What's Iraq?

"The Bush administration conjures up the image of a strong global al Qaeda movement to motivate America's support for the war.
By contrast, many Americans who oppose our presence in Iraq focus on sectarian hatreds that have come to affect millions of Iraqis. While there is an element of truth to each of these images of our challenge in Iraq, neither is the most accurate way to understand the war.
Consider first the numbers of those fighting in Iraq. Throughout the first three years of the Iraq war, Brookings' estimates of the size of the resistance, based largely on CENTCOM data, ranged from 15,000 to 20,000 fighters. Only about 1,000 to 2,000 al Qaeda were typically in Iraq. Yet these individuals, altogether representing less than 0.1 percent of Iraq's population, have used sabotage and terror and assassination so effectively as to prevent Iraqi economic recovery, the formation of a strong government, or a sense of hopefulness among the Iraqi population.
Admittedly, guerrilla movements are often relatively small, but Iraq's insurgency has been particularly so. Its al Qaeda element, responsible for most of the suicide attacks such as those that terrorized Baghdad April 18, has been downright tiny."

Op-ed by Michael O'Hanlon, Brookings Institution [1]

And how much of the civil war aspect is being provoked by the insurgency or al Qaeda?

source
O'Hanlon, Michael. (The Washington Times). A ruthless foe. April 24, 2007.

posted: wednesday, april 25, 2007, 2:48 PM ET

tags: iraq insurgency

Khalizad met insurgents / Constitution regions bad, critics say

"The senior American envoy in Iraq, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, held talks last year with men he believed represented major insurgent groups in a drive to bring militant Sunni Arabs into politics.
'There were discussions with the representatives of various groups in the aftermath of the elections, and during the formation of the government before the Samarra incident, and some discussions afterwards as well,' Mr. Khalilzad said in a farewell interview on Friday at his home inside the fortified Green Zone.
. . . An American official said it was difficult to determine whether the people Mr. Khalilzad met with really were influential representatives of insurgent groups, as they claimed.
. . . The most complex legacy of Mr. Khalilzad — and arguably the most divisive — is the Constitution, passed in a national referendum in October 2005. Sunni Arab voters overwhelmingly rejected it, but most Shiites and Kurds, who make up 80 percent of the population, supported it. That paved the way for full-term elections in December 2005.
. . . Mr. Khalilzad and his colleagues, the critics say, were so fixated on meeting the political timetable laid out by the White House that they pushed through a document that may have inflamed the Sunni-led insurgency by enshrining strong regional control. The Constitution reaffirms Sunni Arab beliefs that Shiites and Kurds want oil and territory." [1]

The new draft oil law hasn't fixed that? And what about that charge that the oil law is cheating Iraq out of much or most of its oil revenue?

source
[1] Wong, Edward. (The New York Times). U.S. Envoy Says He Had Meetings With Iraq Rebels. March 26, 2007.

related posting
Is draft oil law cheating Iraq out of revenue? March 14, 2007.

posted: thursday, march 29, 2007, 12:19 AM ET
update: thursday, march 29, 2007, 12:22 AM ET

tags: iraq zalmay khalilzad federalism oil

Insurgents should be part of government, Sunni VP says

"Sunni insurgents who are 'honorable and genuine' must be given the chance to join the political process, Iraq's Sunni vice president said in an interview published Friday.
Tariq al-Hashemi told the Arabic language daily Al-Hayat that U.S. and Iraqi representatives must negotiate 'with the participation of the resistance' after 'America has failed to run the country.'
Furthermore, al-Hashemi said 'the honorable national resistance' must adopt 'a new ideology to manage the crisis.'
. . . He also criticized the militant Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars, accusing it of meddling in politics and rejecting the notion it represents Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Many Association figures are believed closely linked to insurgents.
His criticism drew a sharp response from the association's spokesman, Sheik Mohammed Bashar al-Fayadh, who told Al-Arabiyah television that al-Hashemi's comments amounted to an attempt to separate religion from politics. 'This is a secularist ideology, not Islamic,' he said."

source
The Associated Press. Key Sunni Official Urges Participation. February 16, 2007.

posted: tuesday, february 20, 2007, 4:44 AM ET
update: tuesday, february 20, 2007, 4:45 AM ET

tags: iraq insurgency sunni

Maliki plan for U.S. to battle insurgents while he deals with Sadr

"Iraq's Shiite prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, has created a two-pronged security plan.
. . . The plan calls for U.S. troops to combat Sunni Arab insurgents for four to eight weeks in outer Baghdad neighborhoods, which Maliki believes are the source of the sectarian violence afflicting the capital, his aides said. Iraqi forces would take over primary responsibility for patrolling inner Baghdad from U.S. forces.
During this period, Maliki would persuade Sadr to stop the Mahdi Army from fomenting violence, using a combination of carrots and sticks, including the threat of force, said the advisers . . . If the Mahdi Army does not stop its assaults, Maliki, with the help of U.S. troops, would crack down on Sadr.
. . . But the government's Shiite-dominated security forces under Maliki's control are widely perceived as ineffective, and are mistrusted by Sunnis. . . . With U.S. troops focusing on Sunni Arab insurgents, Sadr and his forces could solidify their grip in Baghdad.
. . . [Maliki's] advisers insisted that Maliki would be firm with Sadr and that his political survival no longer hinged on the cleric."

source
The Washington Post. Premier Wants U.S. Forces to Target Sunni Insurgents. December 20, 2006.

song
Peace in the middle east

posted: thursday, december 21, 2006, 4:38 PM ET
update: thursday, december 21, 2006, 4:40 PM ET

iraq moktada al-sadr nuri al-maliki insurgency

Withdrawal caused insurgent killings of America's allies in 2004 Anbar

"As the insurgency heated up in early 2004, the Seventh Marine Regiment pulled up stakes and went to fight insurgents in eastern Anbar, leaving the rest of the province in the hands of a battalion of troops.
. . . The consequences were immediate and bloody. Insurgents assumed control of several towns and villages. They tortured and executed police officers, local politicians, friendly tribal leaders and informants. They murdered contractors who had worked with the Americans or the Iraqi government. They tore down American-financed reconstruction projects and in a few cases imposed an extreme version of Islamic law.
. . . Western Iraq became a temporary haven for criminals, terrorists and thousands of local thugs who made up de facto mini-regimes in the absence of a stabilizing force.
. . . The Seventh Marine Regiment pulled up stakes again in November 2004 to join the second fight for Falluja. Conscious of the damage done by the earlier withdrawal, the Marines left behind more troops in an effort to stem the inevitable surge of insurgent and criminal gangs.
. . . Despite this Marine presence, the results were similar."

source
The New York Times. A War That Abhors a Vacuum. December 18, 2006, (op-ed by Ben Connable, Marine Corp major).

posted: tuesday, december 19, 2006, 10:32 AM ET
update: thursday, december 21, 2006, 10:20 AM ET

iraq insurgency withdrawal

Pentagon group is targeting Iraqi unemployment

"Members of a small Pentagon task force have gone to the most dangerous areas of Iraq over the past six months to bring life to nearly 200 state-owned factories abandoned by the Coalition Provisional Authority after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Their goal is to employ tens of thousands of Iraqis in coming months, part of a plan to reduce soaring unemployment and lessen the violence that has crippled progress.
Defense officials and military commanders say that festering unemployment -- at 70 percent in some areas -- is leading Iraqi men to take cash from insurgents to place bombs on roads or take shots at U.S. troops. Other Iraqis are joining sectarian attacks because their quality of life has slipped dramatically, officials say.
Army Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, the top U.S. field commander in Iraq, said that tackling unemployment could do far more good than adding U.S. combat troops or more aggressively pursuing an elusive enemy."

source
The Washington Post. To Stem Iraqi Violence, U.S. Aims to Create Jobs. December 12, 2006.

posting: thursday, december 14, 2006, 4:00 PM ET

Better intelligence needed on insurgency and militias, says Iraq Study Group / Some insurgents want contact

"The Iraq Study Group's "final report harshly criticized United States intelligence officials for failing to answer basic questions about the nature of the Sunni insurgency or the increasingly powerful Shiite militias, both of which pose grave threats to American forces.
The intelligence community has had some success hunting Al Qaeda in Iraq, the report found, but that terrorist organization is small and is not the main enemy confronting American troops.
. . . The study group’s findings echo complaints quietly voiced in recent months by a number of current and former American officials, who have warned of the failure by American intelligence officers in Iraq to adequately penetrate the Sunni insurgency. These officials say the level of violence in Baghdad makes it extremely difficult for American intelligence officers to move around the country to gather information, and as a result they rely far too heavily on Iraqis who come to them in the Green Zone or to other major American bases, and on information from the intelligence service of the new Iraqi government.
That leaves the Central Intelligence Agency and American military intelligence vulnerable to manipulation by Iraqis who feed the Americans disinformation because they have an ax to grind or simply as a way to make money by selling information to the United States." [1]

"To arrest the slide to civil war, international mediators must negotiate directly with the elements of the Sunni insurgency (secular nationalists and more tactical Islamists) that have been seeking talks with the United States for three years." [2]

"Iraq's ambassador to Jordan, Saad al-Hayani, says that meetings have taken place in the Iraqi Embassy here between US representatives and members of the resistance in the past few months, as well as between Iraqis who have accepted and rejected the political process under US occupation, some of whom were directly involved with the insurgency.
. . . Moayed Abu Subieh, a Jordanian journalist who has written about such meetings, says that for the majority of those fighting, their foremost demand remains US withdrawal. Previously, insurgent groups had called for a timetable for withdrawal as a condition for laying down arms, but that demand appears to have solidified into a call for immediate withdrawal.
Mr. Abu Subieh, who writes for Al-Ghad, says that he has knowledge that talks have occurred between US officials and members of the Islamic Army of Iraq, which is made up mostly of members of Mr. Hussein's former military and has been claiming responsibility for attacks on US troops since 2003.
. . . Others, however, say that such meetings are of little significance. "As far as we know, America has not spoken with any of the really active resistance," says Bashar al-Faili, a member of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), a Sunni political group." [3]

source
[1] The New York Times. Sunni and Shiite Insurgents Remain Mystery to U.S., Iraq Report Charges. December 11, 2006.
[2] The New York Times. Close the Bases. December 10, 2006. (Larry Diamond).
[3] The Christian Science Monitor. Quiet US bid to talk to Iraqi insurgents. December 07, 2006.

posting: thursday, december 14, 2006, 3:18 PM ET
update: monday, december 25, 2006, 7:03 PM ET

Saudis fire adviser over Iraq article / Saudi ambassador resigns

"Saudi Arabia said Wednesday it had fired a security adviser who wrote in The Washington Post that the world's top oil exporter would intervene in Iraq once the United States withdrew troops.
Saudi Arabia's government said last weekend that there was no truth in Nawaf Obaid's Nov. 29 op-ed column, which suggested that the kingdom would back Iraq's Sunni Muslims in the event of a wider sectarian conflict.
. . . 'We felt that we could add more credibility to his claims as an independent contractor by terminating our consultancy agreement with him,' Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, told the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia." [1]

"Private Saudi citizens are giving millions of dollars to Sunni insurgents in Iraq and much of the money is used to buy weapons, including shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles, according to key Iraqi officials and others familiar with the flow of cash.
Saudi government officials deny that any money from their country is being sent to Iraqis fighting the government and the U.S.-led coalition.
But the U.S. Iraq Study Group report said Saudis are a source of funding for Sunni Arab insurgents.
. . . Saudi Arabia is a key U.S. ally in the Middle East. The Iraq Study Group report noted that its government has assisted the U.S. military with intelligence on Iraq.
But Saudi citizens have close tribal ties with Sunni Arabs in Iraq, and sympathize with their brethren in what they see as a fight for political control _ and survival _ with Iraq's Shiites.
. . . The Saudi government is determined to curb the growing influence of its chief rival in the region, Iran.
. . . Saudi officials say the kingdom has worked with all sides to reconcile Iraq's warring factions." [2]

"Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United States, flew out of Washington yesterday after informing Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and his staff that he would be leaving the post after only 15 months on the job, according to U.S. officials and foreign envoys. There has been no formal announcement from the kingdom.
The abrupt departure is particularly striking because his predecessor, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, spent 22 years on the job. The Saudi ambassador is one of the most influential diplomatic positions in Washington and is arguably the most important overseas post for the oil-rich desert kingdom.
. . . As Saud's health has declined, Turki has increasingly been rumored as a possible replacement for his older brother.
. . . In the 1980s, while he was intelligence chief, he reportedly met al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden several times during the U.S.- and Saudi-backed support of mujaheddin fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. He subsequently denounced bin Laden.
Turki later served as ambassador to Britain." [3]

"Saudi Arabia has told the Bush administration that it might provide financial backing to Iraqi Sunnis in any war against Iraq’s Shiites if the United States pulls its troops out of Iraq, according to American and Arab diplomats.
The Saudis have argued strenuously against an American pullout from Iraq, citing fears that Iraq’s minority Sunni Arab population would be massacred.
. . . 'It’s a hypothetical situation, and we’d work hard to avoid such a structure,' one Arab diplomat in Washington said. But, he added, 'If things become so bad in Iraq, like an ethnic cleansing, we will feel we are pulled into the war.'
. . . The Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who told his staff on Monday that he was resigning his post, recently fired Nawaf Obaid, a consultant who wrote an opinion piece in The Washington Post.
. . . Arab diplomats said Tuesday that Mr. Obaid’s column reflected the view of the Saudi government, which has made clear its opposition to an American pullout from Iraq.
. . . A former adviser to the royal family said that Prince Turki had submitted his resignation several months ago but that it was refused." [4]

"King Abdullah warned Vice President Dick Cheney during a meeting in Riyadh three weeks ago that Saudi Arabia would back the Sunnis if the Americans withdrew from Iraq and a civil war ensued.
. . . A member of the Saudi royal family with knowledge of the discussions between Mr. Cheney and King Abdullah said the king had presented Mr. Cheney with a plan to raise oil production to force down the price, in hopes of causing economic turmoil for Iran without becoming directly involved in a confrontation.
. . . 'The Saudis made a big mistake by following the Americans when they had no plan,' said Khalid al-Dakhil, a professor of political sociology at King Saud University in Riyadh. 'If the Saudis had intervened earlier and helped the Sunnis they could have found a political solution to their differences, instead of the bloodshed we are seeing today.'
'There is a segment in this country that will do everything the U.S. wants,' said Turki al-Rasheed, who runs a group that seeks to encourage democracy in the Persian Gulf. 'But fortunately the big leaders know this whole agenda will take us to hell.' " [5]

"Eighteen months ago, Prince Bandar bin Sultan ended a legendary 22-year career as the face of Saudi Arabia in the United States. . . . However, Bandar . . . is at least as pivotal today in influencing U.S. policy as he was in his years as ambassador.
. . . Turki was kept so out of the loop that Bandar often did not inform him he was in town.
. . . The rise of Bandar, who is now Saudi national security adviser, may reflect the waning influence of the sons of the late King Faisal . . . Turki . . . has poor chemistry with King Abdullah, they note.
. . . As relations among the royals frayed over the past year, Turki was increasingly squeezed financially.
. . . The al-Faisal brothers . . . have consistently urged dialogue with Tehran and are wary of joint U.S.-Saudi efforts against Iran and its surrogates.
. . . After a year of internal tensions and failure to pay bills, Turki was not invited to Riyadh for Cheney's visit, Saudi sources confirmed. And Bandar returned to Washington again right after the meeting to discuss the specifics of the joint efforts. Two weeks later, Turki quit." [6]

sources
[1] Reuters. Saudi Arabia Fires Security Consultant for Iraq Remarks. December 7, 2006.
[2] The Associated Press. Saudis Reportedly Funding Iraqi Sunnis. December 8, 2006.
[3] The Washington Post. Saudi Ambassador Abruptly Resigns, Leaves Washington. December 12, 2006.
[4] The New York Times. Saudis Say They Might Back Sunnis if U.S. Leaves Iraq. December 13, 2006.
[5] The New York Times. Bickering Saudis Struggle for an Answer to Iran’s Rising Influence in the Middle East. December 22, 2006.
[6] The Washington Post. Royal Intrigue, Unpaid Bills Preceded Saudi Ambassador's Exit. December 23, 2006.

related source
The Washington Post. Stepping Into Iraq: Saudi Arabia Will Protect Sunnis if the U.S. Leaves. November 29, 2006.

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posted: thursday, december 14, 2006, 2:38 PM ET
update: monday, december 25, 2006, 4:08 PM ET

Support for Shiites over insurgent reconcilliation is proposed

"The Bush administration is deliberating whether to abandon U.S. reconciliation efforts with Sunni insurgents and instead give priority to Shiites and Kurds, who won elections and now dominate the government, according to U.S. officials.
The proposal, put forward by the State Department as part of a crash White House review of Iraq policy, follows an assessment that the ambitious U.S. outreach to Sunni dissidents has failed. U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that their reconciliation efforts may even have backfired, alienating the Shiite majority and leaving the United States vulnerable to having no allies in Iraq, according to sources familiar with the State Department proposal."

source
The Washington Post. U.S. Considers Ending Outreach to Insurgents. December 1, 2006.

posted: monday, december 4, 2006, 5:42 AM ET

U.S. military can't defeat Al Qaeda or insurgency in Sunni province, says report

"The U.S. military is no longer able to defeat a bloody insurgency in western Iraq['s Sunni Anbar province] or counter al-Qaeda's rising popularity there, according to newly disclosed details from a classified Marine Corps intelligence report, ['State of the Insurgency in Al-Anbar']."
. . . The report describes Iraq's Sunni minority as 'embroiled in a daily fight for survival,' fearful of 'pogroms' by the Shiite majority and increasingly dependent on al-Qaeda in Iraq as its only hope against growing Iranian dominance across the capital.
True or not, the memo says, 'from the Sunni perspective, their greatest fears have been realized: Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris have been marginalized.' Moreover, most Sunnis now believe it would be unwise to count on or help U.S. forces because they are seen as likely to leave the country before imposing stability.
. . . [Anbar's Sunnis] have been increasingly abandoned by religious and political leaders who have fled to neighboring countries, and other leaders have been assassinated.
. . . A final section of the report, titled 'Way Ahead,' . . . outlined several possibilities for bringing stability to the area, including establishing a Sunni state in Anbar, creating a local paramilitary force to protect Sunnis and to offset Iranian influence, shifting local budget controls, and strengthening a committed Iraqi police force that has 'proven remarkably resilient in most areas.' "

source
The Washington Post. Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker. November 28, 2006.

posted: saturday, december 2, 2006, 1:10 AM ET
update: saturday, december 2, 2006, 4:32 AM ET

Former Baathists driving insurgency

"Many Iraqis and Americans who have tracked the insurgency say it has been strongly shaped by former Baath Party members who want to keep Shiites from taking power. Even the newer jihadist groups have articulated political goals on Web sites — most notably to establish a Sunni-ruled Islamic caliphate.
'There was a whole regime that ruled this country for 35 years,' said Mahmoud Othman, a senior Kurdish legislator. 'Now they’ve gone underground. This is the main body of the resistance.' "

source
The New York Times. A Matter of Definition: What Makes a Civil War, and Who Declares It So? November 26, 2006.

posted: wednesday, november 29, 2006, 3:03 PM ET

Iraqi insurgency

"The insurgency is mainly Sunni, but draws its membership from diverse backgrounds.
Fighters range from former figures in Saddam Hussein's Baath party to Sunni nationalists fearing Shia domination and foreign Islamist fighters who see Iraq as an arena for a global struggle against the West.
The incentives driving individual insurgents are equally disparate - from religious zeal to economic gain, nationalist feeling and anger at the loss of loved ones to the conflict.
Virtually all insurgent groups share the goal of attacking US forces, but other goals vary - with some elements apparently aiming to foment civil war.
. . . By 2006, US military estimates ranged from 8,000 to 20,000, although Iraqi intelligence officials have issued figures as high as 40,000 fighters plus another 160,000 supporters."

source
BBC News. Guide: Armed groups in Iraq. August 15, 2006.

posted: saturday, november 11, 2006, 4:25 AM ET
update: wednesday, november 29, 2006, 2:55 PM ET