Sectarian killings increase

"More than three months into a U.S.-Iraqi security offensive designed to curtail sectarian violence in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq, Health Ministry statistics show that such killings are rising again.
From the beginning of May until Tuesday, 321 unidentified corpses, many dumped and showing signs of torture and execution, have been found across the Iraqi capital, according to morgue data provided by a Health Ministry official who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to release the information. The data showed that the same number of bodies were found in all of January, the month before the launch of the Baghdad security plan.
Such killings are a signature practice of Shiite militias, although Sunni insurgents are also known to execute victims. The number of found bodies is a key indicator of the level of sectarian violence, but the statistics also include some who died from causes unrelated to the political situation.
. . . Lt. Gen. Aboud Qanbar, the Iraqi commander overseeing the security plan, acknowledged in an interview that the number of unidentified corpses is rising and said there has been a spike in sectarian assaults by Shiite militias, especially elements of the Mahdi Army, the militia of Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
. . . 'It's possible that some parties are using the name of Mahdi Army for killing the Sunnis,' said Ahmed Shaibani, a senior Sadr aide."

source
Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Morgue Data Show Increase In Sectarian Killings in Iraq. May 24, 2007.

posted: saturday, may 26, 2007, 10:25 AM ET

tags: iraq sectarian

Sunni says US is problem; against faction meet / Anti-Shiite conspiracy, Shiite hotelier says

" 'The problem in Iraq is the American Army,' . . . [Muhammad al-Daini, a Sunni Arab member of the Iraqi Parliament] told a group of attentive American legislators. . . 'What brought terrorism, what brought Al Qaeda and what brought Iranian influence is the Americans.'
Mr. Daini, soft-spoken and generally unsmiling, has been ushered from meeting to meeting by a public relations firm paid by an American businessman who calls the Iraqi politician 'a true humanitarian.' The businessman, Dal LaMagna, says he is devoting the fortune he made selling his high-end grooming tools business, Tweezerman, to seeking an end to the violence in Iraq.
. . . The American lawmakers were polite and inquisitive but some appeared nonplussed by hints of the polarization of Iraqi views. When Representative Bill Delahunt, Democrat of Massachusetts, suggested that it might be valuable to get all Iraqi factions to meet for talks in the United States, Mr. Daini demurred.
. . . Mr. Daini, 35, is a member of the National Dialogue Front, a Sunni Arab political group led by Saleh al-Mutlak, a former Baath Party official who insists that the Baath Party, the party of Saddam Hussein, was the best party ever to govern Iraq." [1]

"Ayad owns a hotel in the southern city of Karbala, home to two of Shiism’s most important shrines. His wife and two daughters wear veils. He believes that the violence in Iraq is a Sunni and American conspiracy against Shiites, and he argues that Iran is the best ally of Iraqi Shiites.
. . . The Sunnis, he said, have 'oppressed us since the days of the Prophet, and now it is our chance to hit back and rule.'
According to Ayad, a Shiite takeover in Iraq would set a good model for the Shiites of Lebanon, where they number about a third of the population, and Bahrain, where they are a majority.
'Perhaps the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia will act too, rid themselves of the Sunni oppression against them, and rule or at least separate themselves from Riyadh and create their own state.'
It is exactly this possibility that has made the Sunni Arab regimes fear a Shiite regional revolt and moved some to support the Sunni insurgency in Iraq or at least to voice their resentment of the Iraqi Shiite government, which is seen as being biased against Iraqi Sunnis.
. . . 'When we fought the Persians during the 1980s, we were wrong. We’re Shiites before being Iraqis. Sunnis invented national identity to rule us.' "

Op-ed by Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "a former reporter for The Daily Star of Lebanon." [2]

Peace thru oppression?

source
[1] Shane, Scott & Wong, Edward. (The New York Times). Antiwar Iraqi in Washington Has a More Sectarian Agenda at Home. May 14, 2007.
[2] Abdul-Hussain, Hussain. (The New York Times). In Iraq, the play was the thing. May 7, 2007.

posted: wednesday, may 16, 2007, 6:14 AM ET
update: wednesday, may 18, 2007, 6:29 PM ET

tags: iraq muhammad al-daini dal lamagna tweezerman saleh al-mutlak

Surge addresses 2005-06 security turnover mistake

"The push to expand the U.S. and Iraqi presence in Baghdad's neighborhoods reflects what U.S. commanders now acknowledge was a mistaken drawdown in 2005 and 2006 of American troops in the capital, leaving Iraqi forces in their place.
'What we had been doing for 3 1/2 years didn't keep up with the sectarian violence spreading so swiftly,' said Maj. Gen. Joseph F. Fil Jr., the senior U.S. commander for Baghdad. The new approach 'will take every bit of the five brigades' of combat troops now flowing in as reinforcements in the city of 6 million people, he said.
"It's fairly obvious that we transferred out too soon," said Col. Bryan Roberts, who commands a U.S. cavalry brigade in central Baghdad.
The limited U.S. troop presence was one reason that sectarian killings soared out of control in Baghdad after the February 2006 bombing of an important Shiite mosque in Samarra. That spurred what U.S. officers now call the sectarian cleansing of most of eastern Baghdad and large swaths of the west -- as Shiites forced Sunnis out of all but a few enclaves -- a movement that was arrested only with the troop increase this February.
'The sectarian cleansing is pretty much done on the east side' of Baghdad, said a U.S. military official. But since the influx of U.S. and Iraqi forces began, he said, 'for the most part the Shia expansion is frozen where it is.' "

source
Tyson, Ann Scott. (The Washington Post). Commanders in Iraq See 'Surge' Into '08. May 9, 2007.

posted: sunday, may 13, 2007, 10:33 AM ET
update: sunday, may 13, 2007, 10:45 AM ET

tags: iraq baghdad

Inatl conference: debt relief, reform, proxy war

"The Thursday conclave [at the international conference in Sharm el Sheik, Egypt] centered around trying to persuade the international community, particularly the Persian Gulf countries, to agree to a debt relief and financial aid for Iraq. The United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, said that donor countries, including Britain, Saudi Arabia and China, pledged to waive $30 billion in Iraqi debt.
In return, Baghdad promised to enact a series of reforms, like better inclusion of the country’s Sunni minority in the political process, an oil law and better legal protections for Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds." [1]

"Iraq has become a proxy battlefield for influence in the region between the Shiite Muslim government of Iran and the Sunni-led capitals of the Arab world. While the United States would like to help buttress Iraq’s Shiite-led central government, some Arab capitals have been reluctant to offer their support out of concern that they would, in turn, be helping to empower Iran.
Arab leaders believe that the presence of American troops in Iraq are destabilizing the region, inciting people to adopt the most radical Islamic ideologies. But they fear that a precipitous withdrawal would lead to civil war and give Iran a stronger hand in Iraq than it already has, analysts and former officials said." [2]

"For their part, the [U.S] official said, Arab governments need to show more appreciation of the problems Maliki faces and the progress, however slow, he has made. Iraq's Sunni Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, do not understand "what's really happening in Iraq," he said.
The official, who briefed reporters after attending the Rice-Maliki meeting, said that negative Arab views of Maliki's Shiite-dominated government are skewed by a fixation on the Sunni-Shiite divide, based on information from "interested parties" inside Iraq.
While the administration shares their concerns about Sunni minority rights and Shiite Iran's growing influence in Baghdad, he said, the answer "is not exclusion, passivity and ostracization of Iraq" by its neighbors." [3]

sources
[1] Cooper, Helene & Elsen, Jon. (The New York Times). U.S. Officials Meet Briefly With Iranians. May 4, 2007.
[2] Slackman, Michael & Cooper, Helene. (The New York Times). Concern Is High and Unity Hopes Are Nil at Talks on Iraq. May 3, 2007.
[3] DeYoung, Karen. (The Washington Post). Rice Presses Maliki on Eve Of Conference on Iraq Aid. May 3, 2007.

posted: wednesday, may 9, 2007, 9:48 AM ET

tags: iraq sharm el sheik

Iraqi dept removing anti-militia security officers

"A department of the Iraqi prime minister's office is playing a leading role in the arrest and removal of senior Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom had apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite militias, according to U.S. military officials in Baghdad.
. . . Although some of the officers appear to have been fired for legitimate reasons, such as poor performance or corruption, several were considered to be among the better Iraqi officers in the field. The dismissals have angered U.S. and Iraqi leaders who say the Shiite-led government is sabotaging the military to achieve sectarian goals.
. . . At the national level, some U.S. officials are increasingly concerned about the Office of the Commander in Chief, a behind-the-scenes department that works on military issues for the prime minister.
One adviser in the office, Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidri, has enough influence to remove and intimidate senior commanders, and her work has 'stifled' many officers who are afraid of angering her, a senior U.S. military official said. U.S. commanders are considering installing a U.S. liaison officer in the department to better understand its influence."

source
Partlow, Joshua. (The Washington Post). Maliki's Office Is Seen Behind Purge in Forces. April 30, 2007.

posted: sunday, may 6, 2007, 11:09 PM ET

tags: iraq bassima luay hasun al jaidri

Sunni "gated community" controversy

"The U.S. military is walling off at least 10 of Baghdad's most violent neighborhoods and using biometric technology to track some of their residents, creating what officers call 'gated communities' in an attempt to carve out oases of safety in this war-ravaged city.
The plan drew widespread condemnation in Iraq this past week. On Sunday night, Prime Minister Nouri-al Maliki told news services that he would work to halt construction of a wall around the Sunni district of Adhamiyah, which residents said would aggravate sectarian tensions by segregating them from Shiite neighbors.
. . . The tactic is part of the two-month-old U.S. and Iraqi counterinsurgency plan to calm sectarian strife and is loosely modeled after efforts in cities such as Tall Afar and Fallujah, where the military says it has curbed violence by strictly controlling access. The gated communities concept has produced mixed results in previous wars -- including failure in Vietnam, where peasants were forcibly moved to fortified hamlets, only to become sympathizers of the insurgency.
. . . [S]outhern Ghazaliyah is a base for al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni insurgent groups." [1]

"The barrier quickly drew criticism from Adhamiyah residents, who . . . likened it to the barriers Israel has constructed around the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which are much-maligned in the Arab world. Other critics joined the outcry, among them human rights activists and representatives of anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, one of whom told reporters in Najaf that the walls amounted to a 'siege of the city.'
. . . Dawood al-Azami, deputy director of the Adhamiyah local council, said 90 percent of respondents to a survey distributed in the neighborhood on Sunday were strongly opposed to the wall, the Associated Press reported.
U.S. military officials say many residents of the city's newly walled-off neighborhoods are pleased with the barriers. Mohammad al-Kabi [a building contractor] is one.
. . . Checkpoints and road closures already have severed his ties to friends and business partners on the other side of wall, he said. There used to be daily clashes on his street. Now, with the wall going up, he said he feels more protected.
'There are no other options,' said Kabi, a Shiite Muslim. 'It has reduced the violence. The snipers are not shooting at us anymore.' [2]

"The strong reaction underscores the sense of powerlessness Iraqis feel in the face of the American military, whose presence is all the more pervasive as an increasing number of troops move on to the city’s streets.
And it has proved to be an unlikely boon for Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, making the Shiite politician — at least for now — into a champion for Sunnis because he publicly opposed the wall’s construction." [3]

source
[1] Brulliard, Karin. (The Washington Post). 'Gated Communities' For the War-Ravaged. April 23, 2007.
[2] Bruillard, Karin. (The Washington Post). Iraq Blast Kills 9 GIs, Injures 20 At Outpost. April 24, 2007.
[3] Rubin, Alissa J. (The New York Times). Frustration Over Wall Unites Sunni and Shiite. April 24, 2007.

posted: wednesday, april 25, 2007, 3:48 PM ET

tags: iraq gated communities

Is terrorism the main cause of violence in Iraq?

In a recent interview on PBS's NewsHour, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, said:

"The enemy, al-Qaida in particular, has certainly still sought to and, in fact, carried out sensational attacks at various points, trying to reignite sectarian violence and, in some cases, ethnic violence in, for example, Kirkuk.
Those have generally, almost always, been unsuccessful in reigniting sectarian violence, although that was the case in a horrific incident in Tall Afar in western Anbar province in the northwestern part of Iraq a week or so ago and had to be tamped down by interior ministry, defense officials in the Iraqi army.
So, again, mixed results, to be truthful, some encouraging indicators in Baghdad, but then the enemy seeking to take violence outside of Baghdad. And we've certainly gone after al-Qaida, as they have sought to open new fronts in Diyala province north of Baghdad, in the far north, and in the northeast, around Kirkuk."

And in answer to a question involving more than 5,000 Iraqi civilian deaths in the past seven weeks, Gen. Petraeus said that "al-Qaida is still capable and able to cause significant death of innocent civilians." [1]

Does this mean that al-Qaida is responsible for most of the current violence in Iraq, both directly through acts such as the Tall Afar bombing and through acts of provocation, again like the Tall Afar bombing, that intend to ignite sectarian violence? How much of the violence is the Sunni insurgency responsible for? Are al-Qaida and the insurgency working together at all?

If al-Qaida is responsible for much or most of the current violence, then would it be fair to characterize much or most of the current violence as a result of either direct or indirect terrorism, and not a direct result of sectarianism?

And if al-Qaida terrorism, and not Iraqi sectarianism, is responsible for much or most of the current violence, would that increase the motivation for the U.S. to remain in Iraq at least until Iraq is able to successfully defend itself? The reasons for this would be: 1) The U.S. had dismantled Iraq's previous security forces which would have presumably been able to defend itself against al-Qaida; 2) The U.S. turned Iraq into an al-Qaida target by overthrowing it, a Muslim nation; and 3) The U.S. is apparently motivated to oppose al-Qaida in its so-called war on terror.

Concerning reason #2, some have said that the U.S. is also causing much or most of the violence in Iraq through its continued occupation of that country. If America is causing most of the violence, then it should withdraw, especially if the government and/or people of Iraq formally request this. If its presence is causing much of the violence, then its withdrawal will have to be balanced against how much violence it is preventing through its continued presence. And also, on whether the government and/or people of Iraq have formally asked it to stay or go. *

The U.S. military should also withdraw for reasons #1 and #3 if the government and/or people of Iraq formally ask it to withdraw. Currently, this has not happened. Public pronouncements by many of Iraq's leaders and a recent poll conducted by ABC News and others [2] seem to indicate that both the government and people of Iraq want America to stay at least until Iraq is able to defend itself. I am not aware of any Iraqi leaders outside of Sadr who have requested America's withdrawal before this level of competency has occurred.

The question of who al-Qaida and some of these insurgent groups are, exactly, remains though. At least for me.

footnote
* I'm not sure what America should do if one formally asks it to stay and the other asks it to go, however.

source
[1] The Online NewsHour. Petraeus Cites Areas of Improvement in Baghdad. April 4, 2007.
[2] ABC News. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll -Iraq: Where things stand. Ebbing hope in a landscape of loss marks a national survey of Iraq. March 19, 2007.

posted: sunday, april 8, 2007, 11:44 AM ET
update: sunday, april 8, 2007, 3:49 AM ET

tags: iraq david petraeus al qaeda

Revenge killings in Tal Afar after bombings

"One of the bloodiest chapters in Iraq’s sectarian strife unfolded over the past two days in the northern city of Tal Afar where gunmen, some of them apparently police officers, participated in the revenge killings of scores of Sunnis in the aftermath of a huge double suicide bombing in a Shiite area.
Two hours after the explosion of truck bombs, which killed 83 people and wounded more than 185, the gunmen — some of whom witnesses recognized as police officers — went house to house in a Sunni neighborhood, dragged people into the street and shot them in the head, witnesses and local leaders said. The killing went on for several hours before the Iraqi Army intervened. The police are mostly Shiites." [1]

" 'The car bombs are aimed at Shia, and when they see it so one-sided and it keeps carrying on, without any government action, I think it's a matter of time before they come back for revenge,' said Haider al-Ebaidi, a Shiite lawmaker. To Ebaidi, the progress of the security plan, which U.S. and Iraqi forces began implementing in the middle of February, 'so far has been very slow, and the longer it takes, the more pressure there will be on the people to seek help from militias, and this is very dangerous.'
But U.S. military officials cautioned that the attacks in Tall Afar and south of Baghdad did not necessarily add up to a resurgence of Shiite militias.
. . . 'Whether we can say that some group is back or some militia is back after two isolated events in two different parts of the country is probably too early to say,' said Lt. Col. Christopher C. Garver, a U.S. military spokesman.
. . . Tall Afar had as many as 200,000 residents several years ago, although U.S. military officials say the population has declined to 80,000. Most residents are ethnic Turkmen, about 70 percent of them Sunni and 25 percent Shiite." [2]

sources
[1] Rubin, Alissa J. (The New York Times). 70 Killed in Wave of Revenge in Northern Iraq. March 29, 2007.
[2] Partlow, Joshua. (The Washington Post). Gunmen Go On Rampage In Iraqi City. March 29, 2007.

posted: saturday, march 31, 2007, 5:39 PM ET

tags: iraq tall afar

Khalizad met insurgents / Constitution regions bad, critics say

"The senior American envoy in Iraq, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, held talks last year with men he believed represented major insurgent groups in a drive to bring militant Sunni Arabs into politics.
'There were discussions with the representatives of various groups in the aftermath of the elections, and during the formation of the government before the Samarra incident, and some discussions afterwards as well,' Mr. Khalilzad said in a farewell interview on Friday at his home inside the fortified Green Zone.
. . . An American official said it was difficult to determine whether the people Mr. Khalilzad met with really were influential representatives of insurgent groups, as they claimed.
. . . The most complex legacy of Mr. Khalilzad — and arguably the most divisive — is the Constitution, passed in a national referendum in October 2005. Sunni Arab voters overwhelmingly rejected it, but most Shiites and Kurds, who make up 80 percent of the population, supported it. That paved the way for full-term elections in December 2005.
. . . Mr. Khalilzad and his colleagues, the critics say, were so fixated on meeting the political timetable laid out by the White House that they pushed through a document that may have inflamed the Sunni-led insurgency by enshrining strong regional control. The Constitution reaffirms Sunni Arab beliefs that Shiites and Kurds want oil and territory." [1]

The new draft oil law hasn't fixed that? And what about that charge that the oil law is cheating Iraq out of much or most of its oil revenue?

source
[1] Wong, Edward. (The New York Times). U.S. Envoy Says He Had Meetings With Iraq Rebels. March 26, 2007.

related posting
Is draft oil law cheating Iraq out of revenue? March 14, 2007.

posted: thursday, march 29, 2007, 12:19 AM ET
update: thursday, march 29, 2007, 12:22 AM ET

tags: iraq zalmay khalilzad federalism oil

Fadhila to exit Shia bloc, wants to be nonsectarian

"[A] growing number of politicians publicly declared that they embraced the idea of a cross-sectarian political movement that has been gaining strength this week. It was not yet clear the form the front would take, but if successful it would have broad implications for parliamentary divisions and the way government ministries are apportioned: they are currently handed out to parties, most of which have clear sectarian sympathies.
Most significantly, the Fadhila Party, a faction of the united Shiite bloc, the largest group in Parliament, announced it was leaving the bloc.
A spokesman for Fadhila suggested there was frustration with sectarian politics.
'We want to try to build a new politics that is not sectarian that will include all of Iraqi society,' said Bassim Sharif, a leader of the Fadhila party. However, he stopped short of saying that they would join the new bloc. 'For now we will try to work alone to prove there is a Shiite party that can work in a nonsectarian way.' But, he added, 'this is the first step to save Iraq from this crisis.' " [1]

Regarding Fadhila leaving the Shiite bloc, "[o]ne possible scenario in coming weeks would be an alliance between Fadhila and the Iraqi National List, a group led by secular Shiite and former prime minister Ayad Allawi, which has 25 seats.
. . . Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish lawmaker, said he interpreted the move as evidence of growing disapproval of Maliki and the ruling alliance.
"These changes show that neither the Shiite coalition nor the government has been able to improve things and that they are gradually growing weaker," Othman said.
Mithal al-Alusi, a Sunni parliament member, said it is too early to tell how the party's withdrawal will alter Iraq's political landscape. But he said the development should be seen as evidence that democracy has taken root in Iraq." [2]

"Shiite parties under the umbrella of the United Iraqi Alliance now hold 113 seats. Kurdish parties have 53 seats and Sunni groups have 44. The remaining 50 members are independent or do not belong to sectarian groupings." [2]

source
[1] Rubin, Alissa. (The New York Times). Attacks on Shiite Pilgrims Continue. March 8, 2007.
[2] Londono, Ernesto. (The Washington Post). Shiite Bloc in Parliament Diminished by Defection. March 8, 2007.

posted: monday, march 12, 2007, 4:50 AM ET

tags: iraq fadhila

Extremism, sectarianism, politicians and the people

"Moderates Will Be Vigorously Supported in their Battle with Violent Extremists
•Counter extremist portrayal of Iraq’s conflict as Sunni vs. Shi’a, rather than moderates vs. extremists.
•Recognize and act upon the reality that the United States has a national interest in seeing moderates succeed.
•Build and sustain strategic partnerships with moderate Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds." [1]

"•Primary challenge is violent extremists from multiple communities; the center is eroding and sectarianism is spiking.
•Iraqis increasingly disillusioned with Coalition efforts.
•While still committed to a unified Iraq, many Iraqis are also advancing sectarian agendas --as hedging strategies, pursuit of narrow interests, and due to history.
•Dialogue with insurgents has not improved security and may not produce strategic gains in current context." [2]

"SECRETARY RICE: . . . Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed realities in the Middle East. Historic change is unfolding in the region, unleashing old grievances, new anxieties, and some violence, but is also revealing a promising new strategic realignment in the Middle East. This is the same alignment that we see in Iraq. On one side are the many reformers and responsible leaders who seek to advance their interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other side are extremists of every sect and ethnicity who use violence to spread chaos to undermine democratic governments and to impose agendas of hate and intolerance.
Our most urgent diplomatic goal is to empower reformers and responsible leaders across the region, and to confront extremists. The proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those who share these goals -- our allies, Israel and Turkey, of course, but democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, and the responsible governments of the Gulf States, plus Egypt and Jordan, or the GCC plus two." [3]

"We have organized our diplomacy around the proposition that you begin with those who share your views of how the Middle East ought to develop, and therefore our diplomacy and my trip will focus heavily on rallying the support of those responsible Arab states to support the Government of Iraq, to support what needs to be done there, to support of course also Lebanon and the moderate Palestinians.
But as to Iraq, I do believe that the states of the Gulf and the Egyptians and the Jordanians understand increasingly that if they are to resist as much they want to, if they are to resist Iranian influence or increases in Iranian influence in the Middle East, something that they fear quite greatly, then it is going to require support for Iraq. Because Iraq can either be a barrier to further Iranian influence or it can become a bridge if it is not dealt with effectively." [4]

"To many, the crux of Iraq's intractable problem is whether the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- installed as Shiite Muslims were emerging from oppression under Saddam Hussein to become the country's ruling majority -- can rise above deep sectarian rivalry and protect Iraqi neighborhoods equitably, even in the face of catastrophic insurgent attacks by Sunni Arabs.
'The main reason for what's taking place in Iraq is the settlement of historical paybacks,' said Faiz Botros, 50, an Iraqi Christian sitting at a sidewalk table . . . in central Baghdad. 'Neither 20,000 soldiers, nor 100,000, nor hundreds of thousands, will change anything. In Iraq, the politicians are still living in a mentality from 1,400 years ago. And this is the disaster of Iraq.'
. . . 'This is not a one-party decision,' Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi said. 'It doesn't depend on Maliki or the UIA' -- a reference to the dominant Shiite coalition in the parliament -- 'or the Shia or the Sunnis alone. It depends on all parties and how convinced they are they want to live together. This is a process and it is historical work. Some have illusions they can gain power again. Others want to impose their ways.' " [5]

source
[1] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007. p. 9. (Major Strategic Shifts).
[2] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007. p. 7. (Key Assumptions: Now).
[3] U.S. Department of State. Briefing by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January 11, 2007 (quote from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice).
[4] U.S. Department of State. Iraq: A New Way Forward: Secretary Condoleezza Rice. Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. January 11, 2007.
[5] The Washington Post. Bush's Shift in Strategy Gets Dubious Reception On Streets of Baghdad. January 12, 2007.

posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 1:10 PM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:36 PM ET

tags: iraq bush

The Iraq sectarian proxy war

"For Maj. William Voorhies, the American commander of the military training unit at the scene [in Baghdad], the moment encapsulated his increasingly frustrating task — trying to build up Iraqi security forces who themselves are being used as proxies in a spreading sectarian war. This time, it was a Sunni politician — Vice Prime Minister Salam al-Zubaie — but the more powerful Shiites interfered even more often.
. . . This country’s security is going to be left in the hands of Iraqi forces. Those forces, already struggling with corruption and infiltration, have shown little willingness to stand up to political pressure, especially when the Americans are not there to support them. That suggests, the commanders say, that if the Americans leave soon, violence will redouble.
. . . The Sunni forces are being bolstered by support from insurgent strongholds in the West. The Shiite militias are using neighborhoods in the north, specifically Shuala and Sadr City, as bases of operation. There is also increasing evidence that militia members from southern cities like Basra are coming to Baghdad to join the fight."

source
The New York Times. Sectarian Ties Weaken Duty’s Call for Iraq Forces. December 28, 2006.

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posted: friday, december 29, 2006, 10:01 PM ET
update: friday, december 29, 2006, 10:03 PM ET

tags: iraq proxy sectarian