [L. Paul] Bremer told senior CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] officials that he would soon issue an edict prohibiting many former members of Hussein's Baath Party from holding government jobs.
. . . Bremer eventually concluded that the policy had been applied 'unevenly and unjustly.' . . . He announced that appeals would be handled by a de-Baathification commission headed by Ahmed Chalabi, a controversial former exile whose informants had helped the Bush administration make the case for war.
. . . Maliki told Bush recently that he supports a revised de-Baathification law -- but the issue isn't in the prime minister's hands. It's still with Chalabi.
Chalabi is the chairman of the Supreme National Commission for De-Baathification. . . . He has prepared draft legislation that calls for easing some elements of Bremer's policy, but he said parliament has been unable to act on it because a majority of the members of the legislature's de-Baathification committee belong to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's political party, which walked out in November to protest a meeting between Maliki and Bush."

source
The Washington Post. On Iraq, U.S. Turns to Onetime Dissenters. January 14, 2007.

posted: wednesday, january 17, 2007, 1:04 AM ET

tags: iraq de-baathification chalabi

Sadr aide killed in Najaf raid, U.S. troops advising

"A top deputy of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr was killed Wednesday during a raid by U.S. and Iraqi troops in the southern holy city of Najaf, sparking protests from Sadr's followers and complicating an already tense relationship with the powerful anti-American leader.
. . . A raid involving American forces in Najaf is particularly embarrassing for [Prime Minister Nouri al-]Maliki. Last week, in an elaborate ceremony, the U.S.-led coalition handed over control of Najaf to Iraqi forces.
. . . Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell, the top U.S military spokesman in Iraq, told reporters in Baghdad that the raid was led by 35 soldiers from the 8th Iraqi Army Division Forces, with eight U.S. troops serving as advisers.
. . . 'The purpose for going after him is because of the illegal activities that he was conducting, not because he was associated with any particular organization,' Caldwell said.
Amiri's friends and associates called him an honorable man. "He never participated in any kind of violence in all his life for as long as I've known him," said Nasar al-Rubaie, head of Sadr's parliamentary bloc."

source
The Washington Post. Close Adviser to Sadr Dies in U.S.-Iraqi Raid. December 28, 2006.

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posted: friday, december 29, 2006, 9:28 PM ET
update: friday, december 29, 2006, 9:36 PM ET

tags: iraq moktada al-sadr

The Shiite Saboteurs Conspiracy Theory

The Shiite militias and death squads (most notably Moktada al-Sadr or anyone connected to him) are engaging in sectarian violence, not to protect Shiites from terrorists and insurgents, but to sabotage the Iraqi government.

The large-scale sectarian violence began on February 22, 2006 with the bombing of a revered Shiite mosque in Samarra. (Though it was hardly peaceful before.) And yet, 11 days earlier, Iraq had begun a transition period in which they would govern themselves. In three months, on May 20, 2006, they would establish their new government. The Shiites, who comprised 60 to 65% of the population had won the majority of the elections and held most of the power. After centuries of Sunni rule and decades of rule under a Sunni dictatorship, it appeared that the Shiites' time had come. And yet instead, they choose to lash out at the Sunnis, greatly undermining their new government's ability to function. But why would the Shiites choose to engage in this self-defeating, low-class, street justice when legitimate, internationally recognized power was so close at hand, especially since they had shown such self-restraint and maturity against Sunni acts of violence throughout the previous year?

Many seem to say that the mosque was so revered that the Shiites couldn't help but respond or that they were so fed up with the Sunni attacks that they decided to do something about it. But surely they saw the self-defeating nature of this violent response and that they were being provoked into acts that would destroy their chance at leading their nation.

It could be that some Shiites didn't like something about the new government. Sadr associates have previously spoken of meddling from the Americans. Or it could be for some other reason that those more knowledgeable about Iraq might possibly know. But it doesn't make sense to me, so I'll put it in the form of a conspiracy theory for future pondering.

News Quotes

"In early 2004, U.S. forces had intercepted a worried letter from the Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, to Osama bin Laden. Zarqawi fretted that his fight against American forces was going poorly. But he had a plan: "If we succeed in dragging [the Shiites] into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger," he wrote.
Throughout 2005, Sunni insurgents launched increasingly vicious attacks on Shiite civilians and holy places. Sistani regularly called on his followers to exercise restraint, which they did with remarkable forbearance. But Sadr, who had long positioned himself as an Iraqi nationalist—and who had cooperated with Sunni fighters in the early stages of the insurgency—now publicly called for Sunnis to disavow Zarqawi. New battle lines were being drawn.
The turning point came on Feb. 22, 2006, when assailants bombed the golden-domed Askariya Shrine in Samarra. This was the burial place of the 10th and 11th imams, and one of the holiest sites of the Shia faith. After the Samarra bombing, many Shiites felt compelled to lash back." [1]

After various elections and votes, Iraq had begun a transition to Iraqi rule on February 11, 2006, 11 days before the Samarra bomb. The new government took power on May 20, 2006, three months after the bombing. [2]

The Newsweek article also said that America "hammered" Sadr's forces twice in 2004, that Sadr has consistently called for America's withdrawal from Iraq, and that "Washington's favorite Iraqi," Ahmed Chalabi, had helped bring Sadr into the Iraqi political process after America's 2004 battles with Sadr's Mahdi Army. [1]

sources
[1] Newsweek. How Al-Sadr May Control U.S. Fate in Iraq: Sword of the Shia. December 4, 2006.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense. Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq. p. 22. November 2006.

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posted: monday, december 25, 2006, 6:28 PM ET
update: monday, december 25, 2006, 6:46 PM ET

tags: iraq moktada al-sadr conspiracy theory

Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? / Thoughts on the morality of American withdrawal

"After the invasion, as a Shiite religious revival blossomed, Iraq's clerics saw themselves as the caretakers of the nation's Islamic identity. They were as concerned about American power and ambitions for Iraq as they were about the importation of a decadent Western culture. Many refused to deal with U.S. officials . . . a tactic that reaps immense rewards today from a population that is increasingly disenchanted with the United States.
'There's no necessity to meet the Americans,' said Beirut-based Hamid al-Khafaf, the chief spokesman for Sistani. He added that Sistani favored peaceful resistance to end the U.S. occupation.
. . . Senior Sadr officials have circulated a petition among national lawmakers demanding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. They have managed to get 131 signatures, nearly half of the parliament, [independent Kurdish legislator Mahmoud] Othman said.
. . . Hakim, he said [Mahdi Army member Ali Hussein], made a fatal mistake by meeting Bush. In today's Iraq, credibility and power are measured by opposition to the United States." [1]

Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? According to the above article and other sources like a September 2006 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes, many Iraqi politicians and apparently a majority of the Iraqi public would like to see America withdraw. (The September poll said that seven in ten Iraqis would like America to leave within a year and six in ten support attacks on coalition forces.) [2]

The petition by the Sadr officials demanding a withdrawal timetable would be a good solid step in this direction. A formal debate and vote by the Iraqi Parliament would be even better. The Parliament could also arrange a national referendum asking the Iraqi people if they wanted America to stay or go. (I had heard of the referendum idea in a reader's letter to the New York Times which I, unfortunately, cannot locate.) Broad-based, peaceful, mass demonstrations could also be helpful. *

If this is what the Iraqis truly want, then the above types of strong unambivalent expressions of discontent could very well lead to a successful outcome, especially since one of America's stated goals has been to give the Iraqis a voice in their newly democratic country.

If the Iraqis asked America to leave, it would also remove much of the America's moral obligation to remain, in my opinion, unless America has somehow manipulated Iraq into taking this position. Though America should still do all it can to help in other ways, considering its initial invasion was the cause of most of the current problems or allowed them to emerge. **

America could conceivably remain in well-defined, seemingly pro-American, areas like Kurdistan or maybe the northern Nineveh area to help protect these areas from attack. (I've read that some of the targeted Iraqi Christians have expressed a desire for a region in the Nineveh area) [3] America's presence in these areas would be purely defensive, however, and only at the request of the people in those areas. Their presence would not be used to stage present or future attacks on the rest of Iraq or the Middle East region, no matter what the cause. ***

footnotes
* Apparently, the Iraqi prime minister has most of the authority over Iraq's security matters and it's uncertain if Prime Minister Maliki would ever request an American withdrawal. On the other hand, Maliki is just one person and was not directly elected by the people of Iraq. So if the people's directly elected representatives in Parliament and/or the people themselves through a referendum were to formally request an American withdrawal, it would be interesting to see what would happen.

** America might also leave, from a moral perspective (if I can use that word again), if its continued presence was a necessary cause of most of the violence or if its presence was preventing a solution to the violence from being implemented. Though its other obligations would remain.
It's been said that America's continued presence has been the cause of the continuing insurgent and terrorist violence. If an American withdrawal would cause the insurgent-terrorist violence to cease, then America might leave for that reason. However, it's not certain if these two forces would, in fact, cease their violent attacks if America left since it's also been said that the insurgents' and terrorists' goal is not only to cause an American withdrawal, but to foment civil war through attacks on the Shiite majority.
One might also ask if America's withdrawal would cause the insurgents and terrorists to cease their violence, but America's withdrawal would also deny innocent Iraqis needed protection from ongoing sectarian violence, then should America morally remain or withdraw? I don't really have the answer to that. I'm just presenting general alternatives to show that it is not simply a matter of America staying is moral and America withdrawing is immoral or vice-versa.
On that note, America might also exit if it was suffering great hardship. It might take something of a moral hit for placing its own hardship above that of the Iraqis (whose hardship was caused by America's initial invasion, in my opinion), but it would be less of a hit than if America left just because it was tired or fed up with the situation.

*** Sadr has since introduced a law in the Iraqi Parliament that would require U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraqi cities by the end of August of this year (see Sadr's redeployment plan, 1/23/07.)

sources
[1] The Washington Post. Shiite Clerics' Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq. December 21, 2006.
[2] Program on International Policy Attitudes. The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq. September 27, 2006.
[3] The Associated Press. U.S. Iraqi Christians Seek Help. December 15, 2006.

posted: saturday, december 23, 2006, 3:36 AM ET
update: friday, january 26, 2007, 2:14 PM ET

tags: iraq withdrawal shiite morality

Maliki plan for U.S. to battle insurgents while he deals with Sadr

"Iraq's Shiite prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has created a two-pronged security plan.
. . . The plan calls for U.S. troops to combat Sunni Arab insurgents for four to eight weeks in outer Baghdad neighborhoods, which Maliki believes are the source of the sectarian violence afflicting the capital, his aides said. Iraqi forces would take over primary responsibility for patrolling inner Baghdad from U.S. forces.
During this period, Maliki would persuade Sadr to stop the Mahdi Army from fomenting violence, using a combination of carrots and sticks, including the threat of force, said the advisers . . . If the Mahdi Army does not stop its assaults, Maliki, with the help of U.S. troops, would crack down on Sadr.
. . . But the government's Shiite-dominated security forces under Maliki's control are widely perceived as ineffective, and are mistrusted by Sunnis. . . . With U.S. troops focusing on Sunni Arab insurgents, Sadr and his forces could solidify their grip in Baghdad.
. . . [Maliki's] advisers insisted that Maliki would be firm with Sadr and that his political survival no longer hinged on the cleric."

source
The Washington Post. Premier Wants U.S. Forces to Target Sunni Insurgents. December 20, 2006.

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Peace in the middle east

posted: thursday, december 21, 2006, 4:38 PM ET
update: thursday, december 21, 2006, 4:40 PM ET

iraq moktada al-sadr nuri al-maliki insurgency