Extremism, sectarianism, politicians and the people
"Moderates Will Be Vigorously Supported in their Battle with Violent Extremists
•Counter extremist portrayal of Iraq’s conflict as Sunni vs. Shi’a, rather than moderates vs. extremists.
•Recognize and act upon the reality that the United States has a national interest in seeing moderates succeed.
•Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds." [1]
"•Primary challenge is violent extremists from multiple communities; the center is eroding and sectarianism is spiking.
•Iraqis increasingly disillusioned with Coalition efforts.
•While still committed to a unified Iraq, many Iraqis are also advancing sectarian agendas --as hedging strategies, pursuit of narrow interests, and due to history.
•Dialogue with insurgents has not improved security and may not produce strategic gains in current context." [2]
"SECRETARY RICE: . . . Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities in the Middle East. Historic change is unfolding in the region, unleashing old grievances, new anxieties, and some violence, but is also revealing a promising new strategic realignment in the Middle East. This is the same alignment that we see in Iraq. On one side are the many reformers and responsible leaders who seek to advance their interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists of every sect and ethnicity who use violence to spread chaos to undermine democratic governments and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.
Our most urgent diplomatic goal is to empower reformers and responsible leaders across the region, and to confront extremists. The proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those who share these goals -- our allies, Israel and Turkey, of course, but democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, and the responsible governments of the Gulf States, plus Egypt and Jordan, or the GCC plus two." [3]
"We have organized our diplomacy around the proposition that you begin with those who share your views of how the Middle East ought to develop, and therefore our diplomacy and my trip will focus heavily on rallying the support of those responsible Arab states to support the Government of Iraq, to support what needs to be done there, to support of course also Lebanon and the moderate Palestinians.
But as to Iraq, I do believe that the states of the Gulf and the Egyptians and the Jordanians understand increasingly that if they are to resist as much they want to, if they are to resist Iranian influence or increases in Iranian influence in the Middle East, something that they fear quite greatly, then it is going to require support for Iraq. Because Iraq can either be a barrier to further Iranian influence or it can become a bridge if it is not dealt with effectively." [4]
"To many, the crux of Iraq's intractable problem is whether the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- installed as Shiite Muslims were emerging from oppression under Saddam Hussein to become the country's ruling majority -- can rise above deep sectarian rivalry and protect Iraqi neighborhoods equitably, even in the face of catastrophic insurgent attacks by Sunni Arabs.
'The main reason for what's taking place in Iraq is the settlement of historical paybacks,' said Faiz Botros, 50, an Iraqi Christian sitting at a sidewalk table . . . in central Baghdad. 'Neither 20,000 soldiers, nor 100,000, nor hundreds of thousands, will change anything. In Iraq, the politicians are still living in a mentality from 1,400 years ago. And this is the disaster of Iraq.'
. . . 'This is not a one-party decision,' Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi said. 'It doesn't depend on Maliki or the UIA' -- a reference to the dominant Shiite coalition in the parliament -- 'or the Shia or the Sunnis alone. It depends on all parties and how convinced they are they want to live together. This is a process and it is historical work. Some have illusions they can gain power again. Others want to impose their ways.' " [5]
source
[1] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007. p. 9. (Major Strategic Shifts).
[2] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007. p. 7. (Key Assumptions: Now).
[3] U.S. Department of State. Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January 11, 2007 (quote from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
[4] U.S. Department of State. Iraq: A New Way Forward: Secretary Condoleezza Rice. Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. January 11, 2007.
[5] The Washington Post. Bush's Shift in Strategy Gets Dubious Reception On Streets of Baghdad. January 12, 2007.
posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 1:10 PM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:36 PM ET
tags: iraq bush
•Counter extremist portrayal of Iraq’s conflict as Sunni vs. Shi’a, rather than moderates vs. extremists.
•Recognize and act upon the reality that the United States has a national interest in seeing moderates succeed.
•Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds." [1]
"•Primary challenge is violent extremists from multiple communities; the center is eroding and sectarianism is spiking.
•Iraqis increasingly disillusioned with Coalition efforts.
•While still committed to a unified Iraq, many Iraqis are also advancing sectarian agendas --as hedging strategies, pursuit of narrow interests, and due to history.
•Dialogue with insurgents has not improved security and may not produce strategic gains in current context." [2]
"SECRETARY RICE: . . . Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities in the Middle East. Historic change is unfolding in the region, unleashing old grievances, new anxieties, and some violence, but is also revealing a promising new strategic realignment in the Middle East. This is the same alignment that we see in Iraq. On one side are the many reformers and responsible leaders who seek to advance their interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists of every sect and ethnicity who use violence to spread chaos to undermine democratic governments and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.
Our most urgent diplomatic goal is to empower reformers and responsible leaders across the region, and to confront extremists. The proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those who share these goals -- our allies, Israel and Turkey, of course, but democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, and the responsible governments of the Gulf States, plus Egypt and Jordan, or the GCC plus two." [3]
"We have organized our diplomacy around the proposition that you begin with those who share your views of how the Middle East ought to develop, and therefore our diplomacy and my trip will focus heavily on rallying the support of those responsible Arab states to support the Government of Iraq, to support what needs to be done there, to support of course also Lebanon and the moderate Palestinians.
But as to Iraq, I do believe that the states of the Gulf and the Egyptians and the Jordanians understand increasingly that if they are to resist as much they want to, if they are to resist Iranian influence or increases in Iranian influence in the Middle East, something that they fear quite greatly, then it is going to require support for Iraq. Because Iraq can either be a barrier to further Iranian influence or it can become a bridge if it is not dealt with effectively." [4]
"To many, the crux of Iraq's intractable problem is whether the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- installed as Shiite Muslims were emerging from oppression under Saddam Hussein to become the country's ruling majority -- can rise above deep sectarian rivalry and protect Iraqi neighborhoods equitably, even in the face of catastrophic insurgent attacks by Sunni Arabs.
'The main reason for what's taking place in Iraq is the settlement of historical paybacks,' said Faiz Botros, 50, an Iraqi Christian sitting at a sidewalk table . . . in central Baghdad. 'Neither 20,000 soldiers, nor 100,000, nor hundreds of thousands, will change anything. In Iraq, the politicians are still living in a mentality from 1,400 years ago. And this is the disaster of Iraq.'
. . . 'This is not a one-party decision,' Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi said. 'It doesn't depend on Maliki or the UIA' -- a reference to the dominant Shiite coalition in the parliament -- 'or the Shia or the Sunnis alone. It depends on all parties and how convinced they are they want to live together. This is a process and it is historical work. Some have illusions they can gain power again. Others want to impose their ways.' " [5]
source
[1] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007. p. 9. (Major Strategic Shifts).
[2] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007. p. 7. (Key Assumptions: Now).
[3] U.S. Department of State. Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January 11, 2007 (quote from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
[4] U.S. Department of State. Iraq: A New Way Forward: Secretary Condoleezza Rice. Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. January 11, 2007.
[5] The Washington Post. Bush's Shift in Strategy Gets Dubious Reception On Streets of Baghdad. January 12, 2007.
posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 1:10 PM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:36 PM ET
tags: iraq bush
Labels: bush plan, condoleezza rice, iraq, iraqi people, sectarian
posted by eric at 11:18 AM
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