Saturday, May 26, 2007

New US plan to have political emphasis

"Top U.S. commanders and diplomats in Iraq are completing a far-reaching campaign plan for a new U.S. strategy.
. . . The classified plan, scheduled to be finished by May 31, is a joint effort between Gen. David H. Petraeus, the senior American general in Iraq, and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker.
. . . The overarching aim of the plan, which sets goals for the end of this year and the end of 2008, is more political than military: to negotiate settlements between warring factions in Iraq from the national level down to the local level.
. . . The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously -- in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of 'clear, hold and build.' One shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces . . . toward protecting Iraq's population in trouble areas.
. . . Next, the plan emphasizes building the government's capacity to function, admitting severe weaknesses in government ministries and often nonexistent institutional links between the central government and provincial and local governments.
. . . Finally, the campaign plan aims to purge Iraq's leadership of a small but influential number of officials and commanders whose sectarian and criminal agendas are thwarting U.S. efforts."

source
Tyson, Ann Scott. (The Washington Post). New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics. May 23, 2007.

posted: saturday, may 26, 2007, 10:15 AM ET

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Tuesday, May 01, 2007

War of insurgency-subversion-infiltration post-WWII

"Following World War II, there were ample indicators that America's enemies would turn to insurgency to negate our advantages in firepower and mobility. The French experiences in Indochina and Algeria offered object lessons to Western armies facing unconventional foes. These lessons were not lost on the more astute members of America's political class. In 1961, President Kennedy warned of 'another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by evading and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.' In response to these threats, Kennedy undertook a comprehensive program to prepare America's armed forces for counterinsurgency."

source
Yingling, Paul, Lt. Col. (Armed Forces Journal). A failure in generalship. May, 2007. *

footnote
* Good article, but it doesn't mention the surge or Gen. Petraeus who are doing the counterinsurgency that the article seems to favor.

posted: tuesday, may 1, 2007, 4:22 PM ET


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Sunday, April 29, 2007

Excerpts from Gen. Petraeus press conference

"The focus of Multinational Force Iraq is, of course, on working with our Iraqi counterparts to help improve security for the people of Iraq in order to give Iraqi leaders the time and space they need to come to grips with the tough political issues that must be resolved. Resolution of these issues is the key to the achievement of reconciliation among the various ethnic and sectarian groups, political parties and leaders in order to achieve a lasting solution to Iraq's problems.
We are still in the relatively early stages of our new effort, about two months into it, with three of five Army surge brigades and two additional Marine battalions on the ground, and the remainder of the additional combat forces scheduled to be operating in their areas by mid-June.
Baghdad is the main effort, and we continue to establish joint security stations and combat outposts in the city and in the belts around it. The presence of coalition and Iraqi forces and increased operational tempo, especially in areas where until recently we had no sustained presence, have begun to produce results. Most significantly, Iraqi and coalition forces have helped to bring about a substantial reduction in the rate of sectarian murders each month from January until now in Baghdad, a reduction of about two-thirds. There have also been increases in weapons caches seized and the number of actionable tips received.
In the Ramadi area, for example, U.S. and Iraqi forces have found nearly as many caches in the first four months of this year as they found in all of last year.
Beyond this, we are seeing a revival of markets, renewed commerce, the return of some displaced families and the slow resumption of services, though I want to be very clear that there is vastly more work to be done across the board and in many areas, and I again note that we are really just getting started with the new effort.
I am well aware that the sense of gradual progress and achievement we feel on the ground in many areas in Iraq is often eclipsed by the sensational attacks that overshadow our daily accomplishments. While the enemy's effectiveness in carrying out such attacks has been reduced by our operations to some degree, there clearly are still far too many of them, and we obviously are focusing heavily on actions to identify and dismantle the networks that carry out car bomb and suicide vest attacks and their supporting infrastructure.
Our achievements have not come without sacrifice. Our increase in operational tempo, location of our forces in the populations they are securing and conduct of operations in areas where we previously had no presence, as well as the enemy's greater use of certain types of explosive devices, have led to an increase in our losses. Our Iraqi partners have sacrificed heavily as well, with losses generally two to three times ours or even more.
Indeed, while some Iraqi forces remain a work in progress, there should be no question that Iraq's soldiers and police are fighting and dying for their country, and a number of them have impressively shouldered their part of the burden of the fight against al Qaeda and the other enemies of the new Iraq. To help them progress, we have steadily been increasing the number of transition teams, the train and equip effort, and steadily strengthening the partnership programs between our forces and Iraqi elements.
The situation in Iraq is, in sum, exceedingly complex and very tough. Success will take continued commitment, perseverance and sacrifice, all to make possible an opportunity for the all-important Iraqi political actions that are the key to long-term solutions to Iraq's many problems. Because we are operating in new areas and challenging elements in those areas, this effort may get harder before it gets easier.
Success, in the end, will depend on Iraqi actions. As I noted during my confirmation hearing, military action is necessary but not sufficient. We can provide the Iraqis an opportunity, but they will have to exploit it.
During Secretary Gates' recent visit to Iraq, we agreed that in early September, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and I would provide an assessment of the situation in Iraq with respect to our mission and offer recommendations on the way ahead. We will be forthright in that assessment, as I believe I have been with you today.
Finally, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank all Americans for their support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians serving in Iraq. Our young men and women in uniform deserve the recognition that Tom Brokaw accorded them when he described them as America's 'new greatest generation.' It's a privilege to serve with them again."

"[QUESTION]: You say that Iraq is now the central focus of al Qaeda's worldwide effort. Are you saying that al Qaeda in Iraq is now the sort of principal enemy of the U.S. forces stationed there? Before it was Shi'a groups. And do you see that al Qaeda in Iraq -- do you see any evidence that it is linked internationally to bin Laden? How many foreign fighters are actually there?
GEN. PETRAEUS: First of all, we do definitely see links to the greater al Qaeda network. I think you know that we have at various times intercepted messages to and from. There is no question but that there is a network that supports the movement of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq.
It is something we can, you know, keep some track of in a broad way. Obviously, when we can get the final 50 meters, if you will, we then take action against it.
It is clearly the element in Iraq that conducts the sensational attacks, these attacks that, as I mentioned, cause not just horrific physical damage -- and which, by the way, have been increasingly indiscriminate. Secretary Gates noted the other day that al Qaeda has declared war on all Iraqis, and I think that that is an accurate statement. They have killed and wounded and maimed countless Iraqi civilians in addition to, certainly, coalition and Iraqi security forces, and they have done that, again, without regard to ethnosectarian identity.
That significance of al Qaeda in the conduct of the sensational attacks, the huge car bomb attacks against which we have been hardening markets, hardening neighborhoods, trying to limit movement and so forth -- those attacks, again, are of extraordinary significance because they can literally drown out anything else that might be happening.
As I mentioned, we generally in many areas -- not all, but in many areas -- have a sense of sort of incremental progress. Again, that is not transmitted at all. Of course it will never break through the noise and the understandable coverage given to it in the press of a sensational attack that kills many Iraqis.
So this is a -- you know, it is a very significant enemy. I think it is probably public enemy number one. It is the enemy whose actions sparked the enormous increase in sectarian violence that did so much damage to Iraq in 2006, the bombing of the Al Askari mosque in Samarra, the gold-domed mosque there, the third holiest Shi'a shrine. And it is the organization that continues to try to reignite not just sectarian violence but ethnic violence, as well, going after Iraqi Kurds in Nineveh province and Kirkuk and areas such as that, as well. So again, I think a very, very significant enemy in that regard."

"We will have seen [by September] additional Iraqi security forces -- I forget the exact number that is being trained just in the month of May that will graduate from this greatly expanded institutional training capacity of the Iraqis. I think it's in the order of 7,000 to 9,000 in the military alone."

"The Iranian involvement has really become much clearer to us and brought into much more focus during the interrogation of the members -- the heads of the Qazali network and some of the key members of that network that have been in detention now for a month or more."

"I don't think we have found a link [of Iran] to the spectacular car-bomb attacks, which we believe are generally al Qaeda and elements sort of connected to al Qaeda. Typically, in fact, still we believe that, oh, 80 to 90 percent of the suicide attacks are carried out by foreigners. That's a network, again, that typically brings them in through Syria and is again a major concern and certainly a hope that Syria will crack down on the ability of people to come through their airport and so forth and then be brought into Iraq."

"[Prime Minister Maliki is] not the Prime Minister Tony Blair of Iraq. He does not have a parliamentary majority. He does not have his ministers in all of the different ministries. They are from all kinds of different parties. They sometimes sound a bit discordant in their statements to the press and their statements to other countries. It's a very, very challenging situation in which to lead."

"Well, look, I think first of all that the tribal elements of Iraq are a fact of life, and that what Iraq eventually will have is some form of government that at least listens to and incorporates the views of tribes and sheikhs, particularly in an area like Anbar province. Now, it varies when you're in cities; the tribal influence is less.
But I think that, candidly, a mistake that we may have made in early days was not to pay enough attention to these very important elements of Iraqi society, which still play a very, very key role and are really, you know, a lot more than I think sort of the stereotypical view of tribes. I mean, each tribe generally has a construction company, an import-export business, and a trucking company as well. I mean these are entrepreneurs as well as tribes, and they provide a variety of services to the members of their tribes.
So I think, again, that what results in Anbar province will actually have the features of democratic governance representing the citizens of Anbar province and being responsive to them.
But among those elements to whom they are responsive will be certainly the sheikhs and the leaders of the major tribes in that area, because of the allegiance that the people give to them."

"[T]he progress is interesting, because it's a negative. It means nothing happened, in most cases. In other words, there were not sectarian murders. Whether that is newsworthy before it goes on for several weeks is obviously arguable.
But anyway, so what I asked was, 'Hey, come on, it's about dusk, let's go -- we'll fly around the city a little bit.' And we flew around. And so -- I mean, it was unbelievable.
This is a day in which I think there was a car bomb in Iraq, some of . . . [Baghdad's] seven million citizens were affected by that, but you could not have told that from what we saw over the city. There were three big amusement parks operational. I'm talking about, you know, roller coaster kinds of -- these are not just a couple little merry-go-rounds in small neighborhood parks. Restaurants in some parts of the city were booming. Lots of markets were open. The people were on the street. There were -- there had to be a thousand soccer games ongoing. They're watering the grass in various professional soccer fields -- the soccer leagues.
You know, all of this is actually so foreign, I think, in the mind of most people who see the news and of course do see that day's explosion or something like that. And actually there is a city of seven million in which life goes on, and again, citizens are determined to carry on with their life."

source
U.S. Department of Defense. DoD News Briefing with Gen. Petraeus from the Pentagon. (Transcript). April 26, 2007.

video
The Pentagon Channel. Pentagon Briefing 26 April 2007. (Click appropriate link or use search box).

posted: sunday, april 29, 2007, 5:54 AM ET


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Sunday, April 08, 2007

Is terrorism the main cause of violence in Iraq?

In a recent interview on PBS's NewsHour, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, said:

"The enemy, al-Qaida in particular, has certainly still sought to and, in fact, carried out sensational attacks at various points, trying to reignite sectarian violence and, in some cases, ethnic violence in, for example, Kirkuk.
Those have generally, almost always, been unsuccessful in reigniting sectarian violence, although that was the case in a horrific incident in Tall Afar in western Anbar province in the northwestern part of Iraq a week or so ago and had to be tamped down by interior ministry, defense officials in the Iraqi army.
So, again, mixed results, to be truthful, some encouraging indicators in Baghdad, but then the enemy seeking to take violence outside of Baghdad. And we've certainly gone after al-Qaida, as they have sought to open new fronts in Diyala province north of Baghdad, in the far north, and in the northeast, around Kirkuk."

And in answer to a question involving more than 5,000 Iraqi civilian deaths in the past seven weeks, Gen. Petraeus said that "al-Qaida is still capable and able to cause significant death of innocent civilians." [1]

Does this mean that al-Qaida is responsible for most of the current violence in Iraq, both directly through acts such as the Tall Afar bombing and through acts of provocation, again like the Tall Afar bombing, that intend to ignite sectarian violence? How much of the violence is the Sunni insurgency responsible for? Are al-Qaida and the insurgency working together at all?

If al-Qaida is responsible for much or most of the current violence, then would it be fair to characterize much or most of the current violence as a result of either direct or indirect terrorism, and not a direct result of sectarianism?

And if al-Qaida terrorism, and not Iraqi sectarianism, is responsible for much or most of the current violence, would that increase the motivation for the U.S. to remain in Iraq at least until Iraq is able to successfully defend itself? The reasons for this would be: 1) The U.S. had dismantled Iraq's previous security forces which would have presumably been able to defend itself against al-Qaida; 2) The U.S. turned Iraq into an al-Qaida target by overthrowing it, a Muslim nation; and 3) The U.S. is apparently motivated to oppose al-Qaida in its so-called war on terror.

Concerning reason #2, some have said that the U.S. is also causing much or most of the violence in Iraq through its continued occupation of that country. If America is causing most of the violence, then it should withdraw, especially if the government and/or people of Iraq formally request this. If its presence is causing much of the violence, then its withdrawal will have to be balanced against how much violence it is preventing through its continued presence. And also, on whether the government and/or people of Iraq have formally asked it to stay or go. *

The U.S. military should also withdraw for reasons #1 and #3 if the government and/or people of Iraq formally ask it to withdraw. Currently, this has not happened. Public pronouncements by many of Iraq's leaders and a recent poll conducted by ABC News and others [2] seem to indicate that both the government and people of Iraq want America to stay at least until Iraq is able to defend itself. I am not aware of any Iraqi leaders outside of Sadr who have requested America's withdrawal before this level of competency has occurred.

The question of who al-Qaida and some of these insurgent groups are, exactly, remains though. At least for me.

footnote
* I'm not sure what America should do if one formally asks it to stay and the other asks it to go, however.

source
[1] The Online NewsHour. Petraeus Cites Areas of Improvement in Baghdad. April 4, 2007.
[2] ABC News. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll -Iraq: Where things stand. Ebbing hope in a landscape of loss marks a national survey of Iraq. March 19, 2007.

posted: sunday, april 8, 2007, 11:44 AM ET

update: sunday, april 8, 2007, 3:49 AM ET

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Monday, March 12, 2007

Petreaus press conference (video)


"General Petraeus repeatedly stressed the long-term nature of the troop increase.
. . . He said there were no 'looming' requests for additional troops and that he had not yet taken a position on an assessment by the second-ranking commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, that the greatly enlarged American force remain until February 2008.
But he added, 'If you’re going to achieve the kinds of effects that we probably need, it would need to be sustained certainly for some time well beyond the summer.'
Military officials in Iraq have indicated that they would need a large American troop presence for at least a year and probably far longer to achieve lasting stability. For now, Congress seems persuaded to give General Petraeus’s strategy a year to yield results, setting the summer of 2008 as a deadline for the return of all troops.
General Petraeus’s open-ended strategy appeared to be an effort to avoid a repeat of the pattern that has doomed past American efforts to halt the insurgency. In hot spots including Tal Afar and Diyala, United States soldiers have cracked down on insurgents and then reduced the American presence only to see insurgents retake old ground." [1]

Q: "A number of people that we spoke to yesterday were lamenting the fact that Mahdi Army wasn't there to help. That in the past, security has been much better for the pilgrims. . . . Do you think that there is role for Mahdi Army in this sort of manner?
. . . GEN. PETRAEUS: Well, you know, ultimately, that's a question for -- truly for the Iraqi government, for its authorities and certainly its security force leaders.
You know, many of our -- of the coalition countries have a variety of auxiliary police or other functions. The challenge, of course, is that some of these organizations have participated in true excesses, and they have been responsible, some of them, some the extremist elements of them -- and I think that the challenge has been to determine, you know, how do you incorporate those who want to serve a positive -- in a positive way, and as neighborhood watches, let's say, but unarmed in our own communities, but without turning into something much more than that?
. . . I must tell you that I was taken aback by what I saw in driving around Ghazalia, parts of Adhamiya, parts of Mansour, parts of East Rashid, the Dura area and so forth. And some of that certainly, clearly, is the result of extremist sectarian militias. And I think that is the concern about employing them." [2]

Gen. Petraeus also said, "I was heartened by what I saw in Ramadi, by what I've heard described about in Hit, where again Anbaris, the members of those tribes, have said, enough, and have banded together, raised their hand, joined the police forces and in fact are standing and fighting against al Qaeda Iraq. And you can start to see, by the way, for what it's worth, an identity emerging among them that is, again, very heartening to someone who has been here since the beginning off and on and watched things go up and down in Anbar province -- frankly, mostly down during a variety of periods. So that's, again, a very, very interesting development in that regard." [2]

source
[1] Oppel, Richard A. Jr. (The New York Times). New U.S. Commander in Iraq Won’t Rule Out Need for Added Troops. March 9, 2007.
[2] Federal News Service. Multinational force Iraq press conference with General David Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commanding General. MNF-1. March 8, 2007. (no link).

video source

The Pentagon Channel. Gen. David Petraeus. March 8, 2007. (enter "petraeus" in search box).

posting: monday, march 12, 2007, 5:32 AM ET
update: monday, march 13, 2007, 9:52 PM ET


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Tuesday, February 13, 2007

Petraeus officially takes control

"Gen. David H. Petraeus, assuming his position as the new U.S. military commander in Iraq, said Saturday that the "rucksack of responsibility" was too heavy to carry alone there and that without cooperation between Iraqi and U.S. forces, "Iraq will be doomed to continued violence and civil strife."
During a handover ceremony below the crystal chandelier and marble columns in one of Saddam Hussein's former palaces, Petraeus characterized the challenges facing Iraq as daunting but said that "these tasks are achievable, this mission is doable." Promoted to the rank of four-star general, Petraeus will lead a growing U.S. force of more than 130,000 troops in Iraq in an attempt to contain the sectarian killing, especially in violence-racked Baghdad." [1]

" 'The stakes are very high. The way ahead will be hard, and there undoubtedly will be many tough days. But as I recently told members of the U.S. Senate, hard is not hopeless,' said Petraeus, who took over for 58-year-old Gen. George Casey.
Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez was Casey's predecessor and his tenure was marred by the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. He has since retired.
The Sunni insurgency broke out during Sanchez's command, and the conflict in Iraq took on the many of the aspects of a civil war during Casey's tenure. Casey had focused on attempts to train Iraqi forces and on plans to turn over control of security to the Iraqi Army and national police." [2]

"Among American military officers, General Petraeus is considered an imaginative leader with a deep understanding of Iraq’s problems, culled from two tours here. But for some in Baghdad, his assumption of control looked routine.
“The commanders change every now and then,” said Naseer al-Ani, a Sunni member of Parliament. “I don’t think that changing the commander will have a significant impact on the American policy.”
. . . Sami al-Askari, an aide to the prime minister, said the Iraqi government supported General Petraeus and had high hopes for his tenure.
'The character of the commander affects the performance of the military command,' he said. 'General Casey had a certain perspective in fighting terrorism, but we hope that General Petraeus will be more cooperative with the Iraqi command based on his past experience in Iraq, and the relationship will be smoother and more positive.' " [3]

source
[1] Partlow, Joshua. (The Washington Post). Path in Iraq Hard But Not Hopeless, U.S. General Says. February 11, 2007.
[2] Frayer, Lauren. (The Associated Press). New U.S. Commander Takes Over in Iraq. February 10, 2007.
[3] Cave, Damien. (The New York Times). New Boss Takes Reins of U.S. Forces in Iraq. February 11, 2007.

posted: tuesday, february 13, 2007, 6:53 PM ET

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Wednesday, February 07, 2007

Surge off to bad start; Petraeus may not make difference

"A growing number of Iraqis blamed the United States on Sunday for creating conditions that led to the worst single suicide bombing in the war, which devastated a Shiite market in Baghdad the day before. They argued that the Americans had been slow in completing the vaunted new American security plan, making Shiite neighborhoods much more vulnerable to such horrific attacks.
. . . In advance of the plan, which would flood Baghdad with thousands of new American and Iraqi troops, many Mahdi Army checkpoints were dismantled and its leaders were either in hiding or under arrest, which was one of the plan’s intended goals to reduce sectarian fighting. But with no immediate influx of new security forces to fill the void, Shiites say, Sunni militants and other anti-Shiite forces have been emboldened to plot the type of attack that obliterated the bustling Sadriya market on Saturday." [1]

(It's strange that after repeatedly saying that protecting people was the foundation of the surge, the U.S. would dismantle the old security system before installing the new. Is it reasonable to assume that dismantling old checkpoints without replacing them with new ones would make it easier to bring bombs into Baghdad? The recent increase in deaths has been mostly caused by bombs. Bombs have also been the favored weapon of the insurgents and terrorists. Who's in charge here and what are their motivations?)

"At a White House briefing on January 10 by two anonymous senior administration officials, one made this startlingly verifiable promise . . . :
"SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: . . . The Iraqis are going to have three brigades within Baghdad within a little more than a month. They have committed to trying to get one brigade in, I think, by the first of February, and two more by the 15th. . . .
'So people are going to be able to see pretty quickly that the Iraqis are or are not stepping up. And that provides the ability to judge.'
Alright, so now it's past the first of the month, and how's it going?
Steven R. Hurst reported on Thursday (Feb. 1) for the Associated Press: 'Local commanders. . . . said only about 2,000 of the additional troops had reached Baghdad or were nearby. . . .
'An Iraqi army brigade from Irbil, about 3,000 men in principle, will have at most 1,500 men when it finally arrives in Baghdad. The commander says 95 percent of the men don't speak Arabic. A brigade from Sulaimaniyah, also in the Kurdish north, has reached the Muthana Airport in central Baghdad, but it is only 1,000-men strong, not the expected 3,000.' " [2]

"Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new U.S. commander in Iraq, is assembling a small band of warrior-intellectuals -- including a quirky Australian anthropologist, a Princeton economist who is the son of a former U.S. attorney general and a military expert on the Vietnam War sharply critical of its top commanders -- in an eleventh-hour effort to reverse the downward trend in the Iraq war.
. . . Many military insiders are skeptical that . . . lessons learned by [Col. H.R.] McMaster in Tall Afar or Petraeus in Mosul will be easily applied in the far larger arena of Baghdad.
The joke among some staff officers was that Petraeus operated in such a freewheeling manner in Iraq's north that he had his own foreign policy with Syria and Turkey. In Baghdad, by contrast, he will have to operate constantly with Iraqi officials, with the U.S. government bureaucracy, and in the global media spotlight. Also, experts agree that the basic problem in Iraq is political, not military.
. . . 'It wouldn't surprise me if Congress pulled the rug out or the Iraqis blocked major revisions in strategy,' said Erin M. Simpson, a Harvard University counterinsurgency expert." [3]

sources
[1] Cave, Damien & Oppel, Richard A. (The New York Times). February 5, 2007. Iraqis Fault Pace of U.S. Plan in Attack.
[2] Froomkin, Dan. (The Washington Post). February 6, 2007. Bush Daring Dems on Iraq.
[3] Ricks, Thomas E. (The Washington Post). February 5, 2007. Officers With PhDs Advising War Effort.

posted: wednesday, february 7, 2007, 4:47 PM ET

update: friday, february 9, 2007, 12:54 PM ET

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Tuesday, February 06, 2007

Surge to count contractors as part of security force

"During an appearance before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month, Army Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new top commander in Iraq, said he counts the 'thousands of contract security forces' among the assets available to him to supplement the limited number of U.S. and Iraqi troops to be used for dealing with the insurgency.
A former senior Defense Intelligence Agency expert on the Middle East, retired Army Col. W. Patrick Lang, said last week that contracting out intelligence collection and security for Army units and their contractors 'results from actual military forces being too small.' He added: 'I can't remember a subordinate commander considering mercenaries as part of his forces.'
Retired Marine Gen. Anthony C. Zinni, who once headed the U.S. Central Command and today serves on an advisory board of a defense contractor, said there is a role for private firms taking on security missions. But he warned that problems can arise 'when they take on quasi-military roles.' "

source
Pincus, Walter. (The Washington Post). Security Contracts to Continue in Iraq. February 4, 2007.

posted: tuesday, february 6, 2007, 9:12 AM ET


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Sunday, January 28, 2007

America left Vietnam despite credible new strategy

"Certain parallels between Iraq and Vietnam are uncanny. A new general, David Petraeus, is taking over in Iraq with a credible new strategy, counterinsurgency. Four decades ago, General Creighton Abrams became the American commander in Vietnam, also with a new strategy. It called for taking and holding the villages and hamlets of South Vietnam. In a word, it was counterinsurgency, and it worked. Now in Iraq, Petraeus has as good a chance of success, starting with the pacification of Baghdad, as Abrams had. And the painful lesson of Vietnam applies in Iraq: Don't give up when victory is at hand." [1]

-------------------------------

-------------------------------

(Gen. Petraeus is the Baby Einstein of military strategy.)

-------------------------------

sources
[1] Barnes, Fred. (The Weekly Standard). February 5, 2007. Not This Time.
[2] Kagan, Frederick W. & Kristol, William. (The Weekly Standard). January 29, 2007. All We Are Saying . . . Is Give Petraeus a Chance.

posted: sunday, january 28, 2007, 8:53 PM ET
update: monday, january 29, 2007, 10:02 AM ET


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Tuesday, January 23, 2007

Surge numbers based on successful Mosul campaign

"Bush and the military came at the plan from different perspectives. [Gen. George] Casey asked for two more brigades for Baghdad, plus a third that would be stationed in Kuwait as a reserve and two others that would be put on call back in the United States.
Bush decided that was not enough. His advisers studied the experience in the northern Iraqi town of Mosul under Army Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who successfully undercut the insurgency there, and they decided they could not risk having too few troops. Bush had already decided to replace Casey with Petraeus, and through intermediaries the president reached out to Petraeus, who was supportive of more troops than Casey requested.
So the president reversed Casey's plan, deciding that all five brigades would go to Baghdad in a phased deployment. "The president came out and said, 'Let's err on the side of making sure they have everything they need,' " said a senior official."

source
The Washington Post. Embattled, Bush Held To Plan to Salvage Iraq. January 21, 2007.

posted: tuesday, january 23, 2007, 3:17 PM ET


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Sunday, January 21, 2007

Surge numbers low; relies heavily on Iraqi security

"When Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus assumes his duties as the new American commander in Iraq, he will be guided by a new military doctrine on counterinsurgency that makes the security of the population a chief objective.
. . . The additional five combat brigades that would be sent to Baghdad under President Bush’s strategy would roughly double the size of the American force involved in the security operation there, about 15,000 troops. But as a whole, that would still represent only a small portion of the 120,000-strong force that would be required to secure the entire capital according to the force ratios outlined in the military’s new field manual for counterinsurgency, which General Petraeus helped to draft.
Interviews with military officers suggest that the Bush administration can come close to meeting the manual’s guidelines by relying heavily on the efforts of Iraqi security forces and concentrating the effort on key neighborhoods. But this means that the strategy will depend greatly on the performance of Iraqi forces, including police units that have often been criticized as ineffectual or under the influence of Shiite militias."

source
The New York Times. In Baghdad, Pressing to Meet, With Iraqi Help, Pentagon’s Own Standard for Force Levels. January 19, 2007.

posted: sunday, january 21, 2007, 8:58 AM ET

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