Waiting to see surge effect; need reconciliation

"While Washington appears headed toward a political endgame on Iraq . . . the war on the ground is at an ebb tide. All sides -- including U.S. military strategists and Iraqi sectarian leaders and insurgents, as well as regional players such as Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Turkey -- are waiting to see whether the new U.S. approach to make the Iraqi capital safer will work.
. . . An official in Iraq warned that executing the new approach will take time. . . . '[T]here is no way we can defeat this insurgency by summer. I believe we can begin to turn the tide by then, and have an idea if we are doing it. To defeat it completely is a five-to-10-year project, minimum.'
. . . In Baghdad . . . [s]ectarian killings are down about 50 percent since the new strategy began, according to U.S military spokesmen. Car bombings are up, but so are tips from Iraqis. It is impossible to know how much of the decrease in violence is attributable to the biggest Shiite militia -- radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army -- deciding to lie low.
. . . The U.S. government keeps pushing for reconciliation, but there are few signs of movement toward that goal. 'Nothing is going to work until the parties are ready to compromise, and I don't see any indicators yet that they are,' said A. Heather Coyne, who has worked in Iraq both as a military reservist and as a civilian. 'Until then, any effect of the surge will be temporary.' " [1]

"The Sunni Arabs . . . want Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, a conservative Shiite, to make good on his promise to replace ineffective or corrupt ministers. Mr. Maliki promised the shake-up months ago, but the proposal now appears moribund.
The Sunni Arabs also want the Constitution amended to bring power back to Baghdad and reduce the chance that areas in the oil-rich, Shiite-dominated south will follow the model of Kurdistan and create an autonomous state.
. . . The Sunni Arabs continue to push for a rollback of purges of Sunni Arabs from government.
. . . The ruling Shiites must deal with Sunnis outside the government, in the factionalized insurgency, who can offer few guarantees on any promises to stop bombings against Shiites.
'We talk to people who say they represent the insurgents and they all say the same thing: ‘We oppose the occupation, but we don’t believe in killing civilians, in killing women and children,’ ' a senior adviser to Mr. Maliki said. 'But our people are dying in bombs every day. Who is killing them?' " [2]

sources
[1] Ricks, Thomas E. (The Washington Post). Politics Collide With Iraq Realities. April 8, 2007.
[2] Rubin, Alissa J. & Wong, Edward. (The New York Times). Patterns of War Shift in Iraq Amid U.S. Buildup. April 9, 2007.

posted: monday, april 9, 2007, 3:33 PM ET
update: tuesday, april 10, 2007, 10:05 PM ET

tags: iraq surge

Iraq's long-awaited national reconciliation conference accomplishes little

"Iraq's prime minister reached out to Sunni Arabs at a national reconciliation conference on Saturday, urging Saddam Hussein-era officers to join the new army and a review of the ban against members of the former dictator's ruling party.
But key players on both ends of the Sunni-Shiite divide skipped the meeting, raising doubt that the conference will succeed in healing the country's wounds.
'We firmly believe that national reconciliation is the only guaranteed path toward security, stability and prosperity. The alternative, God forbid, is death and destruction and the loss of Iraq,' Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said in his opening remarks.
The long-awaited gathering was touted by the Iraqi government and the White House as a chance to rally ethnic, religious and political groups around a common strategy for ending the country's violence.
. . . [Shiite cleric Muktada] Al-Sadr's bloc said it was boycotting the two-day meeting, as did two major Sunni groups and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a secular Shiite." [1]

"While the conference was billed as an attempt at reconciliation, no one claiming to represent either the Shiite militias or the Sunni extremists, who together are driving the current sectarian strife, was in attendance. Moktada al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric whose militia, the Mahdi Army, has been responsible for much of the sectarian violence, refused an invitation, according to a lawmaker who helped set up the conference.
In addition, the Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni leaders who were at the gathering did not present any new ideas for how to rein in the militias or insurgents.
Instead, in a series of speeches broadcast live on Iraqi national television, top figures in the government renewed calls for Iraqis to work together for stability.
Mr. Maliki also repeated his invitation to former officers and soldiers in the old Iraqi Army, including some members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, to re-enlist." [2]

sources
[1] The Associated Press. Iraq's Al-Maliki Reaches Out to Sunnis. December 16, 2006.
[2] The New York Times. Iraqi Chief Calls Forum to Press for National Reunification; Major Groups Are Absent. December 17, 2006.

posted: sunday, december 17, 2006, 5:27 PM ET

iraq nuri al-maliki reconciliation moktada al-sadr ayad allawi