Sadr returns as Hakim & Talabani medical problems / Sunni tribal leader visits Sadr City

"Moqtada al-Sadr, the influential Shiite cleric and militia leader who went into hiding before the launch of a U.S.-Iraqi security offensive in February, is in the southern city of Kufa, senior U.S. military commanders said Thursday.
Sadr, who has long opposed the U.S. occupation and is ratcheting up pressure for a withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, has returned from neighboring Iran, perhaps as recently as this week, they said.
. . . Sadr's movement is wooing Sunni leaders and purging extremists in his Mahdi Army militia in an attempt to strengthen his image as a nationalist who can lead all Iraqis at a time when antiwar sentiments are growing in the United States and Iraq's political landscape is increasingly fractured.
Sadr's apparent reemergence comes days after his main Shiite rival, cleric Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, went to Iran for treatment of lung cancer. Hakim is also trying to strike a nationalist stance, recently changing the name of his party from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq to the Supreme Islamic Council in Iraq." [1]

"The Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, flew to the United States on Sunday for a multiweek visit that his office said was for rest and for help in reducing his weight. His office denied local news media reports that Mr. Talabani was ill and said he was in general good health apart from his weight, The Associated Press reported. His extended departure comes at a time when the United States is pressing Iraqi politicians to make progress on a variety of measures." [2]

"Radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr resurfaced Friday after nearly four months in hiding and demanded U.S. troops leave Iraq, a development likely to complicate U.S. efforts to crack down on violence and broker political compromise in the country.
. . . 'No, no for Satan. No, no for America. No, no for the occupation. No, no for Israel,' the glowering, black-turbaned cleric chanted in a call and response with the crowd.
. . . 'To our Iraqi Sunni brothers, I say that the occupation sows dissension among us and that strength is unity and division is weakness,' he said. 'I'm ready to cooperate with them in all fields.'
. . . Al-Sadr's associates say his strategy rests in part on his belief that Washington will soon start reducing troop strength, leaving behind a hole in Iraq's security and political power structure that he can fill. He also believes al-Maliki's government may soon collapse under its failure to improve security, services and the economy, they say." [3]

"In a hopeful sign on Tuesday, a Sunni tribal leader made a conciliatory public visit to Sadr City, the Shiite enclave in western Baghdad. Sheikh Hamid al-Hayis, leader of an alliance of Sunni tribes that recently began providing men to fight Al Qaeda beside the marines in Anbar Province, met with backers of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr.
Salih al-Ugaily, a Sadr supporter in Parliament, said in an interview that the two sides had agreed on the need for reconciliation and to expedite holding provincial elections, a major demand of Sunni Iraqis, many of whom have said they feel disenfranchised after boycotting previous elections." [4]

sources
[1] Ricks, Thomas E. & Raghavan, Sudarsan. (The Washington Post). Sadr Back in Iraq, U.S. Generals Say. May 25, 2007.
[2] Cloud, David S. (The New York Times). 7 U.S. Soldiers Die in Iraq, 6 in Sweep of Baghdad. May 21, 2007.
[3] The Associated Press. Radical Anti-American Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr Returns to Iraq. May 25, 2007.
[4] Cloud, David S. (The New York Times). Baghdad Truck Bomb Kills 25 and Wounds 100 Others. May 23, 2007.

posted: saturday, may 26, 2007, 10:55 AM ET
update: saturday, june 16, 2007, 3:55 PM ET

tags: iraq sadr

Hakim to be treated for "limited tumor"

"The leader of Iraq's largest Shiite party said Monday that tests in the United States have shown that he suffers from a "limited tumor" and that he will get medical treatment in Iran.
Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, 57, did not say where the tumor was, but officials close to him said he was diagnosed with lung cancer after undergoing tests last week at the University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston."

source
Hendawi, Hamzi. (The Associated Press). Iraqi Shiite Leader Says He Has Tumor. May 21, 2007.

posted: tuesday, may 22, 2007, 2:19 PM ET

tags: iraq abdul aziz al-hakim

Sistani may support proposed moderate coalition / federalism law may have contributed to gridlock, but did not cause boycott

"Iraq’s most venerated Shiite cleric has tentatively approved an American-backed coalition of Shiite, Sunni Arab and Kurdish parties that aims to isolate extremists, particularly the powerful Shiite militia leader Moktada al-Sadr, Iraqi and Western officials say.
. . . But Ayatollah [Ali al-]Sistani has grown increasingly distressed as the Shiite-led government has proved incapable of taming the violence and improving public services, Shiite officials say.
. . . Since winning 130 of the 275 seats in Parliament, the Shiite bloc has never coalesced as Ayatollah Sistani intended it to, and factional rivalries have deepened, particularly over the past several months. A law enabling provinces to form autonomous regions, approved in October, was supported by Mr. Hakim but bitterly opposed by Mr. Sadr and members of the Fadhila Party, a Shiite group close to Mr. Sadr.
The Shiite infighting has paralyzed the government. Since Mr. Sadr’s loyalists began boycotting the government last month, the Parliament has been unable to form a quorum, preventing the passage of laws.
The new coalition is aimed at circumventing that kind of conflict, its leaders say, which is probably why Ayatollah Sistani is willing to lend his support." [1]

Though Hakim's federalism law apparently did increase tension between him and Sadr and may have contributed to government gridlock, the November boycott by Sadr loyalists was due to Prime Minister Maliki's decision to meet with President Bush in Amman, Jordan, not because of the federalism law as may be implied by the way the above quotation was written.

"Iraqi lawmakers and cabinet ministers allied with Shiite cleric and militia leader Moqtada al-Sadr, a bloc that was pivotal in bringing Maliki to power in May, launched a boycott Wednesday [November 29] of their governmental duties to protest Maliki's decision to meet with Bush [in Amman.]" [2]

"Sadr [in calling the boycott] is bringing pressure to bear on Maliki to not give in to demands by the United States on security matters. They include the U.S. drive to dismantle Iraq's Shiite militias, of which Sadr runs the largest and most violent, the Mahdi Army." [3]

I also believe that Bush said in a speech or press conference within several months prior to the Amman summit that he did not support federalism as a solution to the current crises in Iraq, though I can't locate the quote. And I believe that Maliki also did not support federalism as a solution, though again, I can't locate the quote.

It may also have been better if the October federalism law vote had been put off until the government could have passed some laws or until it became apparent that they weren't going to pass any laws because of the already existing tensions. And with the 18-month lag time between the law's passage and its implementation (which only allows each province to vote if they want federalism for themselves, it does not impose federalism on everyone), federalism has not had the opportunity to show whether it can help lessen the violence or not.

It was surprising that the vote came up when it did, nonetheless. And I still support federalism as a possible solution, by the way. Though the Iraqi people would have to be persuaded to support federalism beforehand.

sources
[1] The New York Times. Top Shiite Cleric Is Said to Favor a Coalition for Iraq. December 20, 2006.
[2] The Washington Post. Bush, Maliki Meet After First Talks Are Canceled. November 30, 2006.
[3] The Washington Post. Sadr Casts a Shadow Over Bush-Maliki Meeting. November 30, 2006.

song
Peace in the middle east

posted: thursday, december 21, 2006, 3:45 PM ET
update: saturday, december 23, 2006, 1:12 PM ET

iraq federalism moktada al-sadr moderate coalition ali al-sistani

U.S. trying to form coalition of political parties to oppose Sadr, say Iraqi officials

"After discussions with the Bush administration, several of Iraq’s major political parties are in talks to form a coalition whose aim is to break the powerful influence of the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr within the government, senior Iraqi officials say.
The talks are taking place among the two main Kurdish groups, the most influential Sunni Arab party and an Iranian-backed Shiite party that has long sought to lead the government. They have invited Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki to join them. But Mr. Maliki, a conservative Shiite who has close ties to Mr. Sadr, has held back for fear that the parties might be seeking to oust him, a Shiite legislator close to Mr. Maliki said.
. . . President Bush met last week in the White House with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Iranian-backed Shiite party, and is to meet on Tuesday with Tariq al-Hashemi, leader of the Sunni Arab party.
. . . If he [Sadr] thinks he is being marginalized within the government, he could ignite another rebellion like the two he led in 2004.
. . . Iraqi officials say that the other main risk is a potential backlash against the parties involved in the talks from other leaders in their own ethnic or sectarian populations." [1]

source
[1] The New York Times. Iraqis Consider Ways to Reduce Power of Cleric. December 12, 2006.

posting: thrusday, december 14, 2006, 4:44 PM ET
update: thrusday, december 14, 2006, 5:18 PM ET

Iraq Study Group on federalism / responses / oil law nearing deal

"One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created a largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be established later, perhaps including a 'Shi’astan' comprising nine southern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favored by the Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe they should govern. Second, because Iraq’s energy resources are in the Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible 'Sunni region.' Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the regions. *
. . . Iraq’s leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader told us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percent of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought for independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general commented that the Iraqis 'still do not know what kind of country they want to have.' Yet many of Iraq’s most powerful and well-positioned leaders are not working toward a united Iraq." [1]

"Devolution to Three Regions
The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central control would be too high. Because Iraq’s population is not neatly separated, regional boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions. Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.
While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States should support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on the Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, the United States should manage the situation to ameliorate humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence, and minimize regional instability. The United States should support as much as - possible central control by governmental authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues." [1] *

"We have not recommended a division of Iraq into three autonomous regions, based on ethnic or sectarian identities, but with a weak central government. As a practical matter, such a devolution in our view could not be managed in an orderly -- on an orderly basis. And because Iraq's major cities are peopled by a mixture of warring groups, a disorderly devolution would likely result in a humanitarian disaster or a broad-based civil war." [2]

"This broader context made [Abdul Aziz al-] Hakim's soft words on Iraq's harsh realities the most important suggestions the president heard last week. As offered by the black-turbaned cleric in a series of public appearances in Washington and as supplemented by his aides, his view goes like this:
U.S. forces and the feeble central government do too little to protect Shiites. We can do that job ourselves if your troops get out of the way. That will clear the way for U.S. withdrawals while leading to the informal division of Iraq into three distinct autonomous regions. That is the only acceptable alternative to a strong central government controlled by the Shiites, which may no longer be in reach.
The Baker-Hamilton study group ruled out partition in any form. But the report trails events on the ground, as Bush is likely to have heard in his third high-level meeting on Iraq when he hosted British Prime Minister Tony Blair on Thursday.
In recent weeks British commanders have reported to London that Hakim's Shiite political party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, or SCIRI, has completed a gradual takeover of Iraq's south." [3]

"For all its deftness and honesty, the Iraq Study Group report flees the hardest choices and leaves us without a credible strategy. . . . The group’s gloomy assessment of the situation should have led it to a clear strategy aimed at limiting damage:
First, try for a federal or decentralized Iraq with oil-revenue sharing, as its Constitution provides. Only federalism can prevent partition, though everything’s a long shot now.
Second, provide means, protection and funds for Iraqis wanting to relocate for safety. It’s the only way to stop ethnic cleansing.
Third, make common cause with Iraqi Sunni Baathists, Saudis and others to crush the terrorists in central Iraq. Once our troops start to leave, we can establish this clear common interest, and the Baathists will do a better job than we.
Fourth, ally diplomatically and economically with Iraqi Shiites, who are, after all, Iraqis and Arabs, not Iranians and Persians, and who don’t want to be ruled from Teheran." [4]

footnote
* "Iraqi officials are near agreement on a national oil law that would give the central government the power to distribute current and future oil revenues to the provinces or regions, based on their population, Iraqi and American officials say.
. . . The major remaining stumbling block, officials said, concerns the issuing of contracts for developing future oil fields. The Kurds are insisting that the regions reserve final approval over such contracts, fearing that if that power were given to a Shiite-dominated central government, it could ignore proposed contracts in the Kurdish north while permitting them in the Shiite south, American and Iraqi officials said.
. . . The Kurds recently discovered two new oil fields after signing exploration contracts with a Turkish company and a Norwegian company." [5]

sources
[1] The Iraq Study Group Report. James A. Baker, III, and Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs. December 6, 2006. (U.S. Institute of Peace). pp. 19, 31.
[2] Iraq Study Group Press Conference Transcript. December 6, 2006. (U.S. Institute of Peace). p. 8.
[3] The Washington Post. Meanwhile, Reality In Iraq. December 10, 2006. (Jim Hoagland).
[4] The New York Times. Find New Allies. December 10, 2006. (Leslie H. Gelb).
[5] The New York Times. Iraqis Near Deal on Distribution of Oil Revenues. December 9, 2006.

posted: thursday, december 14, 2006, 9:52 AM ET
update: thursday, december 14, 2006, 10:01 AM ET