More thoughts on draft oil law

If there is concern over the timely distribution of oil revenue, then the idea mentioned previously of having an outside organization do the distributing seems like a good solution. If some want the revenue distributed by the central government and others want it done by a third party, then let the ones who want it done by the central government have their revenue distributed by the central government and the ones who want it done by a third party have it done by a third party.

Another way of equitably distributing oil revenue and addressing Kurdish concerns over management could be to divide the oil fields between the various groups. The Shiites and Kurds could keep managing the fields in their regions, but the Sunnis and any other groups would get to manage fields in the Shiite and Kurdish regions proportionate to their population.

The potential for manipulation or coercion of Iraqis of all groups by those who control Iraq's oil or oil revenue is great, so care should be taken to pass a law that will ensure that these things will not occur.

posted: wednesday, may 9, 2007, 10:27 AM ET
update: wednesday, may 9, 2007, 10:33 AM ET

tags: iraq draft oil law

Draft oil law submitted to Parliament; Kurd issues

" Iraq's oil minister said the country's draft oil law was submitted to parliament on Wednesday, setting up potentially bitter negotiations over the creation of a framework for managing the country's vast petroleum supplies and distributing oil revenue.
. . . The prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Nechirvan Barzani, told Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that Kurds would not accept the oil law unless a piece of companion legislation, and accompanying annexes detailing revenue distribution, were amended. The changes would allow the Kurds greater concessions in developing oil fields in their territory, according to Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish legislator.
. . . 'The Kurds will not accept the law to be put before the parliament as a first part and a second part -- it needs to be a package,' Othman said. 'The whole problem is because this law was made in a hurry, and the Americans were rushing everyone to do it. The details haven't been discussed, that's why there's no agreement.'
Mehdi Hafedh, a parliament member . . . said he believed that the Kurdish opposition was determined but that eventually a compromise solution would be reached." [1]

"In Iraq, the Kurds have taken issue with a new provision that was quietly packaged with the draft oil law by the Shiite-led Oil Ministry last month. The measure would essentially cede control of the management of nearly all known oil fields and related contracts to a state-run oil company to be established after passage of the law, said a spokesman for the Kurdish regional government.
The spokesman, Khalid Salih, said the provision violated a clause in the Constitution that says the central government must work with regional governments to determine management of known fields that have not been developed. The Kurds . . . have been arguing for maximum regional control over oil contracts.
The provision is part of four so-called annexes that are to be debated with the draft oil law in Parliament. Any objection to one or more of the annexes will stall passage of the law.
. . . A senior Shiite Arab legislator, Sheik Jalaladin al-Saghir, said the concerns raised by the Kurds amounted to a bargaining tactic. 'I think it’s a maneuver,' he said, adding that he believed the Kurds 'will move forward to pass the law since everybody needs it.' " [2]

sources
[1] Partlow, Joshua. (The Washington Post). Draft Oil Measure Sent to Parliament. May 3, 2007.
[2] Wong, Edward & Stolberg, Sheryl Gay. (The New York Times). Iraqi Blocs Opposed to Draft Oil Bill. May 3, 2007.

posted: sunday, may 6, 2007, 11:50 PM ET

tags: iraq draft oil law

Kurds want their oil fields, Sunnis want oil unity

"Politicians from the . . . Kurdish region say measures in the law that would take undeveloped oil fields away from regional governments and have a new national oil company oversee them are unconstitutional.
'Iraq, frankly, does not have the money to invest in oil fields,' said Ashti Hawrami, the Kurdish region's minister of natural resources. He added that the Kurds are disputing four annexes to the draft law that would dilute their ability to exploit oil in their territory. If the draft isn't 'watered down,' Kurdish regional authorities will not support it, he said.
The Kurds also don't trust the central government to distribute oil revenue, saying it has been behind in payments in other instances. Some have suggested that a fund be set up outside Iraq to dole out that money. 'We are asking for our fair share and guarantees that we will receive it,' Hawrami said.
Sunni Arabs and some secular Shiite politicians, however, stand firm that the central government must control oil production and revenue distribution. 'If we want to keep the unity of Iraq, the best way is to keep the oil under the authority of the central government,' said Adnan Pachachi, a secular Sunni with the Iraqi National List party of former prime minister Ayad Allawi. *
While some Kurds favor allowing agreements that would share production with foreign oil companies, many Sunnis and Shiites are against them on nationalistic grounds. They prefer service contracts."

source
Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Baghdad's Fissures and Mistrust Keep Political Goals Out of Reach. April 26, 2007.

footnote
* The main reason for some sort of centralized distribution of oil revenue, whether from the Iraqi national government or somewhere else, should be the fair distribution of these revenues. It should not be used to keep regions or provinces from achieving a more autonomous status, if that's what they want.

posted: saturday, april 28, 2007, 6:07 PM ET
update: sunday, april 29, 2007, 4:42 AM ET

related posting
Should Iraq's oil fields be nationalized? April 11, 2007.

tags: iraq oil

Oil-autonomy increase Turkey-Kurd friction

"The prime minister on Monday warned Iraqi Kurds against interfering in southeastern Turkey, where the Kurdish majority is fighting Turkish security forces, saying 'the price for them will be very high.'
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was responding to Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq, who said Iraqi Kurds would retaliate for any Turkish interference in northern Iraq by stirring up trouble in southeastern Turkey.
. . . Turkey fears that any moves toward greater independence for Kurds in northern Iraq could incite Turkey's own estimated 14 million Kurds to outright rebellion.
Turkey is especially concerned about Barzani's bid to incorporate the northern Iraqi city of Kirkuk into his semiautonomous region, fearing that Iraqi Kurds will use revenues from the city's oil wealth to fund a bid for independence.
. . . [T]he Iraqi government decided to implement a constitutional requirement to determine the status of Kirkuk . . . by the end of the year. The plan is expected to turn Kirkuk and its vast oil reserves over to Kurdish control, a step rejected by many of Iraq's Arabs and its Turkmen." [1]

"Kurdish boldness also comes at a critical time for Turkey, which is facing a growing threat in its own Kurdish region from separatist guerrillas raiding out of northern Iraq and has a presidential election coming up that could aggravate tensions between Islamist and secular Turks.
The fallout already has shaken relations between the United States and Turkey, a longtime ally increasingly frustrated that the overstretched American military in Iraq cannot crack down on Kurdish guerrillas.
That has the United States in a bind _ 'unwilling to open a new front in northern Iraq. Nor can it afford to lose its support from Iraq's Kurdish population,' said Dr. Andrew McGregor, a security analyst and Kurdish expert in Canada.
. . . [T]he opponents within al-Maliki's administration [to the Kirkuk resettlement program] caved in after the Kurds threatened to resign from the Cabinet _ a move that would have spelled the end of the fragile, U.S.-backed governing coalition.
. . . The Kurds used . . . hardball tactics . . . to win concessions granting them a major say in what companies are granted rights to exploit Iraqi oilfields in Kurdish-controlled areas." [2]

sources
[1] Fraser, Suzan. (The Associated Press). Turkey Warns Iraqi Kurds on Interference. April 9, 2007.
[2] Reid, Robert H. (The Associated Press). Ambitions of Iraqi Kurds Worry Turkey. April 17, 2007.

posted: saturday, april 21, 2007, 6:04 AM ET
update: saturday, april 21, 2007, 6:17 AM ET

tags: iraq turkey kurds oil kirkuk

Kirkuk compensation for voluntary exit

"The Iraqi government will soon begin relocating Arabs who were moved to Kirkuk under an edict by Saddam Hussein to force Kurds out of the disputed northern city, officials said Saturday.
The controversial step for the oil-rich city could help determine whether it becomes part of an autonomous Kurdish region, but critics warned that it would stoke sectarian tensions.
Iraq's cabinet on Thursday endorsed a committee's recent recommendation to compensate eligible Arabs who voluntarily leave the city, said Sadiq al-Rikabi, a political adviser to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Those who choose to move will receive about $15,000 and a plot of land in their home town. Officials will soon accept applications to determine eligibility, he said.
. . . Abdul Rahman Munshed al-Asi, leader of the Arab advisory council of Kirkuk, said Saturday that many Arabs fear that the repatriation would be voluntary in name but carried out with force by Kirkuk's Kurdish-led security forces." [1]

"Iraq's constitution sets an end-of-the-year deadline for a referendum on Kirkuk's status. Since Saddam's fall four years ago, thousands of Kurds who once lived in the city have resettled there. It is now believed Kurds are a majority of the population and that a referendum on attaching Kirkuk to the Kurdish autonomous zone would pass easily." [2]

source
[1] Brulliard, Karin. (The Washington Post). Iraq Prepares to Resettle Arabs Sent to Kirkuk by Hussein Edict. April 1, 2007.
[2] Hurst, Steven R. (The Associated Press). Iraq Endorses Arab Relocation for Kirkuk. March 31, 2007.

posted: monday, april 2, 2007, 4:59 AM ET
update: monday, april 2, 2007, 5:35 AM ET

tags: iraq kirkuk

Sunnis skew poll down; federalism good for Sunnis; U.S. criticized, but still wanted

In most of the questions in a poll of Iraqis by ABC News and other news organizations, the nationwide "net" percentages (Shiite-Sunni-Kurd combined) for these questions seem to be skewed downward by the highly negative responses of the Sunnis. For example, in question 1 on how life is going these days, it is said that 39% of the nationwide "net" responded that life was good. But in the sect breakdown portion of the question, 53% of Shiites (who comprise around 60% of Iraqis) and 68% of Kurds (15-20% of Iraqis) said that life was good. A mere 7% of Sunnis (15-20% of Iraqis), on the other hand, said that life was good. So the "net" percentage gets skewed way down to 39%, even though 53% of the Shiites and 68% of the Kurds, said that life was good. And this type of skewed "net" percentage is the percentage that often gets reported.

Wouldn't a more accurate description be that a majority of Iraqis say life is good with the exception being the Sunnis, comprising 15-20% of Iraqis, who overwhelmingly say that life is not good? Not only is it more clear and accurate, but it allows one to focus on potential problem areas and solutions.

Most news accounts of the poll point out this disparity between Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish responses. But I think the point should be made more strongly and pervasively. And as I said before, most of the questions in the poll seem to follow this pattern.

From the poll results, it also appears that autonomous, semi-autonomous or independent regions are gaining favor, at least among Shiites and Kurds. In question 14, 59% of Shiites and 79% of Kurds supported either regional states with a federal government or separate independent states. Only 3% of Sunnis favored either of these choices. The other choice was a "unified Iraq with central government in Baghdad" which 97% of Sunnis favored as opposed to 41% of Shiites and 20% of Kurds.

I'm not sure why the Sunnis still so strongly favor this highly centralized form of government. It seems that Iraq has been trying this type of government since the fall of Saddam and according to the poll, the Sunnis are pretty miserable on most counts. Only 24% of Sunnis have confidence in the police and only 8% have confidence in the national government. Even with their local leaders, only 12% of Sunnis have confidence. This is contrasted with 57% of Shiites and 80% of Kurds who have confidence in their local leaders with similar high percentages for the police and the national government.

And who exactly do the Sunnis want to put in charge of this highly centralized government? Saddam and most of his inner circle are either dead, in prison or in hiding. The Sunnis have no faith in their current local leaders. They don't trust the current majority Shiite national institutions. They certainly don't like the Americans. So who's left?

The Sunnis' current view of their situation seems pretty hopeless. (Perhaps a reflection of their dire situation.) It's possible that the remaining Baathists could take charge, but the Shiites and Kurds seem reluctant to letting Baathists back into most positions of power, let alone letting them run the country again.

On the other hand, with an autonomous, semi-autonomous or independent region, the Sunnis could possibly let the Baathists run things in their Sunni region, if they wanted, as long as they weren't hostile towards the Shiite and Kurdish regions. (They would have to do a better job of chosing their leaders than they are apparently doing now, however. Perhaps they could get some help in this area.) But the possibility of some level of autonomy doesn't seem to appeal to the Sunnis.

But it should since the future looks good for a cooperative, accommodating Sunni population. The oil law seems like it has a good chance of passing, so the Sunnis would have all that oil revenue coming in to build any type of relatively peaceful region they wanted with their own trusted security forces and providers of basic services. It doesn't appear that Iraq is going to break into independent states anytime soon, so there would still be a central, federal government that they could turn to if they needed help. And based on their similar population numbers, the Sunnis would have as much power on the federal level as the Kurds who seem to be satisfied with their current power level. And having federalized regions doesn't mean that the different regions have to be isolated from one another either. They could be as close or as distant as they chose to be, respecting basic rights at all times, of course. Why wouldn't the Sunnis want that for themselves? Why is that such a bad choice?

One thing the poll says that Sunnis and Shiites generally agree on is their negative impression of America's role in Iraq. Though they still apparently would like the U.S. to stay until the security situation improves. The Kurds support the U.S.

source
ABC News. ABC News/USA Today/BBC/ARD poll -Iraq: Where things stand. Ebbing hope in a landscape of loss marks a national survey of Iraq. March 19, 2007.

posted: friday, march 23, 2007, 8:36 PM ET
update: monday, march 26, 2007, 11:38 PM ET

tags: iraq usa today bbc ard abc poll sunni federalism

Reality over perception needed for Iraq success

" 'The administration has been so focused on perception that it has frequently missed the point' of Iraq's complex realities, says Qubad Talabani, Washington representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government. 'If how it looks in Washington becomes more important than how it works out in Baghdad, we all lose.'
That is a caution that applies to war critics who insist on unrealistic benchmarks or deadlines as well as to war supporters who insist on Bush's freedom of action. Both tend to overestimate U.S. ability to manage withdrawal -- or escalation -- on its own terms, relegating Iraqis and others in the region to the status of bit players in an American political drama.
The addition of 17,500 troops into Baghdad that Bush announced Jan. 10 smacked initially of being another gimmick, of resembling an exit-covering escalation, as in an old Western where the gunslinger backs out the saloon door with guns blazing.
But the impression of impending crisis has either prompted or helped Maliki to develop a political initiative of his own to accompany the surge -- and has encouraged U.S. officials to give him more room to maneuver."

By Washington Post columnist Jim Hoagland

source
Hoagland, Jim. (The Washington Post). Desperation Helps Out In Baghdad. March 4, 2007.

posted: tuesday, march 6, 2007, 5:32 PM ET

tags: iraq surge

Turkey and Kurdistan "need each other"

"Despite their history, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan need each other. Kurdistan could become a buffer between Turkey and the chaos to the south, while Turkey could become the protector of a Kurdistan that, though still technically part of Iraq, is effectively cut loose from a Baghdad government that may no longer function. In addition, Turkey has a major economic opportunity in northern Iraq; already, more than 300 Turkish companies and substantial investment are a primary engine of Kurdish growth.
Rapprochement would require major undertakings by both sides. The legendary Kurdish leader who is now president of the Kurdish regional government, Massoud Barzani, needs to rein in the PKK and pledge not to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs. A compromise that took into account legitimate Turkish concerns would be necessary on Kirkuk; while this would be difficult, especially for the Turkish military, I believe it needs to be attempted, with strong American encouragement."

By Washington Post columnist Richard Holbrooke

source
Holbrooke, Richard. (The Washington Post). Opportunity For Turks And Kurds? February 12, 2007.

posted: tuesday, february 13, 2007, 7:24 PM ET

tags: iraq kurdistan turkey

Kurds to be 2 of 3 Iraqi surge brigades

"The Kurdish makeup of two of the three Iraqi army brigades due to be sent to Baghdad under President Bush's new strategic plan is drawing concern from Iraqi and U.S. experts.
. . . A former senior CIA operations officer who is familiar with Iraq said yesterday that sending the units into Baghdad "will not make many friends for the Kurds, depending on where they go." But, said the officer, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, "if you are going in to clear a majority-Sunni area, better to use Kurdish rather than Shia troops. . . . They are obviously better than Iraqi police and more professional."
Last week, Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish lawmaker and a prominent member of the Iraqi Kurdish Coalition, declared his opposition to Kurds going into Baghdad.
"There are fears that a fight like this, pitting Kurds against the Arabs, is bound to add an ethnic touch to the conflict," Othman told the Iraqi newspaper Az-Zaman."
. . . But the deployment holds appeal for the Kurdistan Regional Government, because in return, the Baghdad government would be ready to provide it an additional share of the national budget, a Kurdish official told the New Anatolian, a Kurdish newspaper, last week."

source
The Washington Post. Use of Kurdish Troops In Baghdad Debated. January 16, 2007.

posted: thursday, january 18, 2007, 3:20 AM ET

tags: iraq kurd bush

U.S. attacks Iran in Iraq

"American troops backed by attack helicopters and armored vehicles raided an Iranian diplomatic office in the dead of night early Thursday and detained as many as six of the Iranians working inside.
The raid was the second surprise seizure of Iranians by the American military in Iraq in recent weeks and came a day after President Bush bluntly warned Iran to quit meddling in Iraqi affairs.
. . . The attack was denounced by senior Kurdish officials, who are normally America’s closest allies in Iraq but regarded the action as an affront to their sovereignty in this highly tribal swath of the country. Iran’s Foreign Ministry reacted in Tehran with a harsh denunciation that threatened to escalate tensions with the Bush administration.
. . . The standoff began around 11 a.m. in Einkawa, a pleasant and predominantly Christian suburb of Erbil where many Western officials live and keep offices. Possibly angered by the earlier raid, the Kurdish forces refused to let several American Humvees through a checkpoint." [1]

"The two raids are part of a new U.S. intelligence and military operation launched last month against Iran, U.S. officials said. The United States is trying to identify and detain top officials of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' al-Quds Brigade operating in Iraq. The al-Quds Brigade is active in arming, training and funding militant movements, such as Lebanon's Hezbollah, throughout the Middle East.
. . . While the public focus is on Iraq, the administration is now spending as much time on plans to contain Iran as on a strategy to end Iraq's violence, U.S. officials said.
Last month, U.S. forces seized two senior Iranians -- Brig. Gen. Mohsen Chirazi and Col. Abu Amad Davari -- in the first round of raids.
. . . But the new U.S. policy to confront Iranians in Iraq has already sparked divisions within the administration. The Pentagon wanted to hold the two top al-Quds officials for questioning, but the State Department backed an Iraqi request to deport them. They were sent home a week after their capture." [2]

"In the view of American officials, Iran is engaged in a policy of “managed chaos” in Iraq. Its presumed goal, both policymakers and intelligence officials say, is to raise the cost to the United States for its intervention in Iraq, in hopes of teaching Washington a painful lesson about the perils of engaging in regime change.
Toward this end, American officials charge, Iran has provided components, including explosives and infrared triggering devices, for sophisticated roadside bombs that are designed to penetrate armor. They have also provided training for several thousand Shiite militia fighters, mostly in Iran. Officials say the training is carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security." [3]

" 'They’re training to kill coalition forces,' said one senior American counterterrorism official, speaking on condition of anonymity. 'Their comments about wanting to see a stable Iraq are belied by this type of activity.'
Gen. Michael V. Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, told Congress late last year that while he was originally skeptical of reports of Iranian operations inside Iraq, he now had the 'zeal of a convert' on the matter.
One American official who recently returned from a trip to Baghdad said American commanders in Iraq believed that Iran was using its vast political influence to press Shiite politicians not to forge any long-term agreements with Sunnis." [4]

"Our [America's] allies in the region are concerned about negative Iranian influence in Iraq.
. . . Iran has been cultivating influence in Iraq through all means at its disposal.
Iran’s threat involves both lethal action and the burrowing of Iranian actors into Iraqi institutions." [5]

sources
[1] The New York Times. G.I.’s in Iraq Raid Iranians’ Offices. January 12, 2007.
[2] The Washington Post. U.S. Troops Raid 2 Iranian Targets in Iraq, Detain 5 People. January 12, 2007.
[3] The New York Times. Rice Says Bush Authorized Iranians’ Arrest in Iraq. January 13, 2007.
[4] The New York Times. To Counter Iran’s Role in Iraq, Bush Moves Beyond Diplomacy. January 11, 2007.
[5] National Security Council. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. (Summary Briefing Slides). January 2007.

posted: monday, january 15, 2007, 1:31 AM ET
update: monday, january 15, 2007, 2:12 AM ET

tags: iraq iran

Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? / Thoughts on the morality of American withdrawal

"After the invasion, as a Shiite religious revival blossomed, Iraq's clerics saw themselves as the caretakers of the nation's Islamic identity. They were as concerned about American power and ambitions for Iraq as they were about the importation of a decadent Western culture. Many refused to deal with U.S. officials . . . a tactic that reaps immense rewards today from a population that is increasingly disenchanted with the United States.
'There's no necessity to meet the Americans,' said Beirut-based Hamid al-Khafaf, the chief spokesman for Sistani. He added that Sistani favored peaceful resistance to end the U.S. occupation.
. . . Senior Sadr officials have circulated a petition among national lawmakers demanding a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. They have managed to get 131 signatures, nearly half of the parliament, [independent Kurdish legislator Mahmoud] Othman said.
. . . Hakim, he said [Mahdi Army member Ali Hussein], made a fatal mistake by meeting Bush. In today's Iraq, credibility and power are measured by opposition to the United States." [1]

Is Iraq getting ready to ask America to leave? According to the above article and other sources like a September 2006 poll by the Program on International Policy Attitudes, many Iraqi politicians and apparently a majority of the Iraqi public would like to see America withdraw. (The September poll said that seven in ten Iraqis would like America to leave within a year and six in ten support attacks on coalition forces.) [2]

The petition by the Sadr officials demanding a withdrawal timetable would be a good solid step in this direction. A formal debate and vote by the Iraqi Parliament would be even better. The Parliament could also arrange a national referendum asking the Iraqi people if they wanted America to stay or go. (I had heard of the referendum idea in a reader's letter to the New York Times which I, unfortunately, cannot locate.) Broad-based, peaceful, mass demonstrations could also be helpful. *

If this is what the Iraqis truly want, then the above types of strong unambivalent expressions of discontent could very well lead to a successful outcome, especially since one of America's stated goals has been to give the Iraqis a voice in their newly democratic country.

If the Iraqis asked America to leave, it would also remove much of the America's moral obligation to remain, in my opinion, unless America has somehow manipulated Iraq into taking this position. Though America should still do all it can to help in other ways, considering its initial invasion was the cause of most of the current problems or allowed them to emerge. **

America could conceivably remain in well-defined, seemingly pro-American, areas like Kurdistan or maybe the northern Nineveh area to help protect these areas from attack. (I've read that some of the targeted Iraqi Christians have expressed a desire for a region in the Nineveh area) [3] America's presence in these areas would be purely defensive, however, and only at the request of the people in those areas. Their presence would not be used to stage present or future attacks on the rest of Iraq or the Middle East region, no matter what the cause. ***

footnotes
* Apparently, the Iraqi prime minister has most of the authority over Iraq's security matters and it's uncertain if Prime Minister Maliki would ever request an American withdrawal. On the other hand, Maliki is just one person and was not directly elected by the people of Iraq. So if the people's directly elected representatives in Parliament and/or the people themselves through a referendum were to formally request an American withdrawal, it would be interesting to see what would happen.

** America might also leave, from a moral perspective (if I can use that word again), if its continued presence was a necessary cause of most of the violence or if its presence was preventing a solution to the violence from being implemented. Though its other obligations would remain.
It's been said that America's continued presence has been the cause of the continuing insurgent and terrorist violence. If an American withdrawal would cause the insurgent-terrorist violence to cease, then America might leave for that reason. However, it's not certain if these two forces would, in fact, cease their violent attacks if America left since it's also been said that the insurgents' and terrorists' goal is not only to cause an American withdrawal, but to foment civil war through attacks on the Shiite majority.
One might also ask if America's withdrawal would cause the insurgents and terrorists to cease their violence, but America's withdrawal would also deny innocent Iraqis needed protection from ongoing sectarian violence, then should America morally remain or withdraw? I don't really have the answer to that. I'm just presenting general alternatives to show that it is not simply a matter of America staying is moral and America withdrawing is immoral or vice-versa.
On that note, America might also exit if it was suffering great hardship. It might take something of a moral hit for placing its own hardship above that of the Iraqis (whose hardship was caused by America's initial invasion, in my opinion), but it would be less of a hit than if America left just because it was tired or fed up with the situation.

*** Sadr has since introduced a law in the Iraqi Parliament that would require U.S. troops to withdraw from Iraqi cities by the end of August of this year (see Sadr's redeployment plan, 1/23/07.)

sources
[1] The Washington Post. Shiite Clerics' Rivalry Deepens In Fragile Iraq. December 21, 2006.
[2] Program on International Policy Attitudes. The Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq. September 27, 2006.
[3] The Associated Press. U.S. Iraqi Christians Seek Help. December 15, 2006.

posted: saturday, december 23, 2006, 3:36 AM ET
update: friday, january 26, 2007, 2:14 PM ET

tags: iraq withdrawal shiite morality

Iraq's neighbors untrustworthy, States' rights for Kurdistan, says Barzani

"Any vacancy left in Iraq by the coalition forces before Iraq is ready to stand on its own would be filled by those opposed to democracy. American credibility would dissipate, and any chance for success in Iraq would evaporate. . . . Hopes for real democracy in the Middle East will be history. The regional powers that border us have an interest in keeping us weak and divided.
. . . It is true we fly Kurdish flags. This is yet another similarity we have with Americans, who are proud not only of their country but also of the accomplishments and unique identities of their states. The harbinger of successful democracy in the United States was the willingness of its founders to recognize the particular interests of states and to craft a constitution to safeguard their rights. Baker-Hamilton would deny Iraqis the same rights and thus doom our efforts to construct a system in Iraq that protects all its citizens. It would strip Kurdistan of rights it has negotiated with the central government to protect it from abuses like those it has suffered in the past. We should not forget that over-centralization has been a disaster for the Iraqi people.
. . . Iraq's constitution should be treasured. Iraq's neighbors should not be allowed to violate our sovereignty. Democracy and federalism are the popularly chosen basis of the new Iraq."

Op-ed by Masrour Barzani, "director of the Intelligence and Security Agency of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and a high-ranking member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party."

source
The Washington Post. For Iraqis, A Promise Is in Peril. December 20, 2006.

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Peace in the middle east

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posted: thursday, december 21, 2006, 5:16 PM ET
update: saturday, december 23, 2006, 12:46 AM ET

iraq federalism masrour barzani kurdistan states rights kurds

U.S. trying to form coalition of political parties to oppose Sadr, say Iraqi officials

"After discussions with the Bush administration, several of Iraq’s major political parties are in talks to form a coalition whose aim is to break the powerful influence of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr within the government, senior Iraqi officials say.
The talks are taking place among the two main Kurdish groups, the most influential Sunni Arab party and an Iranian-backed Shiite party that has long sought to lead the government. They have invited Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to join them. But Mr. Maliki, a conservative Shiite who has close ties to Mr. Sadr, has held back for fear that the parties might be seeking to oust him, a Shiite legislator close to Mr. Maliki said.
. . . President Bush met last week in the White House with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Iranian-backed Shiite party, and is to meet on Tuesday with Tariq al-Hashemi, leader of the Sunni Arab party.
. . . If he [Sadr] thinks he is being marginalized within the government, he could ignite another rebellion like the two he led in 2004.
. . . Iraqi officials say that the other main risk is a potential backlash against the parties involved in the talks from other leaders in their own ethnic or sectarian populations." [1]

source
[1] The New York Times. Iraqis Consider Ways to Reduce Power of Cleric. December 12, 2006.

posting: thrusday, december 14, 2006, 4:44 PM ET
update: thrusday, december 14, 2006, 5:18 PM ET