Shiite stronghold model community, but tradeoff

"Ice cream shops in the Shiite stronghold of Kadhimiya are flush with sweet-toothed customers. Hospitals have new supplies. Rents have tripled as displaced Shiites flock to the historic district’s spacious homes, while pilgrims stream to the golden-domed shrine at its heart.
. . . Religious Shiite leaders and their militias have unquestionably consolidated control, transforming Kadhimiya into what could be a model for much of Baghdad if the Shiites have their way.
. . . But the future that Kadhimiya points to may not be democratic, inclusive or just, at least by Western standards. Residents and American commanders describe the area as a nerve center for benign and malignant elements of Shiite power, the raw embodiment of the Shiite revival that has swept Iraq in the last four years.
. . . For the average Iraqi, the tradeoff for relative safety is living with a certain level of extortion, political corruption and religious militancy.
Loyalties in Kadhimiya can change block by block as rival militias vie for turf. Clerics post guards with Kalashnikov rifles in winding alleyways . . . There is even a gas station controlled by a different armed group every few days.
. . . The militias’ intimidating form of street justice, complete with underground Islamic courts, has helped prevent the catastrophic bomb attacks all too common in other Shiite neighborhoods."

source
Wong, Edward & Cave, Damien. (The New York Times). Baghdad District Is a Model, but Only for Shiites. May 22, 2007.

posted: saturday, may 26, 2007, 10:02 AM ET

tags: iraq kadhimiya

Sunni says US is problem; against faction meet / Anti-Shiite conspiracy, Shiite hotelier says

" 'The problem in Iraq is the American Army,' . . . [Muhammad al-Daini, a Sunni Arab member of the Iraqi Parliament] told a group of attentive American legislators. . . 'What brought terrorism, what brought Al Qaeda and what brought Iranian influence is the Americans.'
Mr. Daini, soft-spoken and generally unsmiling, has been ushered from meeting to meeting by a public relations firm paid by an American businessman who calls the Iraqi politician 'a true humanitarian.' The businessman, Dal LaMagna, says he is devoting the fortune he made selling his high-end grooming tools business, Tweezerman, to seeking an end to the violence in Iraq.
. . . The American lawmakers were polite and inquisitive but some appeared nonplussed by hints of the polarization of Iraqi views. When Representative Bill Delahunt, Democrat of Massachusetts, suggested that it might be valuable to get all Iraqi factions to meet for talks in the United States, Mr. Daini demurred.
. . . Mr. Daini, 35, is a member of the National Dialogue Front, a Sunni Arab political group led by Saleh al-Mutlak, a former Baath Party official who insists that the Baath Party, the party of Saddam Hussein, was the best party ever to govern Iraq." [1]

"Ayad owns a hotel in the southern city of Karbala, home to two of Shiism’s most important shrines. His wife and two daughters wear veils. He believes that the violence in Iraq is a Sunni and American conspiracy against Shiites, and he argues that Iran is the best ally of Iraqi Shiites.
. . . The Sunnis, he said, have 'oppressed us since the days of the Prophet, and now it is our chance to hit back and rule.'
According to Ayad, a Shiite takeover in Iraq would set a good model for the Shiites of Lebanon, where they number about a third of the population, and Bahrain, where they are a majority.
'Perhaps the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia will act too, rid themselves of the Sunni oppression against them, and rule or at least separate themselves from Riyadh and create their own state.'
It is exactly this possibility that has made the Sunni Arab regimes fear a Shiite regional revolt and moved some to support the Sunni insurgency in Iraq or at least to voice their resentment of the Iraqi Shiite government, which is seen as being biased against Iraqi Sunnis.
. . . 'When we fought the Persians during the 1980s, we were wrong. We’re Shiites before being Iraqis. Sunnis invented national identity to rule us.' "

Op-ed by Hussain Abdul-Hussain, "a former reporter for The Daily Star of Lebanon." [2]

Peace thru oppression?

source
[1] Shane, Scott & Wong, Edward. (The New York Times). Antiwar Iraqi in Washington Has a More Sectarian Agenda at Home. May 14, 2007.
[2] Abdul-Hussain, Hussain. (The New York Times). In Iraq, the play was the thing. May 7, 2007.

posted: wednesday, may 16, 2007, 6:14 AM ET
update: wednesday, may 18, 2007, 6:29 PM ET

tags: iraq muhammad al-daini dal lamagna tweezerman saleh al-mutlak

Sunni and Shia Baghdad compared

"[I]n Adhamiya, a [Baghdad] community with a Sunni majority, any semblance of normal life vanished more than a year ago.
. . . Anyone who works with the government, whether Shiite or Sunni, is an enemy in the eyes of the Sunni insurgents, who carry out attack after attack against people they view as collaborators. While that chiefly makes targets of the Shiite-dominated Iraqi Army and the police, the militants also kill fellow Sunnis from government ministries who come to repair water and electrical lines in Sunni neighborhoods.
. . . It adds up to a bleak prognosis for Sunnis in Baghdad. Until the violence is under control, there is unlikely to be any progress. But it is hard to persuade Sunnis to take a stand against the violence when they seem to receive so little in return.
. . . The head of the district council was gunned down 10 days ago; three months earlier his predecessor was killed the same way.
The council had been a beacon for beleaguered Adhamiya residents, its offices busy from early morning. But its members are under attack, and it is unclear how long they will be willing to continue to take the risks that come with helping their neighbors." [1]

In Baghdad's Sadr City, Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's "influence is everywhere. His representatives run the hospitals, the Islamic courts, the police, the municipal offices and the mosques. He pays for funerals and school books. He builds houses and controls inflation. He punishes the corrupt and those whose activities taint Islam or his privileged name.
. . . Yet Sadr's stronghold remains one of Baghdad's poorest areas. Banners proclaiming the Sadr name overlook open sewage canals, unpaved roads and crumbling buildings.
Revitalizing his city, Sadr representatives say, is a key motive behind the cleric's uneasy cooperation with his arch adversary, the U.S. military, in recent weeks. Several reconstruction projects, some U.S.-funded, are already underway.
. . . The area is home to fighters linked to death squads who have driven thousands of Sunnis from their houses. Yet children and young men play soccer here in parks with manicured grass. Crowds mingle in open-air bazaars without fear of a suicide bomber. Women walk alone to shop, while men have long conversations in outdoor cafes, a sign of normalcy that has vanished from most of Baghdad.
. . . Now, as sectarian strife transforms the nation, cleansing mixed areas, Sadr City is perhaps the best indicator of the Baghdad that is emerging from chaos. Here, Shiites walk, pray and converse, largely with other Shiites, basking in the trust afforded by mingling with their own sect." [2]

source
[1] Rubin, Alissa J. (The New York Times). Sunni Baghdad Becomes Land of Silent Ruins. March 26, 2007.
[2] Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). An Enclave of Normalcy in Fearful Baghdad. March 27, 2007.

posted: thursday, march 28, 2007, 12:43 AM ET

tags: iraq shiite sunni

Sunnis skew poll down; federalism good for Sunnis; U.S. criticized, but still wanted

In most of the questions in a poll of Iraqis by ABC News and other news organizations, the nationwide "net" percentages (Shiite-Sunni-Kurd combined) for these questions seem to be skewed downward by the highly negative responses of the Sunnis. For example, in question 1 on how life is going these days, it is said that 39% of the nationwide "net" responded that life was good. But in the sect breakdown portion of the question, 53% of Shiites (who comprise around 60% of Iraqis) and 68% of Kurds (15-20% of Iraqis) said that life was good. A mere 7% of Sunnis (15-20% of Iraqis), on the other hand, said that life was good. So the "net" percentage gets skewed way down to 39%, even though 53% of the Shiites and 68% of the Kurds, said that life was good. And this type of skewed "net" percentage is the percentage that often gets reported.

Wouldn't a more accurate description be that a majority of Iraqis say life is good with the exception being the Sunnis, comprising 15-20% of Iraqis, who overwhelmingly say that life is not good? Not only is it more clear and accurate, but it allows one to focus on potential problem areas and solutions.

Most news accounts of the poll point out this disparity between Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish responses. But I think the point should be made more strongly and pervasively. And as I said before, most of the questions in the poll seem to follow this pattern.

From the poll results, it also appears that autonomous, semi-autonomous or independent regions are gaining favor, at least among Shiites and Kurds. In question 14, 59% of Shiites and 79% of Kurds supported either regional states with a federal government or separate independent states. Only 3% of Sunnis favored either of these choices. The other choice was a "unified Iraq with central government in Baghdad" which 97% of Sunnis favored as opposed to 41% of Shiites and 20% of Kurds.

I'm not sure why the Sunnis still so strongly favor this highly centralized form of government. It seems that Iraq has been trying this type of government since the fall of Saddam and according to the poll, the Sunnis are pretty miserable on most counts. Only 24% of Sunnis have confidence in the police and only 8% have confidence in the national government. Even with their local leaders, only 12% of Sunnis have confidence. This is contrasted with 57% of Shiites and 80% of Kurds who have confidence in their local leaders with similar high percentages for the police and the national government.

And who exactly do the Sunnis want to put in charge of this highly centralized government? Saddam and most of his inner circle are either dead, in prison or in hiding. The Sunnis have no faith in their current local leaders. They don't trust the current majority Shiite national institutions. They certainly don't like the Americans. So who's left?

The Sunnis' current view of their situation seems pretty hopeless. (Perhaps a reflection of their dire situation.) It's possible that the remaining Baathists could take charge, but the Shiites and Kurds seem reluctant to letting Baathists back into most positions of power, let alone letting them run the country again.

On the other hand, with an autonomous, semi-autonomous or independent region, the Sunnis could possibly let the Baathists run things in their Sunni region, if they wanted, as long as they weren't hostile towards the Shiite and Kurdish regions. (They would have to do a better job of chosing their leaders than they are apparently doing now, however. Perhaps they could get some help in this area.) But the possibility of some level of autonomy doesn't seem to appeal to the Sunnis.

But it should since the future looks good for a cooperative, accommodating Sunni population. The oil law seems like it has a good chance of passing, so the Sunnis would have all that oil revenue coming in to build any type of relatively peaceful region they wanted with their own trusted security forces and providers of basic services. It doesn't appear that Iraq is going to break into independent states anytime soon, so there would still be a central, federal government that they could turn to if they needed help. And based on their similar population numbers, the Sunnis would have as much power on the federal level as the Kurds who seem to be satisfied with their current power level. And having federalized regions doesn't mean that the different regions have to be isolated from one another either. They could be as close or as distant as they chose to be, respecting basic rights at all times, of course. Why wouldn't the Sunnis want that for themselves? Why is that such a bad choice?

One thing the poll says that Sunnis and Shiites generally agree on is their negative impression of America's role in Iraq. Though they still apparently would like the U.S. to stay until the security situation improves. The Kurds support the U.S.

source
ABC News. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll -Iraq: Where things stand. Ebbing hope in a landscape of loss marks a national survey of Iraq. March 19, 2007.

posted: friday, march 23, 2007, 8:36 PM ET
update: monday, march 26, 2007, 11:38 PM ET

tags: iraq usa today bbc ard abc poll sunni federalism

Some militias allowed to patrol own Baghdad areas

"[I]n Baghdad, American officials seem increasingly willing to tolerate some of those Shiite militias as long as they patrol their own neighborhoods."

source
Cooper, Helene & Sanger, David E. (The New York Times). Iraqis’ Progress Lags Behind Pace Set by Bush Plan. March 15, 2007.

posted: sunday, march 18, 2007, 8:25 AM ET

tags: iraq militia

Fadhila to exit Shia bloc, wants to be nonsectarian

"[A] growing number of politicians publicly declared that they embraced the idea of a cross-sectarian political movement that has been gaining strength this week. It was not yet clear the form the front would take, but if successful it would have broad implications for parliamentary divisions and the way government ministries are apportioned: they are currently handed out to parties, most of which have clear sectarian sympathies.
Most significantly, the Fadhila Party, a faction of the united Shiite bloc, the largest group in Parliament, announced it was leaving the bloc.
A spokesman for Fadhila suggested there was frustration with sectarian politics.
'We want to try to build a new politics that is not sectarian that will include all of Iraqi society,' said Bassim Sharif, a leader of the Fadhila party. However, he stopped short of saying that they would join the new bloc. 'For now we will try to work alone to prove there is a Shiite party that can work in a nonsectarian way.' But, he added, 'this is the first step to save Iraq from this crisis.' " [1]

Regarding Fadhila leaving the Shiite bloc, "[o]ne possible scenario in coming weeks would be an alliance between Fadhila and the Iraqi National List, a group led by secular Shiite and former prime minister Ayad Allawi, which has 25 seats.
. . . Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish lawmaker, said he interpreted the move as evidence of growing disapproval of Maliki and the ruling alliance.
"These changes show that neither the Shiite coalition nor the government has been able to improve things and that they are gradually growing weaker," Othman said.
Mithal al-Alusi, a Sunni parliament member, said it is too early to tell how the party's withdrawal will alter Iraq's political landscape. But he said the development should be seen as evidence that democracy has taken root in Iraq." [2]

"Shiite parties under the umbrella of the United Iraqi Alliance now hold 113 seats. Kurdish parties have 53 seats and Sunni groups have 44. The remaining 50 members are independent or do not belong to sectarian groupings." [2]

source
[1] Rubin, Alissa. (The New York Times). Attacks on Shiite Pilgrims Continue. March 8, 2007.
[2] Londono, Ernesto. (The Washington Post). Shiite Bloc in Parliament Diminished by Defection. March 8, 2007.

posted: monday, march 12, 2007, 4:50 AM ET

tags: iraq fadhila

Surge update: Sunnis violent, Shiites quieter, Baghdad violence down

"In recent months, al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Sunni groups have begun to use more sophisticated tactics, downing U.S. helicopters and staging large attacks that have claimed the lives of hundreds of Iraqi civilians.
Meanwhile, the Mahdi Army, the largest and most violent Shiite militia, headed by anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, has faded from neighborhoods it once visibly controlled. Sadr, whose forces have fiercely battled U.S. troops, appears to be cooperating with the security plan, although a statement attributed to him and released Sunday warned that the plan 'will not be good if it is controlled and ruled by our enemies, the occupiers.'
Mahdi Army militiamen 'have certainly reduced their activities in the past couple of weeks,' said Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, a U.S. military spokesman. 'What is their long-term intention? It is absolutely too early to tell.' " [1]

"The new Baghdad security operation . . . has led to a sharp drop in violence in the capital." [2]

source
[1] Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Sunni Insurgents Ascendant in Iraq's Caldron of Violence. March 3, 2007.
[2] Reid, Robert H. & Abdul-Zahra, Qassim. (The Associated Press). Iraq PM Vows Cabinet Shakeup in 2 Weeks. March 3, 2007.

posted: sunday, march 4, 2007, 8:48 PM ET
update: sunday, march 4, 2007, 9:40 PM ET

tags: iraq shiite sunni surge

Is there an anti-Shiite conspiracy in the Middle East?

"Newspapers are replete with assertions, some little more than incendiary rumors, of Shiite aggressiveness.
. . . [Lebanese] watched the rise of sectarian identity, railed against it, blamed the United States and others for inflaming it, then were often helpless to stop the descent into bloodshed.
. . . Over centuries, differences in ritual, jurisprudence and theology evolved, some of them slight. But the Shiite community . . . is shaped far more today by the underprivileged status it has often endured in an Arab world that is predominantly Sunni.
. . . [A] sense of Western manipulation is often voiced by Shiite clerics and activists, who say the United States incites sectarianism as a way of blunting Iran's influence. In recent years, some of the most provocative comments have come from America's allies in the region: Egypt's president questioned Shiites' loyalty to their countries, Jordan's king warned of a coming Shiite crescent from Iran to Lebanon, and last month King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia denounced what he called Shiite proselytizing."

source
Shadid, Anthony. (The Washington Post). Across Arab World, a Widening Rift. February 12, 2007.

posted: tuesday, february 13, 2007, 7:42 PM ET

tags: iraq conspiracy shiite middle east iran america

Mahdi Army improving, Sadr City residents say

"Bombings here [in Sadr City] have become less common than in other parts of Baghdad, though a coordinated series of explosions last fall killed 144 people. Residents and Sadr party officials said they felt more secure because the Mahdi Army kept watch.
. . . Sadr officials said the militia’s members would disarm temporarily during the Baghdad security plan, even if Sunnis or Americans attacked.
. . . Sunni officials said Sadr officials had calculated that if they stayed quiet for the security plan, American troops would eventually withdraw, giving Shiites even more freedom to exercise power.
. . . The Sadr organization, whose members once whipped people on the streets for selling alcohol, now works out of a centrally located office.
. . . Residents said the building reflected the move from insurgent group to established player. After winning control of six ministries and 30 seats in Parliament, residents said, the Sadrists have become a more traditionally political, less religious force, with leaders primarily interested in safety and power."

source
Cave, Damien. (The New York Times). Shiite District, Flash Point in Baghdad, Rebuilds. February 9, 2007.

posted: saturday, february 10, 2007, 11:11 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr shiite mahdi army

Some Shiite-Sunni tension in U.S. also

"Escalating tensions between Sunnis and Shiites across the Middle East are rippling through some American Muslim communities. . . . Political splits between those for and against the American invasion of Iraq fuel some of the animosity, but it is also a fight among Muslims about who represents Islam.
. . . Some students and experts on sectarianism also attribute the fissure to the significant growth in the Muslim American population over the past few decades.
Before, most major cities had only one mosque and everyone was forced to get along. Now, some Muslim communities are so large that the majority Sunnis and minority Shiites maintain their own mosques, schools and social clubs.
. . . 'I don’t want Shiite students to feel alienated,' said Nura Sediqe, the president of the Ann Arbor student group. 'But the dominant group never sees as much of a problem as the minority.'
. . . Not all campuses have been affected. Some, like Georgetown University and Cornell University, were considered oases of tolerance."

source
MacFarquhar, Neil. (The New York Times). February 4, 2007. Iraq’s Shadow Widens Sunni-Shiite Split in U.S.

posted: tuesday, february 6, 2007, 9:27 AM ET

tags: iraq shiite sunni

Moderates gone; Shiites see war as solution

"The moderates are mostly gone. . . . Even the moderate political leaders have left.
. . . A year ago, my interviews were peppered with phrases like 'Iraqis are all brothers.' The subjects would get angry when you asked their sect. Now some of them introduce themselves that way.
. . . A great many Shiites and Kurds . . . will tell you that in spite of all the mistakes the Americans have made here, the single act of removing Saddam Hussein was worth it. And the new American plan, despite all the obstacles, may have a chance to work. . . . [But probably not], particularly because their Iraqi partner . . . seems to be on an entirely different page.
. . . 'If you don’t allow the minority to lose, you will carry on forever,' [said an Iraqi government official in December].
. . . Abused under Mr. Hussein, they [Shiites] still act like an oppressed class. That means Iraqis are looking into a future of war, at least in the near term.
. . . Hazim al-Aaraji, a disciple of the renegade Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr . . . said the ideal disciples would have 'an empty mind,' and a weapon."

By New York Times reporter Sabrina Tavernise, describing her experiences in Iraq.

source
Tavernise, Sabrina. (The New York Times). January 28, 2007. It Has Unraveled So Quickly.

posted: tuesday, january 30, 2007, 5:20 PM ET
update: sunday, february 4, 2007, 10:29 AM ET

tags: iraq shiite surge

Shiite leaders unhappy with surge / Maliki gone if doesn't deliver?

"The Shiite-led government of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has not publicly opposed the American troop increase, but aides to Mr. Maliki have been saying for weeks that the government is wary of the proposal. They fear that an increased American troop presence, particularly in Baghdad, will be accompanied by a more assertive American role that will conflict with the Shiite government’s haste to cut back on American authority and run the war the way it wants.
. . . It is an opinion that is broadly held among a Shiite political elite that is increasingly impatient, after nearly two years heading the government here, to exercise power without the constraining supervision of the United States. As a long-oppressed majority, the Shiites have a deep-seated fear that the power they won at the polls, after centuries of subjugation by the Sunni minority, will be progressively whittled away as the Americans seek deals with the Sunnis that will help bring American troops home.
These misgivings are broadly shared by Shiite leaders in the government, including some whom Mr. Bush has courted recently." [1]

"Testifying on Capitol Hill about the plan for the second straight day, Mr. Gates said that Iraqi lawmakers might decide to replace Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri Kamal al-Maliki, if he failed to take steps to carry out the new plan to regain control of Baghdad.
'The first consequence that he has to face is the possibility that he’ll lose his job,' Mr. Gates said. 'There are beginning to be some people around that may say, ‘I can do better than he’s doing,’ in terms of making progress.'
Administration officials have discussed among themselves whether they might need to withdraw support for Mr. Maliki if he doesn’t perform, notably by building a new coalition in the Iraqi Parliament.
. . . Mr. Gates conceded that the Iraqi government’s record of fulfilling its commitments is “not an encouraging one,” but said Mr. Maliki now seemed to him 'eager' to follow the plan worked out with American commanders." [2]

sources
[1] The New York Times. Promising Troops Where They Aren’t Really Wanted. January 11, 2007.
[2] The New York Times. Republicans on Panel Back President’s Plan, Masking Divisions. January 13, 2007.

posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:20 PM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 3:25 PM ET

tags: iraq shiite bush maliki

Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? / Thoughts on the morality of American withdrawal

"After the invasion, as a Shiite religious revival blossomed, Iraq's clerics saw themselves as the caretakers of the nation's Islamic identity. They were as concerned about American power and ambitions for Iraq as they were about the importation of a decadent Western culture. Many refused to deal with U.S. officials . . . a tactic that reaps immense rewards today from a population that is increasingly disenchanted with the United States.
'There's no necessity to meet the Americans,' said Beirut-based Hamid al-Khafaf, the chief spokesman for Sistani. He added that Sistani favored peaceful resistance to end the U.S. occupation.
. . . Senior Sadr officials have circulated a petition among national lawmakers demanding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. They have managed to get 131 signatures, nearly half of the parliament, [independent Kurdish legislator Mahmoud] Othman said.
. . . Hakim, he said [Mahdi Army member Ali Hussein], made a fatal mistake by meeting Bush. In today's Iraq, credibility and power are measured by opposition to the United States." [1]

Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? According to the above article and other sources like a September 2006 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes, many Iraqi politicians and apparently a majority of the Iraqi public would like to see America withdraw. (The September poll said that seven in ten Iraqis would like America to leave within a year and six in ten support attacks on coalition forces.) [2]

The petition by the Sadr officials demanding a withdrawal timetable would be a good solid step in this direction. A formal debate and vote by the Iraqi Parliament would be even better. The Parliament could also arrange a national referendum asking the Iraqi people if they wanted America to stay or go. (I had heard of the referendum idea in a reader's letter to the New York Times which I, unfortunately, cannot locate.) Broad-based, peaceful, mass demonstrations could also be helpful. *

If this is what the Iraqis truly want, then the above types of strong unambivalent expressions of discontent could very well lead to a successful outcome, especially since one of America's stated goals has been to give the Iraqis a voice in their newly democratic country.

If the Iraqis asked America to leave, it would also remove much of the America's moral obligation to remain, in my opinion, unless America has somehow manipulated Iraq into taking this position. Though America should still do all it can to help in other ways, considering its initial invasion was the cause of most of the current problems or allowed them to emerge. **

America could conceivably remain in well-defined, seemingly pro-American, areas like Kurdistan or maybe the northern Nineveh area to help protect these areas from attack. (I've read that some of the targeted Iraqi Christians have expressed a desire for a region in the Nineveh area) [3] America's presence in these areas would be purely defensive, however, and only at the request of the people in those areas. Their presence would not be used to stage present or future attacks on the rest of Iraq or the Middle East region, no matter what the cause. ***

footnotes
* Apparently, the Iraqi prime minister has most of the authority over Iraq's security matters and it's uncertain if Prime Minister Maliki would ever request an American withdrawal. On the other hand, Maliki is just one person and was not directly elected by the people of Iraq. So if the people's directly elected representatives in Parliament and/or the people themselves through a referendum were to formally request an American withdrawal, it would be interesting to see what would happen.

** America might also leave, from a moral perspective (if I can use that word again), if its continued presence was a necessary cause of most of the violence or if its presence was preventing a solution to the violence from being implemented. Though its other obligations would remain.
It's been said that America's continued presence has been the cause of the continuing insurgent and terrorist violence. If an American withdrawal would cause the insurgent-terrorist violence to cease, then America might leave for that reason. However, it's not certain if these two forces would, in fact, cease their violent attacks if America left since it's also been said that the insurgents' and terrorists' goal is not only to cause an American withdrawal, but to foment civil war through attacks on the Shiite majority.
One might also ask if America's withdrawal would cause the insurgents and terrorists to cease their violence, but America's withdrawal would also deny innocent Iraqis needed protection from ongoing sectarian violence, then should America morally remain or withdraw? I don't really have the answer to that. I'm just presenting general alternatives to show that it is not simply a matter of America staying is moral and America withdrawing is immoral or vice-versa.
On that note, America might also exit if it was suffering great hardship. It might take something of a moral hit for placing its own hardship above that of the Iraqis (whose hardship was caused by America's initial invasion, in my opinion), but it would be less of a hit than if America left just because it was tired or fed up with the situation.

*** Sadr has since introduced a law in the Iraqi Parliament that would require U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraqi cities by the end of August of this year (see Sadr's redeployment plan, 1/23/07.)

sources
[1] The Washington Post. Shiite Clerics' Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq. December 21, 2006.
[2] Program on International Policy Attitudes. The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq. September 27, 2006.
[3] The Associated Press. U.S. Iraqi Christians Seek Help. December 15, 2006.

posted: saturday, december 23, 2006, 3:36 AM ET
update: friday, january 26, 2007, 2:14 PM ET

tags: iraq withdrawal shiite morality

Sistani may support proposed moderate coalition / federalism law may have contributed to gridlock, but did not cause boycott

"Iraq’s most venerated Shiite cleric has tentatively approved an American-backed coalition of Shiite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that aims to isolate extremists, particularly the powerful Shiite militia leader Moktada al-Sadr, Iraqi and Western officials say.
. . . But Ayatollah [Ali al-]Sistani has grown increasingly distressed as the Shiite-led government has proved incapable of taming the violence and improving public services, Shiite officials say.
. . . Since winning 130 of the 275 seats in Parliament, the Shiite bloc has never coalesced as Ayatollah Sistani intended it to, and factional rivalries have deepened, particularly over the past several months. A law enabling provinces to form autonomous regions, approved in October, was supported by Mr. Hakim but bitterly opposed by Mr. Sadr and members of the Fadhila Party, a Shiite group close to Mr. Sadr.
The Shiite infighting has paralyzed the government. Since Mr. Sadr’s loyalists began boycotting the government last month, the Parliament has been unable to form a quorum, preventing the passage of laws.
The new coalition is aimed at circumventing that kind of conflict, its leaders say, which is probably why Ayatollah Sistani is willing to lend his support." [1]

Though Hakim's federalism law apparently did increase tension between him and Sadr and may have contributed to government gridlock, the November boycott by Sadr loyalists was due to Prime Minister Maliki's decision to meet with President Bush in Amman, Jordan, not because of the federalism law as may be implied by the way the above quotation was written.

"Iraqi lawmakers and cabinet ministers allied with Shiite cleric and militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr, a bloc that was pivotal in bringing Maliki to power in May, launched a boycott Wednesday [November 29] of their governmental duties to protest Maliki's decision to meet with Bush [in Amman.]" [2]

"Sadr [in calling the boycott] is bringing pressure to bear on Maliki to not give in to demands by the United States on security matters. They include the U.S. drive to dismantle Iraq's Shiite militias, of which Sadr runs the largest and most violent, the Mahdi Army." [3]

I also believe that Bush said in a speech or press conference within several months prior to the Amman summit that he did not support federalism as a solution to the current crises in Iraq, though I can't locate the quote. And I believe that Maliki also did not support federalism as a solution, though again, I can't locate the quote.

It may also have been better if the October federalism law vote had been put off until the government could have passed some laws or until it became apparent that they weren't going to pass any laws because of the already existing tensions. And with the 18-month lag time between the law's passage and its implementation (which only allows each province to vote if they want federalism for themselves, it does not impose federalism on everyone), federalism has not had the opportunity to show whether it can help lessen the violence or not.

It was surprising that the vote came up when it did, nonetheless. And I still support federalism as a possible solution, by the way. Though the Iraqi people would have to be persuaded to support federalism beforehand.

sources
[1] The New York Times. Top Shiite Cleric Is Said to Favor a Coalition for Iraq. December 20, 2006.
[2] The Washington Post. Bush, Maliki Meet After First Talks Are Canceled. November 30, 2006.
[3] The Washington Post. Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting. November 30, 2006.

song
Peace in the middle east

posted: thursday, december 21, 2006, 3:45 PM ET
update: saturday, december 23, 2006, 1:12 PM ET

iraq federalism moktada al-sadr moderate coalition ali al-sistani

Lebanon protest rally continues; Shiites have not been treated well

"The center of Beirut was packed Sunday with hundreds of thousands of pro-Hezbollah and allied demonstrators who, in a jubilant mass of protest and carnival, pressed their call for the government to resign.
. . . Over and over, the crowd, the speakers and the posters offered clear explanations. They did not want a government controlled by the so-called March 14 coalition, an amalgam of Sunni, Christian and Druse parties. They did not want a government aligned with Washington. In short, a very large number of Lebanese citizens said they did not want the present leadership.
. . . Hezbollah and its allies have managed for 10 days to control the center of Beirut with a loud, peaceful, organized protest. In many ways, Hezbollah has adopted a strategy that has been cheered by the White House in the past, in places like Ukraine, and even Lebanon, leaning on large, peaceful crowds to force unpopular governments to resign and pave the way for elections.
But this time Washington and its allies have said the protest amounts to a coup d’état, fueling charges that the United States supports democratic practices only when its allies are winning." [1]

"In some ways, Hossam Yassine represents the changing fortunes of Lebanon's Shiites. Yassine is college-educated, back from a job in the Persian Gulf. And every day this week, he has gone to the festival-like protests, in part for the party, in part because Hezbollah wants him to and in part because he believes.
"Hezbollah came and made something for the Shia, that we are here," the 22-year-old said.
. . . In a way, the protests . . . are the equivalent of a new kind of politics in Lebanon, drawing on the street, roiled by populist demands: a protest over government corruption, a denunciation of the United States and Israel, a celebration of the war this summer, tinted with a sense of betrayal at the hands of other Lebanese, and a call for change, however ill-defined it might be.
. . . "From the beginning we weren't treated well. Not just now. From the previous government and the government before that," Yassine said. "The people aren't going here because what Sayyid Hasan said. Sure, they'll do what he says. They love him. But they're going here because they're unhappy. I'll go not one night, two nights or three nights. I'll go for a year or two years."
. . . "They can't let any fight get big," Yassine said. "If a small fight gets big, Lebanon is gone." [2]

sources
[1] The New York Times. As Crowd Demands Change, Lebanese Premier Is Puzzled. December 11, 2006.
[2] The Washington Post. Lebanon's Shiites Grapple With New Feeling of Power. December 10, 2006.

posted: thursday, december 14, 2006, 5:49 PM ET
update: thursday, december 14, 2006, 5:52 PM ET

Sadr's militia targets Sunnis in Baghdad's mixed neighborhoods; some Shiites coming to support targeting

"The strengthening role of Sadr's Mahdi Army presents a disturbing window onto the possible path of this war. While they claim to be only targeting the "deserving" and are acting to protect their coreligionists, more and more the militia is taking a lead role in the sectarian battle unfolding daily on the ground in Baghdad.
"Some of us told them that our Sunni neighbors aren't terrorists, they should be left alone," says a Shiite man, who asked that his name not be used, estimating that five Sunni families have left his street in the past week. "They wouldn't listen - and some Shiites are now saying the solution is to drive the Sunnis out."
Evidence on the ground shows that militia groups have grown stronger since the current government took power early this year. While US advisory groups, such as the Iraq Study Group, are calling for mediation and reconciliation, street-level combatants seem determined to kill as many representatives of the other side as possible.
. . . 'Originally, months ago, the problem in the neighborhood was between two tribes - the Jiburi and the Maksosy,' says Wissam Hamed, who lives in Hurriyah. 'But the problem is the Jiburi are Sunnis and the Maksosy, Shiites. It became about religion pretty quickly.' "

source
The Christian Science Monitor. Iraq battle lines fracture mixed neighborhoods. December 13, 2006.

posting: thursday, december 14, 2006, 5:09 PM ET

Support for Shiites over insurgent reconcilliation is proposed

"The Bush administration is deliberating whether to abandon U.S. reconciliation efforts with Sunni insurgents and instead give priority to Shiites and Kurds, who won elections and now dominate the government, according to U.S. officials.
The proposal, put forward by the State Department as part of a crash White House review of Iraq policy, follows an assessment that the ambitious U.S. outreach to Sunni dissidents has failed. U.S. officials are increasingly concerned that their reconciliation efforts may even have backfired, alienating the Shiite majority and leaving the United States vulnerable to having no allies in Iraq, according to sources familiar with the State Department proposal."

source
The Washington Post. U.S. Considers Ending Outreach to Insurgents. December 1, 2006.

posted: monday, december 4, 2006, 5:42 AM ET